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ARTICLE I.

LUTHER AND FREE WILL.

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Most of us who have not made a special study of the subject, regard Luther a necessitarian. We know that he wrote a book against Erasmus and called it *De Servo Arbitrio*. We have often seen quotations from his writings like this: "It is manifest that there can be no such thing as free will." It is positively asserted in our histories of philosophy and many of our theological books that he denied that the will is free. Schaff in his volume of Church History devoted to the German Reformation, says, "Luther infers from God's almighty power that all things happen necessarily, and that there can be no freedom in the creature." Fisher in his recent History of Doctrine says, "Luther reiterated with vehemence his propositions relative to human impotence and the absolute control of God within the sphere of man's voluntary action." With so many authorities of high rank agreeing in the same assertion and often supporting their statements by references and quotations from Luther's writings, it has passed into a generally accepted fact that Luther was a philosophic necessitarian. Bledsoe, who had never read any of Luther's works did not question its correctness and devotes the first section in the first chapter of his Theodicy to "The attempt of Calvin and Luther to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the responsibility of man." Luther taught a form of necessity and in the most positive language denied the freedom of the will in the sense in which he understood it, but

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still it may be questioned whether he was a philosophic necessitarian. There is room for renewed study of the case. In the revived interests in his life and theology, especially in our Church, a new presentation seems opportune.

Luther wrote as a theologian and not as a philosopher. His interest in the question of the freedom of the will was wholly religious. But he was not unacquainted with the philosophic side of it and the rational principles involved. At the University of Erfurt he was educated in philosophy according to the best methods in use at that time. Trutvetter and Arnoldi, his favorite professors, were not great philosophers, but they were able men and widely known. The chief text-books in this department were Aristotle's *Logic*, *Ethics* and *Physics*. Through these teachers and books he got not only his earliest training in philosophic thinking but also his first ideas and his fundamental principles in philosophic thought. He had a philosophic mind, acute and analytic, and at that time a decided philosophic taste. He devoted himself with great earnestness and assiduity to his work in philosophy. While he studied the ancient classics and was intimate with some of those who became eminent Humanists, his strength was laid out upon his *Logic* and *Ethics*. He was known as the foremost man in his class, and the Faculty looked upon him as a philosopher of great promise. Rubianus, some years later, in a personal letter to him, alludes to his reputation among the students: "You were the musician and erudite philosopher of our old circle." Either in the university or in the monastery he studied also William Occam, John Gerson, Peter D'Ailly and Gabriel Biel. He studied Occam very closely and ever afterwards held him in high esteem. He said that Occam was the most highly gifted of the scholastic doctors. He had sympathy with the evangelical and reform views of Gerson. He read D'Ailly and Biel until they were almost committed to memory. We hear most about his spiritual struggles in the monastery, but we have evidence that he found time during this period to make himself familiar with a large part of the scholastic philosophy and theology. His reputation as a student at the university survived his monastic

burial, and his philosophic work in the cell was known to Staupitz. When the University of Wittenberg, after a temporary transfer to Heidelberg, was reopened and the faculty enlarged, he was nominated to the chair of philosophy, and for several months lectured on the Logic and Physics of Aristotle. It was upon his own request that he was made professor of theology.

These opportunities and studies made Luther the heir in philosophy of the ages dating from Aristotle. Humanism had opened up the best books in philosophy, written during the classic period. Scholasticism had brought down much of the Grecian and Roman speculative thought. The ambitious student and professor had read all that was extant. He was influenced even by those great thinkers whose books had not fallen into his hands, for their thought had been taken up into the general current and been carried on after the source had been forgotten. But there are with every man certain writers who are most helpful, and we know who did most to mould the opinion of Luther in regard to free will. After the Bible, Augustine had the greater influence over him. Aristotle first put him to thinking and gave him his first views. He knew the doctrine as held by the early Church Fathers. Through them he became acquainted with the ideas of the Stoics and Gnostics. He had followed Thomas Aquinas and Peter Lombard through their discussions. Through these influences, positive and negative, he had reached his own conclusions. To understand clearly his doctrine it is necessary to take a brief review of the history of the doctrine of the will.

Socrates, the father of ethical speculation, made the moral element in reason the starting point of his philosophy. No man can emphasize as he did moral truth without recognizing the freedom of the will. He assumed it without verification. But in defining the nature of virtue he admitted principles which, logically carried out, undermined his assumption. He identified virtue with knowledge and made sin the result of ignorance, a defect of the intellect and not of the will. If we must do what we know to be right and good, and must know what falls under

our faculties of knowing, our will is not free. Plato agrees with his teacher so far as to say that vice is involuntary, but held that virtue is voluntary, because the natural tendency of the will is towards the good.

Aristotle, in the third book of his *Ethics*, discusses the will. He asserts that it is free. It is the common sense view, and is proved by civil laws. He makes a distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions, and also between voluntary and premeditated action. He confounds desire and will. "There is volition in regard to impossibilities, as of immortality. And there is volition about things which cannot by any possibility be performed by one's self, as that a particular actor should gain the victory." He defines the voluntary as that of which the principle is in the doer himself, having a knowledge of the circumstances of the act. He limits the compulsory to external restraint. "Now the compulsory appears to be that of which the principle is external and to which the person compelled contributes nothing." The will is free whenever the agent meets no external obstacle and is able to deliberate intelligently. Virtue is a habitude, a constant state or disposition of the will which determines its volitions. Here is abundant room for the entrance of necessitarianism, both theological and philosophic. He regarded the soul as the entelechy of the body and the ethical as the end, the fruit of the natural. Necessity rules in the natural and must therefore in the last analysis rule in the moral. With this definition of will Luther could say that the will is not free, because, first, the desires are enslaved and, second, the intellect is so obscured as to true religion that we cannot deliberate intelligently, and yet hold that because there is no external compulsion man's sins are voluntary. Neither Socrates, Plato nor Aristotle, ever considered the question whether the will itself is self-determined or is governed by necessity.

The later Stoics were preëminently moralists, and as such they stoutly affirmed the freedom of man and the freedom of the will. But it was only a relative freedom. They held that all things are ruled by an iron fate. They taught that we ought to love virtue for virtue's sake, and yet they said that a man who

voluntarily and maliciously injures us ought to be forgiven, because he could not avoid it. Fatalism is absolutely contradictory to virtue, and annuls every ought. The Stoics could not have admitted into their system such irreconcilable inconsistencies if they had seen clearly the indissoluble connection between liberty and virtue.

The early Church Fathers were brought into contact with the Stoic teachings, and the idea of fatalism drove them into the extreme which Luther saw and condemned. But while maintaining a false autonomy of the will they brought out distinctly what the philosophers had largely overlooked. Justin Martyr asserted that freedom is necessary to accountability. "If all things are determined by fate, farewell freedom of the will; and if this man is destined to be good and that one to be evil then neither the one nor the other can be justly approved or condemned; so that unless we suppose that man has it in his power to choose the good and refuse the evil no one can be accountable for any action whatever. But to prove that men are good or evil by choice I argue in this manner: We see in the same person a transition to quite contrary actions; but now were he necessitated either to be good or bad he would not be capable of the contrary." (Ap. 1: 10, 80). Clemens of Alexandria said, "Man like every other spiritual being can never lose the power of arbitrary choice" (Strom, 8). Origen held with Clemens that every voluntary action is a compound of free choice and divine aid, and that without liberty there is no accountability. Tertullian asks, "How can man destined to rule over the whole creation be a slave in respect to himself?" But yet in other places he sows the seeds which develop afterwards into the Augustinian philosophy. Luther accepted the general truth that only the voluntary is accountable, but rejected their doctrine of free will. He remanded to philosophy the question of the relation of volition and choice to responsibility.

Augustine introduced an epoch in the history of speculation concerning the will. He himself passed through several stages before he reached his final conclusions. He started as an enthusiastic opponent of Manicheism and emphasized its freedom,

but as his system advanced he approximated more closely towards necessitarianism. Necessity is closely related to unconditional election. He distinguished between three kinds of necessity, 1. Spontaneity as opposed to external force. This belongs to all men and is the sphere of civil liberty. 2. The power of a contrary choice. This belonged to Adam in Eden. 3. Freedom through grace. This is the *non posse peccare*, the union of freedom and necessity. He saw that the acts of the will are conditioned upon the persistent disposition, the habitude, but this, he thought, did not destroy its freedom. The power of a contrary advice is not possible in a perfectly established habitude, but that is not necessary to freedom. God cannot choose sin and is for that very reason alone perfectly free. The sinner in a state of nature can not choose the spiritually good, but nevertheless his will in the sense of spontaneity is free. The power of contrary choice was not a perfection in Adam, but was given him for probationary purposes. If he had chosen persistently the good he would have lost the power to choose evil and would have become thoroughly free. Through that power of contrary choice he could and did in fact originate sin *ex nihilo*. That power is then a defect rather than a virtue. In confirmed drunkenness the man is a slave, but his will is free. But he went on to say that not only no sinner but also no creature has the power of self-determination to the right. One can choose the good only through divine grace. God is made the direct agent in all virtue, and the created will is merely the instrument. Augustine is not clear in his analysis of the will. He makes the feelings, especially the desires, a part of it. He says for example, "I was bound by my own iron will. For of a perverse will came lust, and lust yielded to became habit, and habit not resisted became necessity." As his doctrine of predestination was developed his opinions in regard to the freedom of the will become more confused and obscure. He thinks of grace as a power outside of the mind determining the acts of the will. Irresistible grace is incompatible with a free will, even though the first effect of that grace be to make one willing. It is to the mind an external force, a compulsion

Inconsistently he asserts that we must have free will that punishment may be just. He saw the inconsistency, and warns us that in defending grace, free will must not be given up, and in defending free will, grace must not be given up. Bain says, "It is difficult to give any meaning to free will in such passages." Mozely thinks that with Augustine free will means only voluntary action and that he allowed only a determination by either original sin or divine grace. In evil he asserts a self-determination. "The cause of evil is in the will which turns aside from the higher to the lower. The evil will works evil, but is itself not moved by any positive cause." The sinner is justly punished. But there is no merit in virtue. "The free will follows grace as its servant. It is certain that we act when we act, but the fact that we act is due to God who communicates to us the necessary powers. God is our might." This he maintained for the reason that God upholds the will in its existence and the continuance of its power depends upon him. In grace it became doubly true because God must supply the spiritual principle or power by which it can choose the good. Luther, for reasons that will hereafter appear, rejected along with Augustine the name free will, and to a large extent agreed with him in regard to the nature and powers of the will, in spiritual things.

Not much was added by the schoolmen. Thomas Aquinas taught that voluntary action is action springing from internal principles. The will is not subject to the necessity of compulsion but to that necessity which does not destroy freedom, the necessity of striving after ends. Man judges of ends by reason, does so freely and after comparison. By controlling our ideas we control our decisions. The choice lies in our power, but still we have need of divine grace in order to be truly good even in the sphere of natural virtue. The moral faculty was not destroyed by the fall but remains as a natural power of practical principles. The will is related to free will as *intellectus* is to *ratio*. Will is the desire for anything for its own sake; the free will is the desire of anything as a means to an end. There are two kinds of necessity: 1. Natural, absolute or intrinsic; 2. Extrinsic, which is compulsion and excludes will. Peter Lom-

bard distinguished two kinds of liberty: 1. Freedom from necessity; 2. Freedom from sin. Many of the Schoolmen analyzed will into velleity, intention and fruition.

Such in brief outline was the inheritance of Luther. Many of the questions now fervently discussed had never been raised, and many of the distinctions with which we are familiar had not been made. The principle of accountability had been established, but its nature and bounds had not been defined. The influence of motives and their character as causes, the nature of a sufficient reason in relation to volition, the difference between the voluntary and the freely voluntary, the real distinction between liberty and necessity, and the essential elements of the will had not been fully considered. They do not seem to have occurred to Luther, and having failed to make these distinctions he fell into seeming inconsistencies and exposed himself to the charge of philosophic necessitarianism. It is unjust to pick out single statements and construe them strictly. With our clearer definitions we are in danger of putting into his language a meaning he did not intend.

Most of us take a short cut to the conclusion that the will is free. We believe that we are conscious of its freedom. All men believe that they are free, and this universal and spontaneous judgment can not be wrong. If the will is not free there can be no just punishment for sin or crime. Ethics and civil government postulate liberty. Without it all religion is ridiculous and all attempts at philosophizing preposterous. If we are not free we are not persons, but mere machines. The doctrine of necessity seems absurd, and we dismiss the subject with a feeling of pity, if not of contempt, for the poor befogged necessitarian philosophers. We feel that it is a stain upon the memories of Luther and Calvin and Edwards that they were entrapped. But when we stop long enough to look at the chain of argument by which necessitarianism is maintained we find one of iron. Dr. N. K. Davis has put it in this form: Every change has a cause. A volition is a change, therefore a volition has a cause. Everything caused is necessitated. A volition is caused, therefore a volition is necessitated. Many eminent phi-

losophers have struggled with the problem and pronounced it insoluble. Prof. William James started on the objective side and found himself confronted with necessity. He said that psychology would not prove that the will is free, and turned the question over to philosophy. Kant in his speculative philosophy found that contradictory propositions were equally tenable, and fell back on the postulate of practical philosophy. Sir William Hamilton thought it could be proved only by the law of excluded middle or by the philosophy of the conditioned. We can neither think a volition as caused nor yet as uncaused, but as they are contradictory the one or the other must be true. Dr. McCosh in his *Divine Government* stands up for liberty, but Bledsoe has pointed out that he slipped back into the ranks of the necessitarians. It is not strange then that Luther without the philosophic apparatus of to-day and without the acute distinctions brought out by Leibnitz, Hobbes, Collins, Clarke and many others, used language and held some principles in common with the advocates of necessity. How far he is justly charged with necessitarianism must be learned from a careful study of his own statements.

Köstlin* has given the growth of Luther's doctrine of the will. His deep consciousness of sin and his personal struggles had early in his religious life fixed his opinion in regard to original sin. He knew that man is thoroughly depraved and utterly helpless without divine grace. Out of this profound conviction grew his idea of the complete impotence of the will in spiritual things. It was primarily and chiefly in relation to his conception of Divine grace that he took any interest in the subject of the will. We find him saying before the Indulgence Controversy that "The will of man is not free without grace but in slavery and that not unwillingly; appetite is not free but captive." Free will is opposed here to self will. Adam and Satan by a choice of their own wills transformed the free wills which they had received from God into self wills. Free will is

*Luther's Theology, Vol. I., pp. 140-150, 284, 326, 428. (Hay's translation).

obtained by gazing upon God's will. A remnant of the original will remained, a synteresis, and upon this grace can lay hold, but without grace it is unable to turn to God. It is an inclination to knowledge and love for the invisible. It is a power of punishment in hell, for the lost do not desire hell but salvation. He denies free will in respect to merit and demerit but not in regard to inferior things. In 1518 he reaffirms that the will has only a capacity for evil so far as it regards religion. He asserts that Adam's fault was in his will. He had the ability to do if he willed, but he had not the will to do what he was able. At Leipsic he maintained that the will is merely passive in every act of its own, for it is borne along by grace like a saw in the hands of a carpenter. The Bull of Excommunication specified among other errors that Luther had called free will an empty name. In reply he maintains that the will is not free, because it is enslaved by sin, and says that the word ought to be abandoned. In a Latin treatise he carried the question up to metaphysical grounds. He denies that the will is free because of man's supreme dependence upon God. He can not of himself even choose evil. He can not control his own thought. He thinks himself free only because of the limitation of his view. In the higher conception of man's relation to God he finds himself a slave. But having made the assertion he falls back upon the practical, religious side, indicating by that fact that he regarded the philosophic view as incidental and secondary. We have in this outline all the essential features of Luther's doctrine. He amplified and supported, but never added an important principle.

Luther has spoken of the will and free will a great many times. Sometimes he makes a passing remark and at others he discusses some one aspect a little more at length. We have his fully developed doctrine stated and defended in his *De Servo Arbitrio*. It was a formal treatment of the subject in reply to the greatest scholar of the age. In such a treatise we look for guarded and precise statements sustained by the clearest and strongest arguments at one's command. It was written in 1525. Its author held it in high esteem. In 1537 he said that if like

Saturn he could devour his children he would spare this book and his Small Catechism. Rightly, therefore, the world has regarded it as the first and highest source of his opinion upon this subject.

But when we take it up we are disappointed by not finding any precise definitions of will, of free will, of necessity, of man's innate power, or of God's control over human actions. He has scattered statements through its pages which we must gather together and from them draw our inferences as to his ideas of them. We do not read far, however, before we understand why he did not give formal definition. They were not necessary to his purpose. He was intent only on proving that man can do nothing for his salvation without divine grace. He states it clearly and repeatedly: "Whether our will be active in those things which pertain to everlasting salvation, or be merely passive, grace meanwhile being the agent; whether we do by mere necessity (which we must rather call suffer) whatever we do of good or evil." "To know whether the will does anything or nothing in the matter of salvation. This is the very hinge of our discussion."* The proposition laid down by Erasmus and which he discusses is: "Moreover by free will here I mean that power of the human will, whereby a man is able to apply himself to those things which lead to eternal salvation or to turn himself away from them."† It is this that he denies and refutes. "We are not arguing," he says at this conclusion, "about nature, but about grace; we are not inquiring what sort of persons we are upon earth, but what in heaven and before God. But this is our question whether man has free will towards God so that God wills and does what man wills, or whether God rather has free will over man so that man wills and does what God wills."‡ He speaks of God's power only to show what free will is: "It is impossible for you to understand what free will is until you know what the human will has power to do and what God does; whether he foreknows or not."§ It is, then, avowedly a treatise on man's inability in religion rather than on the nature

*Part 1, Sec. 8, 9.

†Part 3, Sec. 1.

‡Part 5, Sec. 28.

§Part 1, Sec. 9.

of the will. We do him great wrong when we interpret, as writers generally do, this theological book by philosophic rather than by religious conceptions.

Luther has used the word will in a very comprehensive sense. We are accustomed to a careful distinction between will and the other mental faculties. It is more distinct from the intellect, the feelings, including sensations and emotions and affection, and the desires than the imagination is from the memory or the faculty of thought. The essential elements of the will are choice, intention and volition. It is conditioned upon desires, but the desires are not a part of the will, for there are always conflicting desires, but there can be one choice in any given case. It is conditioned on cognition, for until we know something to be desired we cannot desire it and until we know something to be done we cannot choose to do it. But cognition and desire are not elements of the will, no more than memory is a part of the imagination which is conditioned upon it. Memory must furnish the material for imagination, and without it imagination is impossible, but the imagination is a distinct faculty. Without the distinction between the will as a special faculty and the other special faculties confusion of thought and statement is inevitable. Edwards included the desires under the will in his celebrated definition: "So that whatever names we call the act of the will by: choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining or being averse, a being pleased or displeased with; all may be reduced to this of choosing." In this wrong definition lay a large part of his error. But Luther includes not only the desires but also the intellect. Sometimes he means by it not only all the active powers but even the entire being. When he says that the will is not free we are sometimes at a loss to know whether he means the will as we understand it or something else. He gives this definition: "By a power of the human will, then, is meant, as I suppose, an ability or faculty disposedness or suitedness to will, to refuse, to choose, to despise, to approve, to reject and to perform whatever other actions

there are of the human will."* Disposedness means the state of mind or character which lies back behind the will. To despise and to approve refer to things as well as actions, and these actions may be our own or those of others; while choice as a part of the will means only actions possible for one's self. He adduces as evidence that the will is enslaved the fact that the heathen Cicero and the Greeks with a genius, erudition and diligence surpassing Christians, never obtained grace. "What have the most excellent wits amongst the heathen thought of a future life and of the resurrection? Was it not true that the more they excelled in genius, the more ridiculous did the resurrection and eternal life appear to them? Festus called Paul a madman for preaching these things? What does Pliny talk about these things in his seventh book? What does Lucian so great a wit teach?"† He says: "The Sophists, or at least Peter Lombard, their father, deliver what is far more tolerable to us when they affirm that free will is the faculty of first discerning good from evil and then choosing good from or evil according as grace be present or wanting."‡ "What does this mean but that the free will or the human heart is so trodden under foot of Satan that except it be miraculously raised up by the Spirit of God it can not of itself either see or have those things which strike upon the very eyes and ears, so manifestly as to be palpable to the hand; such is the misery and blindness of the human race. What can be more marvellous? The light, saith he, shineth in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not."§ That he includes the appetites under will is evident from the passage quoted before from Köstlin: "The will is not free; appetite is not free but captive." That he includes also other faculties will hereafter appear.

He is not more precise in his use of the expression free will. What he meant by it may be seen in some measure in the fact that he attributes it in its perfection to God. "Free will is a

*Part 3, Sec. 2.

†Part 2, Sec. 8; Part 3, Sec. 3. All the translations from *De Servo Arbitrio* are from the Latin by E. T. Vaughan, published in London 1823.

‡Part 3, Sec. 5.

§Part 2, Sec. 18.

title which belongs altogether to God, and cannot be found in any other being save the Divine Majesty only. For that Divine Majesty can and does effect all that he wills in heaven and on earth. But if that title be ascribed to men you might just as well ascribe divinity itself to them.* "Free will is a term peculiar to God and expresses a divine perfection."† God has free will—

1. Because he is self-existent. This is only indirectly stated but is clearly implied in some of his denials of free will to men. "With how much less propriety can we call a man or an angel free when they live in the most absolute subjection to God (to say nothing of sin and death) so as not to subsist for a moment in their own strength?"‡ 2. Because there is no law or force outside of himself to control him. "He is God whose will has no cause or reason which can be prescribed to it for a rule and measure; seeing it has no equal or superior but is itself the rule of all things. If it had any rule or measure, or cause or reason it could no longer be the will of God. For what he wills is not right because he ought to have willed so; on the contrary because he wills so therefore what is done must be right. Cause and reason are prescribed to the creature's will but not to the Creator's, unless you would set up another Creator over his head."§ Luther does not regard God as a tyrant and his will as caprice, but as the embodiment of reason and justice. He does not speak of the special faculty of volition but of the whole mind and character of God. He does not make the will independent of reason and holiness, but independent of any ulterior force or higher being. This is evident from the last sentence in which he denies that there is any Creator who can lay down a law by which God's actions must be judged. 3. Because God is perfectly holy. The will is free only so far as it obeys reason and conforms to the behests of holiness. God's will does this perfectly and therefore it is perfectly free. 4. Because he has the power of self-determination. He is subject to no constraint from any external force but follows only and always the impulses of his own nature. 5. He is independent of all restraint.

*Part 1, Sec. 5.

†Part 3, Sec. 4.

‡Part 3, Sec. 1.

§Part 4, Sec. 15.

He is absolutely free to execute his purposes. Nothing can compel him and nothing hinders him. Luther lays so much emphasis upon God's omnipotence that he often seems to make it the great constituent of his will. Köstlin says, "The will of God for Luther is the *natural power* of God, his very nature itself." So far as our wills are wanting in any one of these characteristics Luther could deny that they were free and yet not hold a single principle in common with the necessitarians. But he did not hesitate to say that God's absolutely free will was under necessity. God is necessarily self-existent and omnipotent. By the holiness of his nature it is impossible for him to choose the evil. He is omniscient and must necessarily foreknow. "The Christian faith is altogether extinguished, the promises of God fall absolutely to the ground if we be taught and believe that we have no need to know that the foreknowledge of God is *necessary* and that all acts and events are *necessary*."* God's foreknowledge makes necessary, and as he foreknows his own actions, his own acts are done under necessity. Necessity in Luther's view is not opposed to the most perfect liberty.

In opposition to his conception of the true meaning of free will he gives us the popular idea of it: "Free will is too magnificent, extensive and copious a term by which the common people suppose (as both the force and nature of the word require) that a power is meant which can turn itself freely to either side and to such extent as not to yield or be subjected to any one."† The liberty of indifference, which he here positively rejects, is not held now by any reputable philosopher. Free will is necessarily a power of a rational being, and to act without reason and character is not will but mere blind impulse.

Luther objects to the word necessity. "I could have wished indeed that another and better word had been introduced into our disputation than this usual one, Necessity, which is not rightly applied to the will of either God or man. It has too harsh and incongruous a meaning for this occasion, suggesting

*Part I, Sec. 13.

†Part I, Sec. 25.

to the mind the notion of something like compulsion and what is at least the opposite of willingness, for both God's will and man's will does what it does, whether good or bad, without compulsion, by dint of mere good pleasure and desire as with perfect freedom. Let the understanding of the reader supply, then, what the word necessity does express; apprehending by it what you might choose to call the immutability of God's will and the impotency of our will, what some have called a necessity of immutability."* He positively and repeatedly denies the desire to reject the fact of accountability when he affirms that the will is governed by necessity. In reply to the objection that necessity has neither merit or demerit he says, "If we speak of a necessity of compulsion this is true."† He ridicules the distinction made by the Schoolmen between the necessity of the consequent and the necessity of the consequence, and proves that both alike fall under the necessity of immutability, but denies that either is by compulsion. Bain, like Luther, objects to the words freedom and necessity as applied to the will. He points out the difference between their common meaning and that in philosophy. He says, "The perplexity of the question of free will is mainly due to the inaptness of the terms to express the facts. The capital objection to the word free will is the unsuitability, irrelevance and impropriety of the metaphor of freedom in the sequence of motive and acts of volition. We do not bring mental sequence under pure material laws by calling them sequence and maintaining them to be uniform in their working."‡ Even Edwards noted the difference between the popular and philosophic sense. "It follows that when the terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable, are used, they are not used in their popular signification but quite beside that in common speech."§ Bain remarks that Edwards did not draw the obvious inference that the word necessity should be discarded from the discussion. Having excluded the idea of compulsion Luther, as Edwards did afterwards, used freely the word neces-

*Part 1, Sec. 11.

†Part 3, Sec. 38.

‡Psychology, p. 318.

§Works, Vol. 2, p. 10.

sity as best expressing his idea. What, then, did he mean by it? What is the necessity of immutability?

There is no will without choice, and there can be no choice where there is compulsion. Luther saw this very clearly and said, "This will of Satan we do willingly and cordially, agreeably to the nature of our own will which if we be compelled would not be a will; for compulsion is, if I may so speak, mere non-will."* But there is ambiguity about the word compulsion. It may mean an objective force compelling our external actions as in the case of a slave, or it may mean a force exerted directly upon the will. Liberty of the will was made by Locke, Edwards and most necessitarians to consist simply in the absence of restraint in carrying out our purposes. But the question is not about a force resisting the will but one determining its volitions. Luther's language, notwithstanding his protest against compulsion, often seems to mean that the will is irresistably controlled by the power of God exerted immediately and directly upon it. The question forces itself upon us, does Luther contradict himself and after all his efforts fall back among the most rigid necessitarians?

Luther does not admit any meaning of necessity that interferes with the natural ability of the will. Once his words taken by themselves might imply a doubt as to the very existence of such a faculty in us: "You might, perhaps, with propriety attribute will to man, but to attribute free will in divine things is too much."† But he never thought of questioning it. He said that no influence exerted upon men when they sinned did violence to the will, and that they sinned willingly. "But now seeing that he is driven and hurried along to an act of willing—no violence, it is true, being done to his will, because he is not forced against his will, but a natural operation of God hurrying him away to a natural acting of his will, such a one as it is, and that is a bad one—it follows that he can never run foul of the word."‡ This will is the basis for the ope-

*Part 1, Sec. 24.

†Part 3, Sec. 1.

‡Part 4, Sec. 17.

ration of divine grace. Without a will acting naturally we could not be brought under the saving power of the Spirit. "For we also confess this power (that is, this fitness) in the will or, as the Sophists speak, this disposable quality and passive adaptedness; which everybody knows is not implanted in trees and in the beasts; for God has not created heaven for geese and ganders as it is said."* Will acting naturally is governed by motives, and if God or Satan rules it without violence they must do it through motives. The will can be enslaved only by changing the habitude, the disposition so that wrong motives will always be the strongest or by controlling the external influence so that it may be always led to wrong decisions. One might hold either or both views, as Luther did, without being a necessitarian in the philosophic sense.

Luther in common with libertarians held that we have since the fall of Adam a certain degree of freedom of the will. Protesting against the word as misleading, he said, "If then we be not willing to give up the term altogether, which would be the safest expedient and most consistent with piety, still let us teach men to keep good faith in using it only within certain limits by which free will shall be conceded to man and only with respect to such substances as are inferior to himself, and not to those which are superior. In other words let him know that he has faculties and possessions and a right of using them—of doing and forbidding to do—according to his own free will, although this very right be also controlled by God's free will whenever he sees fit to interfere."† In another place he said, "We know that free will performs certain natural acts; that she eats and drinks and begets children and rules the house." "He had no need of Diatribe's instructions, surely, to teach him that man already had eyes, nose, ears, mouth, mind, will, reason and all other properties of a man."‡ "For this is the very point I am arguing and trying to get proved, that free will does many things which are but nothing in the sight of God."§ The Augsburg Confession teaches the same doctrine asserting, as Luther

*Part 1, Sec. 25

†Part 1, Sec. 25.

‡Part 4, Sec. 25.

§Part 4, Sec. 51.

uniformly had done, that man has a free will, in the common acceptation of the term, in civil matters. Luther always held that Adam and Satan had free wills before they fell. While he was denying that man since the fall had the full power of contrary choice in religion, as held by some of the fathers, he denied also that the will is absolutely determined by external powers as taught by some of the ancients.*

In Luther's broad use of the terms free will and slavery of the will he could affirm that the will was free and enslaved in the very same act without contradiction. It could be so in different relations. In this way most of the inconsistencies and contradictions in his statements are to be explained. We may criticise his language but we ought to be just to his thought.

We have already seen that he denies freedom to the will because it is dependent upon God for its existence. It cannot "subsist" by its own power. Allowing his use of the word will we must agree with him that in no act whatever is it free.

We have seen also that he denies that the will is free because it cannot make its own laws. In this sense no created will can be free. But this is a wrong use of the word freedom. A nation which has the best laws and the most loyal subjects is most free. A citizen who most cheerfully and implicitly obeys the wise and just laws of society is most a freeman. The savage in his wild independence is most a slave. Through obedience to law we ascend to true liberty. It is not necessary that the laws should be enacted with our consent. It is true no matter who made them. The Jews with God as lawgiver and king had the opportunity of being the freest people in the history of the world. But admitting Luther's definition we cannot deny his conclusion. "Free will in the judgment of all men is properly applied to that which can do and which does whatsoever it pleases without being confined by any law or by any command. You would not call a slave free who acts under the command of a master. With how much less propriety do we call a man or angel free."

We have seen further that Luther includes under will the

*Leipsic, Vol. 1, p. 32 b.

faculty of knowing spiritual things, and in that respect denies that it is free. "Erasmus making no mention of the power of discerning confines his praises to the power of choosing alone and so deifies a sort of crippled and half begotten free will."* Granting that definition we must grant also that the will is not free. We would in holding to free will deny the need of a revelation. We would have to endorse all the crudities and absurdities of the heathen religions. We would have to shut our eyes to the failures of philosophy in all ages in discovering spiritual truth. Luther was wrong only in failing to distinguish the cognitive powers from the special faculty of the will.

Luther made the habitude, disposition, character a part of the will. He said that God's will is free, not because it is free from determination, but because it is determined by his one holy character. Its freedom consists in its holiness. Man's will is enslaved because it is determined by his own sinful nature. "The free will, without the grace of God is absolutely not free but is immutably the captive and slave of sin; since it cannot of itself turn to good."† The will has a power of self-determination in respect to motives. It can turn its attention from one motive to another and thus determine which motive shall prevail. But in any given moment it cannot get back behind itself to the habitude which gives power to the motive. In choosing between actions according to existing motives the will is free. But it may from another point of view be the slave of an inveterate passion, prejudice or permanent type of character. The habitual drunkard each time he takes up the glass acts according to his free will. He is self-determined but yet he is a slave because his will has been determined by a depraved appetite. He is accountable because his will is free, but he is a slave at the same time because his will is governed not by reason and interest but by passion. In the light of these facts we can understand what Luther meant when he denied that the will is free because of a sinful nature. He did not deny freedom in

*Part 1, Sec. 25.

†Part 3, Sec. 4.

choice or the power of self-determination but the power of self-determination towards God and holiness. In this he was right.

Paul said, "we are not sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves but our sufficiency is of God." "The carnal mind is at enmity against God and is not subject to the law of God neither indeed can be." We must be born again precisely because our first birth put us in direct opposition to God. Reconcile it as we may with responsibility for our lives, our wills are determined by character, and if the character is debased the will is enslaved. Libertarians who stop short of the solution of this knot in the problem, as most of them do, fail to fully establish their case. It is enough for our present purpose of understanding Luther to observe that if God can have an absolutely free will and yet his will be absolutely determined by his own holy nature, a sinner may have a free will and yet be determined by his own sinful nature. God is free but the sinner is a slave. The only contention we can have with Luther is as to the use of words; we must agree with him in the matter of thought. Without this determination there would be no uniformity in life. There would be no such thing as character. There could be neither saint nor sinner. We could forecast no man's actions. We could trust no one. Society would be impossible. There can be no question as to the fact that free will is determined by the state of mind whether habitual or transitory which lies behind it. Concede to Luther that this state is innate and so deep and thorough that a man can do nothing towards changing it and he would not stickle for the statement that free will is an empty name.

Luther did not enunciate the principle that liberty is a conscious conformity to reason, but it was determinative in his reasonings about the freedom of the will. In a general way we say that anything is free which is permitted to act according to the impulses of its own nature. So Spinoza defined freedom. It is self-determination. God is free because he acts according to his own nature. We speak of the freedom of the water, of the winds, and of the flames. We call the bird free while it feeds and flies and sings according to its own will. Our will is

not an entity, set up over the mind, but is an essential part of it. It must conform to law. It was made to obey reason. It is free, therefore, only when it follows an enlightened reason. It must rule the appetites according to reason, and when it allows itself to be swayed and dragged by them into unreasonable choices it is enslaved. Sin is contrary to our nature; it is against reason. When a man sins he violates his rational nature, and when his whole nature is steeped in sin his will is a slave. It is thus that all men think and speak of the vicious man and they do not dream that they are calling in question the freedom of the will in its own peculiar sphere. Luther when he said that there is no free will because all men are born depraved, meant nothing more than the Church has always understood the Saviour to mean when he said, "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave of sin."

We can understand now Luther's doctrine concerning the will of Adam in Eden. He held with Augustine that Adam had a free will but it was not perfect! He had a free will, not because he had the power of a contrary choice, but because he willed according to law and reason. Conformity to law and reason was its habitude. It was not perfect because that habitude was not thoroughly established. It was possible for him to choose, as he did, to obey his appetites against God's holy will. The power of the contrary choice between righteousness and sin was an incompieteness, a defect in his will. We understand, too, what Luther means when he said that free will comes only through a new birth.† It is free because it is not only possible to choose to love God and holiness but chiefly because the heart does actually turn to God. The new birth is not wrought by the omnipotence of God. Might cannot make right. It can not change character. We stand in the presence of the mystery of regeneration. But by some influence, not physical but spiritual, God brings about a change in the habitude of the will, and its choices are changed. We begin to choose to do what it was impossible to choose before. The will is set Godward, and for that reason Luther says it is free. Here again Luther is in full

*Liepsic, Vol. I, p. 349 a.

†Liepsic, Vol. 17, p. 374 b.

accord with the practical thought and feelings of the whole Church from the very beginning.

If there is any evidence to convict Luther of necessitarianism it must be found in his doctrine of foreknowledge and of the all controlling presence of God's omnipotence. His language often conveys the idea of the most rigid necessity, and he seems sometimes to be a necessitarian of the most extreme type. But it is true that on any fair interpretation of his words in connection with his doctrine of the will the charge can be rightly fixed upon him? Does he make God, as he appears in some places to do, the author of sin?

Before entering upon the investigation we must recall the fact he was proving that man without divine grace can do nothing in the matter of his salvation. It was to show us our helplessness and make humble submission to the divine influence that he denied that the will is free. It was to fortify his position and silence forever the opposition that he introduced these subjects. They are incidental to his main contention, means to his chief end. It was not so much to exalt God as to make us realize our nothingness that he treats them. His purpose was practical, and not metaphysical. His aim will help us to understand his meaning as we follow him into the mazes of foreknowledge and sovereignty. He states plainly his reason for discussing them. "For it is impossible that you should know what free will is until you know what the human will has power to do and what God does, whether he foreknows or not."* And, then, we must know what free will is to know how we can be saved.

Luther regards God's knowledge as a most direct proof of necessity and an undeniable evidence of the slavery of the will. "It is most necessary and most salutary for a Christian to know this also; that God foreknows nothing contingently but foresees and purposes and accomplishes everything by an unchangeable, eternal and infallible will. But by this thunderbolt free will is struck to the earth and ground to powder."† "The foreknowledge of God is necessary and all acts and events are

*Part I, Sec. 9.

†Part I, Sec. 20.

necessary."* "If Paul had not resolved this question, or had not unequivocally determined that a necessity is imposed upon us by the divine prescience, what need was there to introduce persons as murmuring and alleging that it is impossible to resist his will? For who would murmur or be indignant if he did not think that this necessity had been determined?"† Prescience is inseparably linked with certainty. What is infallibly foreknown is absolutely certain, and what is absolutely certain is in some sense necessary. Luther saw this and concluded that the will is not free. "So that God's foreknowledge and omnipotence are diametrically opposed to free will. For either God will be mistaken in his foreknowledge and disappointed in his efforts, which is impossible, or we shall act according to his foreknowledge and agency. This omnipotence and prescience, I say, absolutely abolishes the dogma of free will."‡ "For all find this sentiment written in their hearts so as to approve and recognize it even against their will when they hear it discussed: first, that God is omnipotent, not only in what he is able to do but also in what he does, else he would be a ridiculous God; secondly, that he knows and foreknows all things and can neither be mistaken nor misled. These two things being conceded through the testimony of their heart and senses, by and by they are compelled to admit by an enevitable consequence that we are not made by our own wills but by necessity; and hence, that we do not anything in sight of free will but just as God hath foreknown and doth direct us by a counsel and energy which is at once infallible and immutable. So then we find it written in our hearts that there is no such thing as free will."§ "If you allow the necessity of a consequence free will is vanquished and laid prostrate and is nothing aided by the consequents being either necessary or contingent. What is it to me that free will does what she does willingly and not by compulsion? It is enough for me that you concede, it must necessarily be that Judas do willingly what he does and that the event cannot be otherwise if God has so foreknown it. If God foreknows that Judas will

*Part 1, Sec. 3.

†Part 4, Sec. 19.

‡Part 4, Sec. 20.

§Part 4, Sec. 21.

betray the Lord or will change his mind to betray him, whether of the twain he shall have foreknown, it shall necessarily come to pass; else God will be mistaken in his foreknowledge and predictions, which is impossible. The necessity of the consequence effects this; if God foreknows an event that very event necessarily happens. In other words free will is nothing."*

This problem of foreknowledge without predestination, and certainly without necessity, has seemed dark to both the theologian and the philosopher. It has been pronounced by many, as by Dr. Schaff, insoluble and has led many, as Augustine, Calvin and Edwards, into the ranks of the necessitarians. Hazard finds a solution in the denial of God's foreknowledge. He says that God voluntarily foregoes a foreknowledge not only of the future actions of his creatures but also of his own.† In this extreme and untenable position he has been followed by others and recently by Dr. Darling. The Church has always held that God foreknows all things. Edwards regards it, as Luther did, a thunderbolt against free will, and he presses it with great vigor. He lays down first the proposition that God has absolute and certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents.‡ He proves it at length by the prophecies of such events as God could not have certainly foreknown unless he had foreknown the volitions; by the fact that if God had not known the volitions of moral agents he could not have foreknown the fall of man and of angels and the great events consequent upon them; that if he does not foreknow he is liable to be wholly frustrated of his ends and to be continually repenting of what he has done. From these things, argued at wearisome length, he draws the conclusion that all human actions are necessary with a necessity of consequence. He says that Origen's remark is an evasion: "God's foreknowledge is not the cause of things future, but their being future is the cause of God's prescience that they will be." He discusses the different kinds of necessity but falls back upon the idea that God

*Part 4, Sec. 23.

†On The Will, pp. 386, 450.

‡Works, Vol. 2, p. 61-80.

could not foreknow unless he himself had determined to cause. His conception of necessity of the future is solely that of immutable causality. But there are other grounds of foreknowledge than predestination, and of certainty than causal necessity.

There are different kinds of necessity. The popular meaning differs from its metaphysical and philosophic sense. There is natural necessity and moral necessity and closely akin to them inability. There is great danger, in our reasoning from necessity, of an ambiguous middle. We may start with one kind and introduce another and draw a conclusion when none is warranted. A past fact is necessary. It may have been caused by a hundred different things. Its necessity has no reference to its cause. What God has done is necessary in this sense, and some things are positively certain to us, but these necessary things were done by an absolutely free will. If we can be certain of necessary things in the past, done by an absolutely free agent, may there not be certainty and a kind of necessity in regard to the acts of a free agent in the future? Certainty and the necessity connected with certainty, therefore, are not inseparably connected with a necessary cause. We may find difficulty in construing such a foreknowledge of a future fact because we know the future only by reasoning from cause to effect and that only in the realm of physical causation. All outside of that is for us contingent. We suppose that God must reason in the same way. But we assume too much. We forget that he is not limited to our modes of knowledge. He sees without eyes and hears without ears. He does not lay down premises and proceed through long processes to his conclusions. Our ratiocination is necessary to us because of our limitation. His cognition is most nearly akin to our intention. He can see a fact in the future as a fact without running down the chain of senses which will produce it. But limit him to our method of reasoning, and still there is no need of necessary causes. He knows the nature of the human mind and the laws under which it acts. He knows the conditions under which every individual will be placed. He knows the state of mind or disposition, and therefore what motive will be strongest, at any moment under which every choice will be

made. He can thus foresee perfectly free actions. He foresees his own actions without surrendering his own free agency. Foreknowledge, certainty and necessity do not take away free will in the sense of self-determination according to one's own character. And this is the only kind of liberty or freedom of the will that any libertarian can claim.

Luther therefore may have spoken of certainty and necessity arising from foreknowledge without being a necessitarian. With his broad use of the term free will he may have held that foreknowledge crushed free will to the ground without denying the power of choice and self-determination under character. He is at least entitled to the benefit of the doubt. But we have strong proof that he did not deny the freedom of the will as the libertarian understands it. Adam's acts before the fall were foreknown and were certain and necessary, but Luther says he had free will. The same thing is true of the actions of Satan in heaven. Bledsoe charges him with self-contradiction in these opinions but only because he did not know that Luther used free will more broadly than he was accustomed. Luther says that our actions in the affairs of life and in everything except in the matter of salvation are done by free will, but these are foreknown and therefore certain and necessary. He says repeatedly that the will remains and acts according to its own nature. It must choose, and choice is necessarily free. In one of the strongest of his passages he grants that free will does willingly what it does and not by compulsion, and that Judas acted willingly and might possibly have changed his mind. These things make it clear that Luther believed as we do about the freedom of the special faculty of the will and that he was not a necessitarian.

Luther used quite strong language in regard to God's almighty power and sovereignty. He had such a profound sense of God's infinite greatness and of our littleness and nothingness that he did not shrink from any statement in regard to God that the Scriptures seemed to authorize. He endorsed Wickliffe's assertion: "All things are done by necessity," and adds, "That is by the unchangeable will of God."* In another place he

*Part 3, Sec. 54.

said, "Each of these two things are connected under this trope, namely that on the one hand we can do nothing of ourselves, and on the other whatever we do God worketh in us."* "Since then God moves and actuates all things in all things it cannot but be that he also acts and moves in Satan and in the wicked. But he acts in them according to what they are and what he finds them; that is, since they are wicked and averse from him and are hurried along by this divine omnipotency they do only such things as are averse from him and wicked, just as a horseman driving a horse which is lame in one or the other of his feet, drives him according to his make and power, and so the horse goes ill. But what can the horseman do? He drives the horse such as he is in a drove of sound horses: he makes him go ill, the others well; it cannot be otherwise unless the horse be cured. By this illustration you see how it is when God works in bad men, and by bad men evil is the result; but it cannot be that God does wickedly, although he works evil by the agency of evil men, because he being good himself cannot do wickedly; but still he uses evil instruments, which cannot escape the urgency and impulse of his power. The fault is in the instruments, which God does not suffer to remain idle, that evil is done; God in the meanwhile being the impeller of them. Just as if a carpenter should cut ill by cutting with an axe or a saw that is toothed and sawed. Hence it arises that the wicked man cannot but go astray and commit sin continually inasmuch as being seized and urged by the power of God he is not allowed to remain idle but wills, desires and acts just according to what he is."† "God's omnipotence causes that the wicked man cannot escape the moving and driving of God, but being necessarily subject to him obeys him."‡ "The will of God, nevertheless, is immutable and infallible and governs our mutable will—as Boethius sings, 'and standing fixed moves all the rest'—and our will, wicked in the extreme, can do nothing of itself."§ Even the Christian is impelled by the same

*Part 3, Sec. 35.

†Part 4, Sec. 11.

‡Part 4, Sec. 12.

§Part 1, Sec. 11.

almighty power. "Christians are not led by free will but by the Spirit of God. Now to be led is not to lead ourselves but to be driven along, just as the saw or hatchet is driven along by the carpenter."* He has repeated the same idea a great many times but never in stronger language than in these quotations. One of them is commonly used to prove that he was a necessitarian. His view of God's all comprehensive and all regulative power seems to make God an agent in sin, and Luther accepts the inference. "What is more injurious, you say than to publish to the world this paradox, whatsoever is done by us is not done by free will but by mere necessity, and that saying of Augustine that 'God works both good and evil in us and that he rewards his own good works in us and punishes his own bad works in us?' Here you are rich in giving or rather in demanding reasons."† Instead of denying the charge of Erasmus he acknowledges it and defends himself. He interprets literally the Scripture which says that God hardened Pharaoh's heart. He explains David's words about Shimei's curse thus: "David then had regard to this consideration that the omnipotent God speaks and it is done; that is he who doeth all things by his eternal word. So then, the divine agency and omnipotency seizes hold of the will of Shimei together with all his members—that will which was already evil and which had aforetime been inflamed against David who met him just at the right time, as having deserved such a cursing—and even the good God commands (that is, he speaks the word and it is done) this curse which is poured out by a wicked and blasphemous organ inasmuch as he seizes hold of that organ and carries it along with him in the course of that agency."‡ This looks like making God at least partaker of the guilt of sinful actions, and it has been said that Luther took refuge from the conclusion in the inscrutable will of God. "But why does he not change those evil wills which he excites? This belongs to the secrets of his Majesty in which his judgments are incomprehensible. We have no business to ask these questions; our business is to

*Part 3, Sec. 44.

†Part 1, Sec. 22.

‡Part 4, Sec. 13.

adore these mysteries."* "But why this majesty of his does not remove this fault of our will or change it in all men (seeing that it is not in the power of man to do it) or why he imputes this fault of our will to us when we cannot be without it, these are questions which it is not lawful for us to ask, or which if you should ask them you would never get answered."† "In these words, I imagine, it is abundantly shown to us that it is not lawful for us to scrutinize the will of sovereignty."‡

This is the case that those who charge Luther with necessitarianism on the ground of God's omnipotence and sovereignty make out against him, but it is not by any means unanswerable! It assumes that Luther held that God exerted a direct control over the will. But he was far too profound a philosopher to be guilty of any such absurdity. Power may restrain effort but cannot constrain volition. Such irresistible power if possible would be compulsion, and that Luther repudiates most emphatically and repeatedly. It ignores his limiting and qualifying statements in the very passages cited. "Our will is not compelled to do evil." "God works in them according to what they are and what he finds them." "The fault is in the instrument." "Let not any think that God when he is said to work evil in us does so by creating evil as it were anew in us." "Some when they hear it said that God works both good and evil in us and that we are subjected to the operation of God by a mere passive necessity, seem to fancy that man is made the subject of a bad work of God."§ "God lays hold of Satan's evil will in the course of his operations and moves it whithersoever he will."|| "No violence is done to his will because he is not forced against his will but a natural operation hurrying him to a natural acting of the will." "When one is destitute of the Spirit of God he does not work evil against his will through a violence put upon him." "This will we do willingly and cordially according to the nature of our will." God's omnipotence, then, is not exerted directly upon the will, and

*Part 4, Sec. 15.

†Part 3, Sec. 28.

‡Part 3, Sec. 32.

§Part 3, Sec. 28.

||Part 4, Sec. 13.

God's sovereignty is exercised in perfect harmony with or fully respects the free choices of the will."* The charge overlooks Luther's explanations. In respect to the hardening of Pharaoh's heart he said, "Add to this that he at the same time presents from without that which naturally irritates and offends it; so that Pharaoh cannot avoid being hardened any more than he can avoid the agency of the divine omnipotence and the aversion and malignancy of his own will. So that Pharaoh's hardening is completed thus: he sets from without before his maliciousness that which he of his own nature hates, after this he ceases not to stimulate his evil will just as he finds it by his own omnipotent impulse within."† "Furthermore he was equally sure that the will of Pharaoh, naturally wicked and averse from him, could not consent to the word and work of God which was contrary to it, so that whereas the impulse to will was preserved inwardly in Pharaoh by God's omnipotence and a contradictory word and work of God was thrown upon it from without, nothing else could result but a stumbling and a hardening of Pharaoh's heart."‡ Here is nothing but a man hardening himself under motives which God had presented to him. The influence is from without. The charge overlooks the significance of the contrast between God's influence over the will and that of Satan. "The human will is placed as a sort of pack-horse between two contending parties. If God hath mounted, it wills and goes whither God pleases; if Satan hath mounted, it goes whither Satan pleases."§ "You imagine both God and the devil to be afar off as mere spectators of this mutable and free will and do not believe that they are impellers and agitators of this bond will of ours, each of them most determined warriors on the side on which he acts."|| Satan has no power over the will except through motives, and if God exerted any other kind of influence or by direct power interfered with the natural activity of the will there would be no likeness and no contest between them.

*Part 1, Sec. 24.

†Part 4, Sec. 14.

‡Part 4, Sec. 17.

§Part 1, Sec. 24.

||Part 4, Sec. 50.

Luther in his strongest expressions, like that of God being the principal agent in all things, only makes prominent certain familiar and universally accepted doctrines. We are dependent upon God for our continued existence. He upholds us and thus only can we exercise any faculty or power. "In him we live and move and have our being." Our wills therefore in every act are dependent upon him. The will is naturally active. It must act continually. As God's omnipotence sustains it Luther speaks of it as being impelled and driven by that omnipotence. In the light of his repeated statements there is no other legitimate interpretation. God's providence is over all his works. He directs the circumstances under which our lives fall and under which we are compelled to choose. He does not determine the choices; we ourselves do. Whatever we do we do willingly. He permits the evil acts when he determines to overrule them for good. The wicked in this sense must carry out God's will. Under the conditions of our being, the free will is not absolutely independent of God, however rebellious against him it may be. Luther meant nothing more than this in those passages which taken apart from the whole discussion look so ugly. As he explains his own meaning we all agree with him. The will is not free in the sense that it can turn itself capriciously just any way whatever, independent of character and motive, and that it can act independently of God's power and carry out its intentions in the face of God's will. Erasmus charged Luther with opposition to all the Fathers. Luther admitted it with the exception of Augustine, Wickliffe and Laurentius Valla. We know that he admitted much more than he ought. But it was not in regard to the nature of the will but simply its power in the matter of salvation.

We must agree with him about the inscrutable will of God. We can know God's will only so far as he has revealed it in his word and works. There are many things we would like to know about his plans and purposes that we can never know. There are many, many mysteries in his providence, and so far as that providence has to do with the will we may speak properly of his inscrutable power over it. We may not agree with

Luther in his remark about the death of the sinner, where he says that "God does not will it according to his revealed will but does according to his inscrutable will," because he confounds God's general desire with his particular will under special conditions, but this has no direct bearing upon the nature of our will. The Lutheran Church holds as Luther taught that while the will is free it is wholly incapable of doing anything to attain salvation without divine grace. It differs from him not in faith but in the form of expression.

That we have interpreted his doctrine aright is evident from a collation and comparison of his teaching throughout his works, but we must content ourselves, because of our limits, with a hurried review and a few references to the most important passages.

As we go through these volumes the first thing that strikes us is, that the charge of necessitarianism against Luther, based on his relation to Augustine, is false. Superficial study created the opinion that Augustine was a fatalist, and as Luther held to the Augustinian theology he was a fatalist also. As an example of this general opinion we may take Seebohm's. He says, "From this time Luther accepted other points of the theology of Augustine and especially those afterwards adopted by Calvin, and are now called Calvinistic, such as all things are fated to happen according to the divine will, that man has, therefore, no free will, and that only an elect number, predestined to receive the gift of faith, are saved." "He then wrote an abusive reply to the Bull pushing his Augustinian doctrines to so extreme a point as to amount to fatalism."* This is an utter perversion of Luther's view. His doctrine of the sacraments are inconsistent with the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, and far more with fatalism. He taught that the means of grace are God's institution and that they bring saving grace to every recipient. This is the determinative doctrine of the Lutheran as over against the Calvinistic system. It is so plainly and fully taught that citations are hardly necessary. Nothing could be

*Era of the Reformation, pp. 98, 112.

more positive than his words concerning infant baptism: "No one is born to be a child of wrath."* Luther adopted Augustine's doctrine of human depravity and made it fundamental in his system of theology, but he did not accept everything that Augustine taught. Augustine, whether consistently or not, admitted that in some respects the will is free. In the Augsburg Confession, written some years after Luther's reply to the Bull, Augustine is quoted as saying, "We acknowledge that in all men there is a free will, for they all indeed have natural innate understanding and reason; not that they are able to act in something pertaining to God or to love and fear God from the heart, but only in external works of this life have they freedom to choose good and evil."† Luther endorsed this Confession as the authorized expression of his own doctrines. In his comment on the article, he says, "A bad tree cannot bring forth good fruit, and without faith no one can please God. Therefore although we admit that it is in our power to do such external works, we nevertheless say that the free will and reason can do nothing in spiritual things, viz: trusting in God, confiding in him, believing that God is with us, hears our prayers and forgives us our sins. These are the true, high and noble good works of the first table of the ten commandments and no human heart understands them without the light and grace of the Holy Spirit."‡ The Augsburg Confession uses almost the very same words that Luther had five years before used in his reply to Erasmus. Both drew directly from Augustine. Luther repeatedly gave utterance to the same idea. It was one of his most settled convictions that we have a free will in civil and social things and to some extent in moral duties but not in spiritual matters. "Man has a knowledge and free will that he may rule inferior creatures, but he does not know how to rule himself and obey God. Without God's word the will is blind, powerless, dead and condemned in spiritual matters. We cannot choose or do anything in regard to them but must rely upon the word of God."§ These facts show us how Luther un-

*Leipsic, Vol. 4 : 21 b.

†Article 18.

‡Leipsic, Vol. 20 : 103 b.

§Leipsic, Vol. 4 : 108 b.

derstood Augustine and in what respect Luther followed him. It is not our present task to interpret Augustine but Luther, but if Augustine was a necessitarian it is unjust and false to charge Luther with the same philosophic error.

Another thing that strikes us as we go over Luther's works is, the very broad sphere he gives to the will. In the citation just made he makes the reason a part of it. The will is not free because it is blind as well as powerless. It cannot, unless enlightened by the Holy Spirit, understand even the Ten Commandments. The reason is with him the faculty of spiritual discernment. Even when he seems to distinguish between the reason and the evil, as he does in many places, he makes them parts of the same faculty. In his sermon on Nicodemus he said, "Nicodemus shows us what reason and free will can do in one of the very best of men who are not enlightened by the Holy Spirit. He was a Pharisee and a ruler. In the sight of God his reason and free will were blind indeed. The longer he was with Christ the less he understood."* In discussing the giving of the Law upon Sinai, he said, "Here we can see what are the powers of the free will and what it can do. The children of Israel, although sanctified, could not understand a syllable or letter of the law. It is therefore a vain, false and odious thing to say that we ought to value highly the free will with its powers in matters of conscience."† When he puts the reason and will in contrast, as he does in a few places, he limits often the will to the feelings. "The will is that which wishes, desires and enjoys."‡ As thus defined he says it is desperately depraved and incomprehensible. The passions and desires are blind, without the power of self-control and cannot therefore be free. Free will thus limited, we must confess is nothing but an empty name. If spiritual discernment be made a part of the will, we must confess again, it is not free. "No man can call Jesus Lord but by the Holy Ghost." When Peter said "Thou art the Son of God," our Lord replied, "Flesh and blood have not revealed it unto thee but my Father which is in heaven." It is

*Leipsic, Vol. 14 : 17 b.

†Do., Vol. 11 : 235 a.

‡Do., Vol. 13 : 66 b.

everywhere manifest that when Luther denies freedom to the will he does not speak of the faculty as we now understand it.

Another thing that strikes us is that he uses the word liberty very often in the popular sense of personal independence. When he denies that the will is free it is generally in opposition to that sense. Self-will, denying its dependence and allegiance to God, comes from Satan and Adam. A truly free will, recognizing its relation to God, looks up to God's will, and it is only by obeying God's will it becomes truly free. He proves that self-will is not free by different arguments. It is not free because we are taught to pray: "Thy will be done." If we pray that God's will rather than ours be done we acknowledge that ours is not free. It is not free because Christ said, "Without me ye can do nothing." How can the will, helpless to do anything right and good, be free? It is not free because Christ has supreme will over all things. "All power is given unto me." The will that must yield to the power of Christ can not be free. It is not free because God's providential control extends to the sparrows, not one of which can fall without God's permission, and to the hairs of our heads, all of which are numbered. Much more must it extend to human actions. Nothing can be independent of God, and the freest acts of the will are under his direction. In this light we must understand those passages which seem most fatalistic like that of the carpenter and the saw. He got the figure from Isaiah 10 : 15. "Shal the axe boast itself against him that heweth therewith? or the saw magnify itself against him that shaketh it?" It was the prophet's rebuke of the boasts of the king of Assyria who said, "By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom, for I am prudent," (verse 11). In Luther's comment upon it he uses his strongest language: "And this comparison teaches us, contrary to the doctrine of those who maintain the freedom of the will, that we can do absolutely nothing good or evil. For the saw does not make itself, and that which the saw does is not a work of the saw but a work of him who uses it. If he ceases to work with it, it rusts away. In like manner we are God's instruments which God handles and uses. And the objection

does not hold of those who say, "The saw is a thing without life hence the comparison fails," for God compares the mightiest tyrant with all his power and wisdom to a saw. Now a monarch is certainly a living instrument, yet God compares him to a dead one."* The king was boasting of what he had done in civil affairs, and Luther never questioned that in such things men have free will. But the king was under that control which directed the fate of a sparrow. Like the saw his works were used by God to work out ends the king could no more understand than the saw can understand the purposes of the carpenter. This was the thought in Luther's mind when he wrote this passage, and therefore in denying that the king had a free will he did not deny that he had a will that chose its own plans and means, but that the king was independent of God's providential control.

There is nothing more manifest in every place where Luther speaks of the will than his practical, religious aim. He has stated it in the plainest words. It is seen in every one of the several scores of passages in which he alludes to the will. No statement could be more direct than this: "*Free will is condemned in theological and spiritual matters, not in worldly affairs.*" When we dispute about free will we inquire what it can do *from a theological standpoint*, that is, in matters which relate to God, to God's will and word, *not what it may do in earthly affairs and which are subject to reason.* And we say that man without the Holy Spirit is wicked and godless in the sight of God, however much he may be graced and adorned with all the heathen virtues; as truly one finds in the histories of the heathen admirable examples of chastity, humility, love for country, love for parents and for children, likewise examples of manliness, kindness, etc. We also find that the very best ideas of God, of God's will and of God's service are in the greatest darkness. For the light of reason, which has been given to man, understands nothing more than what is good for and does good to the body; this is however a corrupt love of pleasure."† We open

*Leipsic, Vol. 7 : 143.

†Leipsic, I : 49 b.

at random and we read: "Man has not a free will to do good and forsake evil. It cannot obey God by its natural powers;"* "Free will can do nothing. The only power for good is in the seed of the Sower. The field, which is the human heart, brought forth only weeds and thorns;"† "The free will after the fall has nothing more than a mere name, and when it does what is possible for it, it commits a sin. The free will is in bondage and is a servant of sin, not that it is nothing, but that it is not free except to sin. Augustine speaks about this in the book on The Spirit and Letter, saying, "The free will without divine grace can do nothing except sin."‡ But it is unnecessary to cite passages any further. One who looks into his works cannot fail to see anywhere that Luther is writing and thinking as a theologian, and not as a philosopher, and that his utterances are to be interpreted in their theological, and not their possible philosophic sense. With this fact so patent one fails to understand how he has been so greatly misunderstood.

It is admitted that Luther in his fear of meritorious works and in his zeal in opposing all forms of Pelagianism was often one-sided in his statements. He wrote hurriedly and often under strong emotions, and, as all men do who write in that way, gave expression to the thoughts as they came to him. They were, therefore, not sufficiently guarded, and while true from the standpoint in which he was for the moment considering them, they were only partial truths. He did not give sufficient prominence to the other side, and the Lutheran Church sometimes seems to dissent, when really it does not, by emphasizing more the neglected sides. In this way we are to understand the difference between its language and that of Luther on the subject of predestination.

Luther's view of the will is that of all evangelical churches. If they reject his language they accept his thought. We are justified and saved through faith only, and that involves the truth that the will has no power without grace in spiritual things. "Erasmus and the Pelagians," as Dorner says, "makes man at

*Do., 21 : 212 b.

†Do., 12 : 381 b.

‡Do., 17 : 151.

first richer than Luther does, but yet how far is Luther's conception of freedom ultimately superior." They thought "the best element of freedom is reached in freedom of choice." "Luther's conception of freedom leads to godlike, real freedom by grace."

ARTICLE II.

THE MEASURE OF BENEFICENCE.

BY REV. WILLIAM HULL, D. D.

In the Scriptures we are told that the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof. The gold and the silver are his and the cattle upon a thousand hills. It is asserted that the earth is his for he made it. He owns it by right of creation. Mankind are tenants of his property and he has not alienated a square foot of the earth or any of the personal property to any of his tenants since time began. One generation comes and uses both real and personal property, and then leaves it for the use of the next generation.

Men often speak of lands as their own; they pose as owners, and they speak of themselves as possessors of large estates, but this is all assumption and a fiction. No one can produce a deed from the Great Owner to establish his title. The best he can do is to show a deed from some former tenant who was *not* the owner. We brought nothing with us into the world and we can take nothing out of it. God says at the close of the life of each tenant, "Give an account of thy stewardship as thou mayest be no longer steward." He says, "Occupy until I come." There is a radical difference between an occupant and an owner. Mankind therefore are only tenants at will of the Great Lord of the Manor.

Tenants are expected by landlords to pay rent or a part of the crops for the use of the land. In the early history of this country certain men, called patroons, obtained large tracts of land, called patents, from some European government which gave them the lands in fee simple, and then they let the prop-

erty, divided into farms, to tenants, and these usually gave annually to the lord of the manor twenty bushels of wheat, several fat fowls and a number of days work for the use of each of such farms. Some of these leases were in perpetuity and some were life leases. The former descended to the heirs of the tenants, but the title remained generation after generation in the proprietor.

After God had created the world, he placed the first human pair in the Garden of Eden, and later they were driven out of it on account of disobedience and disloyalty.

Cain acknowledged God's ownership of the earth as he brought of the fruit of the ground as an offering unto the Lord. Abel, his brother, had the same theory as he brought of the firstlings of his flock and the fat thereof as an offering to the Great Proprietor. They thus acknowledged God's ownership.

Abraham did the same as he traveled from place to place as a sojourner in the Holy Land. He built his altar and offered burnt offerings unto the Lord.

When Israel went out of Egypt and the theocracy was established in the wilderness, its economy included the acknowledgment of God's proprietorship, in offerings unto the Lord. The tithe or tenth was the measure of rent which Jehovah was to receive. The first fruits of the harvest were presented to the Lord of the harvest.

In heathen lands offerings and sacrifices have been presented to their supposed deities of all ages. In these acts mankind has disclaimed the ownership of the world, and they have acknowledged the ownership to be in another direction. They have not withheld the rental.

Under the old dispensation the proportion for God was fixed at the tenth. It is claimed that other offerings brought it to about one seventh.

But could the nation bear such a burden of tithing for the Proprietor? It *did* bear it, and prospered under it. The revenue was used for the benefit of the people. It went to maintain the institutions of religion. One of the twelve tribes was supported out of this ecclesiastical revenue, and they devoted

their lives as public teachers of religion and in giving intellectual instruction to the nation.

If a person were to propose in our day that one twelfth of the population of our country should devote themselves to religious and educational work and that they be supported by the other eleven twelfths, his sanity would perhaps be questioned. Yet this was God's plan for Israel and when it was most faithfully adhered to the nation enjoyed its highest prosperity. God said, "Bring all the tithes into the storehouse that there may be meat in my house, and prove me now herewith, saith the Lord of Hosts, if I will not open you the windows of heaven and pour you out a blessing, that there shall not be room enough to receive it" (Mal. 3 : 10). While this tithing was nominally for God, the Great Proprietor, it was really for themselves. As they were the recipients of the resulting blessings, they had no reason to complain.

When the new dispensation opened, the ceremonial law and the law of tithing passed away, but the same principle remained and the wants of the kingdom of God continued and even increased, for the Christian religion was to be carried to the ends of the earth and the gospel proclaimed to all nations. A larger and grander field of operations confronted the new dispensation.

When our Lord sent out his apostles to preach in the cities of Israel, he told them not to carry money or provisions with them, but to enter houses and eat what was set before them, for said he, "The laborer is worthy of his hire." He taught that those who devote their lives to religious work should be supported by those who receive the benefit of their labors. St. Paul afterward taught the same doctrine. He said that they who preached the gospel should live of the gospel. The ox that trod out the corn was not to be muzzled. He inquired, "Who goeth a warfare at his own charges?" He also asserted, "Even so hath the Lord ordained that they who preach the gospel should live of the gospel." He also said, "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we shall reap your carnal things?"

That Christ approved of great liberality in the things of religion is taught in connection with the act of the poor widow. The account says, "And Jesus sat over against the treasury; and many that were rich cast in much. And there came a certain poor widow, and she threw in two mites, which make a farthing. And he called unto him his disciples and said unto them, Verily I say unto you that this poor widow hath cast more in, than all they which have cast into the treasury; for all they did cast in of their abundance; but she of her want, did cast in all that she had, even all her living—(Mark 12 : 41-44).

On the day of Pentecost after the mighty outpouring of the Spirit, we read, "And all that believed were together and had all things common, and sold their possessions and goods and parted them to all men as every man had need."

The Scriptures present these facts which we have enumerated from our instruction, and in view of them we may ask, "How much owest thou unto my Lord?" and what is "The Measure of Beneficence?"

It is hard for us to lay down a specific rule for every one as deduced from these general principles. No specific portion is assigned to the Christian Church as was apportioned under the old dispensation. St. Paul writes to the Corinthians (16 : 22), "Upon the first day of the week let every one lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him."

Our Lord did not mean to teach in commending the act of the poor widow, that every one should put into the Lord's treasury all that he had. What the Christians did on the day of Pentecost was probably governed by the circumstances of that peculiar exigency. At that feast the largest hospitality was practised by the resident Jews to those who came from all directions to attend that festival, and those who believed in Christ made provision for a longer stay on the part of believers who came from a distance. Their course at that time was not enjoined upon the Church and we have no knowledge that holding property in common was practised in the Apostolic Church or at any subsequent period. St. Peter told Ananias and Sapphira specifically, that they had voluntarily sold their property,

and had the control of it. Their sin was in pretending that they had brought the whole proceeds of the sale, when in fact they were only bringing a part.

While the percentage of giving is not stated in the New Testament, yet a large measure of beneficence to the cause of God and humanity is enjoined. The Saviour says, "Freely ye have received, freely give." Our Lord said to Peter, "And every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife or children, or lands for my name's sake, shall receive a hundred fold and shall inherit everlasting life."

The young ruler was told by our Lord to sell all that he had and to give to the poor and to come and follow the Master. Yet our Lord did not give such a direction to his friend Lazarus, at Bethany, nor to Joseph of Arimathea.

For some, the rule of devoting a tenth of their income to benevolence might well apply. They are able to do it and should do it. With others, who have a large income, one tenth would be too small and they should give more, while there are others who depend upon charity themselves for an existence, have no income and nothing to give and must therefore be excused.

Those who have an income should give a percentage of that income to God and to his cause, no matter how small it may be. Some persons who can give but little often excuse themselves from giving at all for that reason, but this is wrong. Although the contribution may seem small in the eyes of men, yet if given with a good motive it will not appear so in the eyes of God, as we learn from the story of the poor widow who gave the two mites. Many small offerings, in the aggregate make a large sum to help the work of the kingdom, and generally the poorer classes pay more in proportion to their ability than the rich.

But God leaves the problem with every tenant to measure the amount he should pay. From that decision however there is an appeal to the Great Proprietor, who will at length say, "Thou mayest be no longer steward—render an account of thy stewardship." Those who have withheld more than is proper will receive censure and condemnation. God said through his prophet

Malachi (4 : 8, 9), "Will a man rob God? Yet ye have robbed me. But ye say wherein have we robbed thee? In tithes and offerings. Ye are cursed with a curse: for ye have robbed me, even this whole nation."

This duty of giving should be conscientiously performed and we should rather err on the liberal side than on the other. We are told that, "There is that scattereth and yet increaseth; and there is that withholdeth more than is meet, but it tendeth to poverty" (Prov. 11 : 24). We cannot afford to be guilty of robbing God and losing the blessing which comes from the exercise of a proper beneficence. Our Lord said, "Give and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down and shaken together and running over shall men give into your bosom. For with the same measure that ye mete withal, it shall be measured to you again" (Luke 6 : 38). In the Proverbs we read (11 : 25), "The liberal soul shall be made fat; and he that watereth shall be watered also himself."

When the brethren in Jerusalem were in need, we are told, "Then the disciples, *every man according to his ability* determined to send relief to the brethren which dwelt in Judea; which also they did and sent it to the elders by the hands of Barnabas and Saul" (Acts 11 : 29, 30).

Here we see again the proper measure for giving, "*every man according to his ability*"—not a part of the men and none less than he could afford.

If this "Measure of Beneficence" were observed, what great sums would flow into the Lord's treasury, in this very wealthy country, for the support of the gospel and the needy in our own land, and what vast sums there would be at hand for sending the gospel to the ends of the earth. What hundreds of millions are spent annually in foolish display and luxury and to gratify the lusts of the flesh, the lusts of the eye and the pride of life. What hundreds of millions are freely spent annually on depraved appetites which only minister harm and ruin as a return for the expenditure.

How feebly the Christian Church comes up to the measure of its duty and its high privilege in this respect. How the Lord's

cause is crippled for lack of means, while at the same time there is such great wealth in the hands of the Lord's tenants and the Lord's stewards. Without distressing themselves they could furnish the money to meet with alacrity all legitimate calls to supply the wants of the needy, sustain the Church in Christian lands and in a very few years carry the gospel to the ends of the earth.

ARTICLE III.

LUTHER AND THE AUGSBURG CONFESSION.

BY PROF J. W. RICHARD, D. D.

INTRODUCTORY.

This series of articles is offered as a complement to the series entitled, *Melanchthon and the Augsburg Confession*, which appeared in THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY for July, 1897, July and October, 1898. The object of the former series was to present the history of the Augsburg Confession from the standpoint of Melanchthon's relations to it. The object of this series is to present the history of the Augsburg Confession from the standpoint of Luther's relations to it. In this way the reader will be enabled to get a more comprehensive and a more accurate view of that immortal document, which, from age to age, commands the attention of students of church history and of Christian doctrine. Nor will the true student of history object to the re-employment of materials which figured so largely in the former series. Many facts connected with the history of the Confession can be properly understood only when they are viewed in this proposed double setting; and the history of the Confession can be rightly understood only when it is studied in its relations to Luther and in its relations to Melanchthon. No one-sided representation can satisfy all the demands of truth; and certainly we are far enough away from the exciting scenes and partisan strifes of the sixteenth century, to demand full and accurate narration, with documentary verification, and to reject or discount

all special pleading, and every assumption not supported by testimony from the times. This is the diplomatic method of writing history, and it as the only method that can meet the requirements of the science. It is also the inductive method. All known facts must be presented, and must be placed in their proper relations, before an attempt is made to draw a conclusion. It is only in this way, viz., by exhibiting the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and by carefully separating fact from fancy, that history can be made a guide of conduct and a philosophy of life. Given the facts, and the intelligent reader may be safely left to draw his own conclusions.

With such views as to the method of writing history and as to the mission of history, we aim here chiefly, even at the expense of historical perspective, to let the documents speak, and scholars and historians of highest repute for learning and fairness. Besides, every important fact and opinion will be placed to the credit of its source. In this way we hope to secure and to hold the confidence of the reader, though we may weary him with long quotations and with multiplied details. In a word, we aim here to present such a full and exhaustive account of the *composition* of the Augsburg Confession and of Luther's *relations* to the same, as to enable the reader to affirm this or that, upon the basis of documentary evidence, and to draw his own conclusions. Hence no fact known to the writer and pertinent to the subject in hand, will be omitted from this series of articles.

But where shall we begin in writing a history of the Augsburg Confession and of Luther's relations to the same? If the object were to include in such history all the antecedents and all the causes, that culminated in the most important ecclesiastical event of the year 1530, we ought to begin with Luther's call to a theological professorship in 1512, for in his first theological lectures already, and in his contemporaneous letters and preaching, we discover the germs of those great evangelical truths, which, expanded, clarified, and fortified by Scripture and by the witness of the fathers, appeared in the *Augustana* in 1530. To treat the subject in such a way would require the writing of an ac-

count of the teaching of Luther and Melancthon at Wittenberg,—of the one for eighteen, and of the other for twelve years. In this way it could be shown that the Augsburg Confession was a growth, that it had its causes and antecedents, remote, mediate and immediate. Note might also be made of another series of facts: That the Reformers, confident of the correctness of their views, and of the harmony of their teaching with that of the early Church, had steadily pleaded for a general council, and had promised to abide by its decisions; that the Pope had persistently refused to call a general council of the Church; that the Emperor, Charles V., during the earlier years of his reign, was not in a position to demand the calling of a general council of the Church. But these matters belong to ecclesiastical and civil history, rather than to the history of the Augsburg Confession. The history of the Augsburg Confession as such, begins with the calling of the Diet of Augsburg, as prior to that time the reforming and protesting Princes and cities had had neither desire nor opportunity to make a common confession of their own faith and of the faith of their churches; and prior to that time their affairs were not in such a condition as would enable them to make *such* a confession as they at length made.

In the year 1529 the dark hour had come; but it was the dark hour that heralds the dawn of day. Events that at the time were alarming, and that boded disaster, proved to be blessings in disguise. June 29th, 1529, Charles V. concluded the Peace of Barcelona with the Pope, and August 5th, 1529, he concluded the Peace of Cambray with France. He was now ready and prepared to counsel for the national security and religious quiet of the German peoples. The situation, no less from a civil than from a religious point of view, was grave. The Turks had besieged Vienna, and were desolating the fairest portions of Austria; and the Emperor's most powerful and loyal German Princes, and fourteen imperial cities, had protested against the action of the majority at Spires, and with their protest had sent an Appeal across the Alps to the Emperor, to a na-

tional council and to impartial judges.* An imperial diet was demanded by the exigencies of the times. A ruler even less diplomatic than Charles, and less loyal to the Church, would have seen the necessity of visiting Germany in person, and of consulting the collected wisdom of the nation concerning the safety of the Empire and the harmony and integrity of the Church. A ruler so prudent as Charles would naturally employ pacific measures first.† Accordingly, January 21st, 1530, he issued from Bologna an imperial rescript, summoning a diet to meet at Augsburg, April 8th, ensuing, and promising to be present in person. The object of the Diet as stated in the Rescript was to counsel about resistance to the Turks, and to consider the best method of putting an end to the dissensions about religion. The references to the religious dissensions are couched in mild and conciliatory language: "To consult and decide about the disturbances and dissensions of the Holy Faith and the Christian Religion. And in order that all dissensions and errors may be abolished in a salutary manner, all sentiments and opinions are to be heard, understood and considered between us in love and kindness, and are to be composed in sincerity, so as to put away what is not right in both parties, that true religion may be accepted and held by us all, that as we live and serve under one Christ so we may live in one fellowship, Church, and unity."‡

*The Protest and Appeal were carried to Italy by John Eckinger, Alexius Faventraut and Michael von Kaden. These ambassadors were detained by the Emperor at Piacenza and Parma as prisoners, and were forbidden to communicate with their principals.

†"According to other testimonies, a formal league was concluded at Bologna of the following import: The Emperor and Ferdinand were to make every effort to bring back the heretics, and the Pope was to supply the spiritual means. But if they stubbornly persisted, the Emperor and Ferdinand were to coerce them by arms and the Pope was to see that the other Christian princes assisted with all their forces." Again: "The Emperor was exhorted to unite with the Catholic estates, to work against the Protestants, at first with promises and threats, and then by violence, and after their suppression, to establish an inquisition." Gieseler, *Eccles. History*, IV., pp. 136-7, notes.

‡Original in Förstemann's *Urkundenbuch zu der Geschichte des Reichstags zu Augsburg*, I., 2-9.

This Imperial Rescript, expressed in such gracious language, at once dispelled the darkness that had gathered about the minds and hearts of the Reformers during the autumn and winter of 1529-30. The apprehension of a common danger had led several reforming Princes and cities to propose and to consider methods of defense; but they were divided in their counsels, and were unable to reach a common conclusion. The Swiss and Upper Germans were considerably alienated from the Wittenbergers. The Nuremberg Convention of January 6th, 1530, had dissolved in disorder. Only dire and ominous reports came from Bologna, where the Pope and the Emperor were living together in the same palace.

Suddenly the mighty tension was broken. The Imperial Rescript had recognized the Protestants as a "party," and had given the fullest assurance that an amicable settlement of existing difficulties was to be expected! At once the whole welkin grew bright. Sunshine took the place of gloom. The Protestants were now to have a hearing before their peers in a diet presided over by an impartial judge. Forthwith it was resolved at Torgau that the Elector of Saxony should attend the diet in person; and the next day, March 12th, the electoral counsellors presented a report to their master, containing various items of suggestion and advice touching the journey to Augsburg, and naming the persons who in various official capacities were to accompany the Prince. The following are named as "learned counsellors:" "Dr. Martin, Jonas the Provost, Philip Melancthon, Musa of Jena. Dr. Martin and Jonas are to remain at Nuremberg and await further orders. Master Eisleben as preacher; Master Spalatin to be employed in connection with faith, and for other reasons, together with other scholars."*

*Förstemann's *Urkundenbuch*, 1., 13 *et seqq.* It will be seen from this report that from the beginning it was not the intention, at least not immediately, to take Luther to Augsburg. He must await further orders at Nuremberg.

THE PREPARATION FOR THE DIET.

The electoral counsellors were thus making provision for a proper representation and defense of the Protestant cause. Nor was it deemed sufficient merely to take these "learned counsellors" to Nuremberg and to Augsburg. The wise senior chancellor, Dr. Gregory Brück, forecasting the importance of the proposed Diet, wrote the following letter to the Elector: "Inasmuch as the Imperial Rescript provides that the opinion and view of each one is to be heard, it would be a good thing for us to bring together systematically in writing, the views maintained by our party, and to fortify them out of Holy Writ, so as to present them in writing, in case the preachers shall not be admitted to a participation in the transactions. This will facilitate business, and it will serve to remove misunderstanding to have such views and opinions presented."*

In all probability it was this prudent suggestion that influenced the Elector, March 14th, to write a somewhat lengthy letter to the Wittenberg theologians, in which he informs them that a diet is to be held at Augsburg, beginning April 8th, ensuing; that such diet will probably take the place of a national council; that matters pertaining to religion are to be considered; that whatever is not right in both parties is to be corrected, so that "all may receive and hold one true religion, and as we all live and serve under one Christ, so we may live in one fellowship, Church and unity, and finally thus attain to a good unity and peace." He then instructs his theologians to prepare articles "both of faith and other church usages and ceremonies," and to present them in person at Torgau by Sunday 20th; and further: "If the preachers and estates shall not be permitted to attend, ye, and especially you Doctor *Martin*, shall await our further decision at Coburg."†

The Imperial Rescript had declared the restoration of Christian fellowship and unity to be the religious aim of the proposed Diet. The Elector's letter to his theologians, Brück's letter quoted above, and the Report of the Saxon counsellors, March

*Förstemann's *Urkundenbuch*, I., 39.

†Förstemann's *Urkundenbuch*, I., 41-44.

12th,* show to a demonstration that the Saxon court at Torgau was fully possessed by the desire, thought and purpose of reconciliation with the Church, and that they all enter on their preparation for the Diet with such desire, thought and purpose in the ascendent. This is made so clear by these and other official documents, and is expressed with such evident sincerity and simplicity that it becomes a chief point of view from which to study the history of the Confession, and furnishes a necessary cue in ascertaining its original meaning. Nothing was further from the thought of the Saxon Court than to go to Augsburg with a belligerent, defiant and aggressive spirit. They took the Emperor at his word, and sought to establish peace and reconciliation.† That such was the prevalent frame of mind, becomes increasingly evident from letters written by the Wittenberg reformers themselves. Luther wrote to Jonas as follows: "The Prince writes us, that is, you, Pomeranus, Philip and me, a letter in common, to unite, and, putting aside everything else, to make ready by next Sunday whatever is necessary for the Diet on the coming eighth of April. For the Emperor Charles himself will be at Augsburg, and will amicably settle (*amicæ compositurus*) all things, as he writes in his proclamation. Hence to-day and to-morrow, though you are absent, we three will do what we can. Nevertheless it will be your duty also to obey the Prince, and, turning over your duties to your colleagues, to join us here to-morrow. For all is hurry. Christ grant that everything may be done to his glory. Amen. 12 o'clock, March 14th, Anno 1530.‡

The following day Melanchthon wrote to Jonas in a similar strain of delight and gratification: "A diet has been appointed

*Förstemann's, *Urkundenbuch* I., 11, *et seqq.*

†See the Preface to the Augsburg Confession. Also Brentz's letter to Isenmann, June 24th, 1530: "In ea (Confessione) petunt principes, ut amicæ controversia componatur, et pax constituatur." C. R., II., 125. Also Melanchthon's letter to Camerarius, C. R., II., 119. C. R. II., 281. Virck in *Zeitschrift für Kirchenges.* (1888), p. 69-72.

‡DeWette's, *Luther's Briefe*, III., 564.

at Augsburg. The Emperor has graciously promised to review the case and to correct the faults of both parties."*

The day for which Princes, courtiers, and theologians, had long pleaded, was now in sight. They hailed it with joy, and began to make preparation for its duties and privileges. But as regards the preparations of the Wittenberg theologians, as to whether they, in obedience to the command of the Elector, wrote articles of faith and external ceremonies,—of such things we have no contemporaneous record. Indeed there is no documentary proof from the times that they wrote at this particular juncture a single line in exhibition or defense of the faith held, and of the ceremonies practiced by themselves and their adherents. The statement made by some of the older historians† of the Confession, that "before the journey to Augsburg began, Luther composed seventeen articles," which are "the archetype of the Augsburg Confession," is, so far as chronology is concerned, a pure fiction. The seventeen Schwabach articles which are "the archetype" of the first *seventeen* articles of the Augsburg Confession, were composed by Luther and others more than five months before that time, and were in all probability at that time in the electoral archives at Torgau, and not at Wittenberg. Neither were they *revised* for the proposed Diet, nor placed among the preparations for the Diet, as we learn from Luther's own words in the Preface to his published edition of those articles. He writes: "Seventeen articles have lately been published under my name with a title that indicates that I meant to lay the same before the present Diet. Of such a thing I never had a thought. It is true that I helped to compose such articles, for they were not composed by me alone, but not on account of the Papists, nor to lay them before this Diet. It is very well known why they were composed. I had not even intended that they should be published, much less that they should go out with such a title under my name. And whoever did it,

*C. R., II., 28.

†Coelestin, *Historia Comitiorum Anno M. D. XXX. Augustae*, etc., p. 25 *et seqq.*; J. J. Müller, *Historie von der Evang. Slende Protestation und Appellation*, etc., p. 441; Chytraeus, *Historia*, p. 18.

knows very well that I had neither commanded nor wished it. Not that I shun the light, or think that such articles are not right. They are too good and too precious to be used in negotiating with the Papists. For what do they care about such beautiful, holy, superb articles?"*

It would have been impossible for Luther to write in this way, had he even *revised* these articles for use at the proposed Diet. They were written for an entirely different purpose, and were at no time designed by him to become the basis of an Apology, or Confession, to be laid before the Emperor. Hence we have in this Preface also another clear and distinct proof in support of the proposition that the Wittenberg theologians did not write "articles of faith" in obedience to the electoral command of March 14th.† It was only a subsequent and unforeseen exigency that brought the seventeen articles into requisition, and caused them to be made the basis of the first seventeen articles of the Augsburg Confession.‡ But it is the very general supposition of scholars and specialists in this field of Reformation history, that between March 14th and 27th, certain

*Erlangen edition of Luther's Works, Vol. 24 : 337. These seventeen articles, known as the Schwabach Articles, were composed by Luther and others about the 7-10 of October, 1529, (Kolde in *Beiträge zu Reform. Geschichte*, p. 110,) and were laid before the Schwabach Convention, Oct. 16th, ensuing. They were offered by the Saxon Elector and the Margrave of Brandenburg as a condition of union with the Swiss and the Upper Germans, but were rejected by them. Early in the year 1530 Hans Bern of Coburg published these Articles with the title: "The Confession of Martin Luther composed in Seventeen Articles to be laid before the present Diet at Augsburg." Misled by the title, Conrad Wimpina, John Mensing, Wolfgang Roderfer and Rupert Elgersma, Catholic Theologians at Augsburg, wrote a refutation of these articles. Thereupon Luther, who was at Coburg, wrote the Preface (from which we have just quoted) to these seventeen articles, and had the whole printed at Wittenberg under the title: "Martin Luther's Reply to the Howl of Certain Papists." These articles reached Augsburg already in May, as we learn from a letter of Jacob Sturm to Zwingli (Zwingli's Works, VIII., 459).

†It is purely gratuitous for Dr. Krauth to say: "March 20. These XVII. Articles of Luther revised were sent to Torgau." *Conservative Reformation*, p. 29. There is not a syllable of contemporaneous proof of any such *revising* or *sending*.

‡See LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, July, 1897, p. 312.

articles on abuses, now called the "Torgau Articles," were composed by Melanchthon,* and subsequently, perhaps not before April 3rd, taken to Torgau, and called "Torgau Articles." But of contemporaneous documentary proof of this supposition, and of the veritable existence even of "Torgau Articles," there is not a line known to historians.† That is, there does not exist a line or even a word from the times, which tells us that the Wittenberg theologians wrote articles on "external ceremonies," March 14th–27th, and sent or carried them to Torgau, nor have we any document from the times inscribed, "Torgau Articles." It is only highly probable, not historically and demonstratively certain, that the essay,‡ of several parts, and discussing several subjects, discovered by Karl Edward Förstemann at Weimar, and published by him in his *Urkundenbuch zu der Geschichte des Reichtags zu Augsburg in Jahre 1530*, pp. 68–84, was written at Wittenberg, March 14th–27th, carried to Torgau, thence to Augsburg, and finally used in composing the second part of the Augsburg Confession. The data in hand will not allow any more definite affirmations in regard to a basis of the Articles on Abuses.

The fact is, we are almost entirely destitute of information touching the doings of the Wittenberg theologians from March 14th to March 27th. From Luther and Melanchthon we have in those thirteen days only the letters to Jonas quoted above.§

*See Prof. Dr. Brieger's exceedingly acute and learned article in *Kirchengeschichtliche Studien*, 1888, pp. 268–320; Engelhardt in *Niedner's Zeitschrift*, 1865, pp. 515–629. LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, July, 1897, pp. 301 *et seqq.*

†Dr. Krauth wrote: "March 20. In addition to these (Schwabach Articles) a special writing, of which Luther was the chief author, in conjunction with Melanchthon, Jonas, Bugenhagen, was prepared by direction of the Elector and sent to Torgau. These articles are on the abuses, and are the *Torgau Articles proper*." *Conservative Reformation*, p. 219. In its main features this paragraph also is gratuitous. But as the matter was fully discussed in the LUTHERAN QUARTERLY for July, 1897, pp. 301–310, no further notice need be taken of it here.

‡Translated into English, and published in Vol. II. of Jacobs' *Book of Concord*, pp. 75–98.

§DeWette assigns to March a letter from Luther to Amsdorf, but the date is in dispute. It contains no reference to happenings at Wittenberg.

From Jonas and Bugenhagen we have nothing during that time. We know, however, that the Wittenberg theologians did not appear in Torgau, Sunday March 20th, for March 21st, the Elector wrote them to hasten to Torgau with their books, as matters of importance were demanding attention there. We find Melancthon at Torgau, March 27th.* But there is no proof that Luther and the other theologians went at that time.† Even of Melancthon's doings at Torgau, counting out what he has reported about Campanus, and of the date of his return to Wittenberg, we know nothing. We can now go so far as to say that we know very little of the doings of the Wittenberg theologians from March 14th to April 3rd, a period of nearly three weeks. If they made any theological preparation at all for the Diet, it seems to be confined to an essay on abuses, and they themselves seem not to have any very definite ideas as to the future. To Nicholas Hausmann Luther wrote April 2nd: "Philip, Jonas and I are going with the Prince as far as Coburg, until it is made known what is to be attempted at Augsburg. Have your church pray earnestly for the Diet."‡ On the same day he wrote to Cordatus: "I hear you want to go to the Diet. I advise against it. First, because I have not been summoned thither; but for certain reasons will attend the Prince only through his own dominions."§

One thing, however, is clear: Luther is not to go to Augsburg, at least not at once and in company with the other the-

*C. R., II., 33, 34.

†Köstlin says: "The articles were first considered at Torgau and delivered to the Elector, April 3rd. For an earlier consideration of them by Luther and Melancthon at Torgau, there was no opportunity. March 27th, Melancthon was there (C. R. II., 33) engaged on the new doctrines of Campanus, and Luther was not there with him. For April 1st he still knows nothing about the doctrines of Campanus." *Martin Luther* (1883) II., 651. This is absolutely conclusive, for April 1st Luther wrote: "For about fifteen days already he (Campanus) has been at Torgau, publishing wretched monstrosities of doctrines, which I have not yet seen, but only heard of. Hence I cannot imagine what he maintains." Luther could not have written thus, had he been at Torgau with Melancthon engaged in considering the doctrines of Campanus. De Wette III., 566.

‡De Wette, III., 567.

§De Wette, III., 568.

ologians. But there is no existing document of this, or of earlier date, that tells us *why* Luther was to be left at Coburg. We know only that he had been so informed by the Elector's letter of March 14th, quoted above. We do not know whether at this time he knew the reasons, or whether at any time in his life he knew all the reasons, that led to the determination not to take him to Augsburg. Nor is there any evidence that at this time Luther was dissatisfied with the decision that had been made in the matter.

We have now come to the beginning of the journey. April 3rd, Luther, Melancthon and Jonas left Wittenberg for Torgau.* The following day the electoral train consisting of about one hundred and sixty persons,† set out for Augsburg. They took with them three boxes full of civil and religious documents, among which in all probability were the Schwabach Articles, and the so-called "Torgau Articles," though these are not named in the Catalogue given by Förstemann.‡ The train proceeded *via* Grimma, Altenburg, Isenberg, to Weimar, which was reached on Saturday 9th, and where the Elector was met by a messenger from Nuremberg who announced that the Emperor was on his way to Germany, and would certainly appear at Augsburg.§ On Palm Sunday (April 10th), Luther preached at Weimar, and the Elector and some of his train partook of the Lord's Supper.|| After resting a couple days at Weimar, the party turned southward, and on Friday, April 15th, entered Coburg on the southern limit of the Elector's dominion. Here again Luther preached. In his sermons he made no reference to the questions of the hour, but declaimed violently against the fanatics, "as if it were sufficient once more to warn his Elector against any association with Sacramentarians."¶

*Jonas' *Briefwechsel*, I., 145.

†Seckendorf, II., 152.

‡*Urkundenbuch* I., 134, *et seqq.*

§Jonas' *Briefwechsel*, I., 145.

||Schirrmacher, p. 372; Coelestin, I., 29 b.

¶Kolde, *Martin Luther*, II., 327.

LUTHER LEFT AT COBURG.

Already, April 7th, from Eisenberg, the Elector had requested the senate of Nuremberg to receive Luther and to furnish him protection during the Diet, as he (the Elector) wished to have him in a safe place, and nearer at hand for the purpose of consultation, "than in our land,"* that is, in Coburg. As the Elector found no answer awaiting him at Coburg, he wrote again, April 15th, and repeated the request of April 7th.† But the next day, April 16th, Michael von Kaden came to Coburg to say that, April 13th, the Nuremberg senate had decided not to receive Luther, nor to furnish him with a safe-conduct.‡ This information at once determined the place of Luther's residence during the Diet. It had been the Elector's intention to take him as far as Nuremberg, or within about one hundred miles of Augsburg, that as "opportunity offered" (nach Gelegenheit) he might consult him in the proposed transactions.§ It was now decided to leave Luther at Coburg. Accordingly on the morning of April 23rd, before four o'clock, he was conveyed secretly to the castle. This was the best that the circumstances would allow. He was under the ban of the Empire, and under the excommunication of the Pope. It would not have been expedient to take him to Augsburg. In all probability he would have been killed on the spot. But while it is documentarily certain that the Elector and his counsellors wanted Luther nearer than Coburg, it is highly probable that they did not want him

*Original letter is given by Prof. Kolde in *Kirchengeschichtliche Studien*, pp. 155-7.

†Original in Kolde's *Analecta Lutherana*, p. 119.

‡Von Kaden delivered this information *viva voce*. But he carried with him an "Instruction," written by Lazarus Spengler, which gives many reasons why Luther could not be received at Nuremberg. Original given by Kolde in *Kirchengeschichtliche Studien*, pp. 257 *et seqq.* Very justly does Kolde say: "The Nurembergers did not have the steadfastness and the courage to expose themselves to danger."

§Kolde's discovery and publication of the correspondence between the Elector and the Nuremberg senate, has enabled us to perceive the final reason why Luther was left at *Coburg*, and not taken to Nuremberg.

at Augsburg. At least we meet with no expression of desire to have him at Augsburg, and learn of no effort having been made to remove the obstacles that opposed his going thither. There were, on the contrary, two kinds of personal reasons why Luther would have been a *persona non grata* at Augsburg. He was literally "hated" by the Electoral Prince, John Frederick, who ascribed to Luther's influence much of the resolute opposition shown by the Elector to the Emperor.* His presence at Augsburg would have been intensely exasperating to the Romanists, and would have rendered negotiations more difficult. He was enthusiastic in defense of his cause, uncompromising in spirit and violent in discussion. It would have been highly impolitic on the part of the Elector, and very dangerous to his expressed purposes of conciliation and fellowship with the opposite party, to take Luther to Augsburg. It would have been like the throwing of a bomb into the camp of an enemy. One can readily see how the whole cause of Protestantism, which was now on trial, would have been brought into greater peril by allowing Luther to appear at the Diet. This must have been foreseen by the Elector and his counsellors. Hence after reading all the known contemporaneous documents relating to the question of Luther's detention at Coburg, we cannot resist the conclusion that, much as the Elector desired to have Luther as near as possible for consultation, he did not want him at Augsburg to assist in the pending negotiations. Such also, essentially, is the conclusion expressed or intimated by not a few historians who cannot be justly accused of *tendenz*, nor of prejudices, nor of insufficient information;† and such a conclusion is in no sense contradicted by Luther's declaration: "It was not safe to take me

*See Melancthon's letter to Luther, May 22nd, C. R., II., 61; and Walch's *Luther's Werke*, XVI., 819.

†Mathesius (1565) says: "For great and important reasons Doctor Luther was left at this castle (Coburg), lest the enemy should be rendered more bitter by his presence, and the chief cause should be brought into discredit." *Eighth Sermon*. See Pfaff: *Geschichte des Angsb. Glaubensbekenntnisses*, I., 198; Weber, *Kritische Geschichte der A. C.*, I., 27; Strang's *Martin Luther*, p. 603; Facius' *Geschichte A. C.*, p. 42; Engelhardt, *Niedner's Zeitschrift* (1865), p. 570; Koehler's *Journeys of Luther*, p. 284; Kahn's, *Dogmatik*, II., 423; "Personally too exasperating."

to Augsburg,"* nor by his expressions of impatience with his detention at Coburg. It was not Luther's fault that he was not taken to Augsburg. The responsibility in the matter rests with the Elector, who had to consider the peaceful issue of the Diet, as well as Luther's personal safety.

At all events the Elector commanded Luther to remain at Coburg. Michael von Kaden explained to him "briefly and very gently" the reasons why he could not be taken to Nuremberg; and von Kaden reports that Luther declared to him that his "original counsel had been to be left at Wittenberg, since he did not believe that anything more would be accomplished at the pending Diet than had been accomplished at former ones."†

April 23rd the Elector and his party left Coburg, and, proceeding *via* Bamberg and Nuremberg, reached their destination May 2nd. But Luther was safe in the castle of Coburg. Yet his heart and his prayers went with his friends. Even on the first day of his residence in the castle, he wrote three letters, one to each of his three friends, Melancthon, Jonas and Spalatin;‡ but he makes no reference to the "Apology," and no serious reference to the Diet. To Wincleslaus Link he writes, April 23rd: "We are sitting here at Coburg uncertain about the Diet and the coming of the Emperor. Perhaps you have more accurate information. My companions have gone to Augsburg, but the Prince wants me to stay here. You will see

*De Wette, IV., 27.

†See Michael von Kaden's official report to the Nuremberg senate in *Kirchengeschichtliche Studien*, p. 263. Von Kaden says *inter alia*: "I think my gracious lord the Elector will send Doctor Martin back to Wittenberg." See Dr. Heinrich Rinn's *Die Entstehung der A. C.*, p. 17. It is evident that neither von Kaden nor the Elector gave Luther all the reasons why he could not be taken farther, for April 18th he wrote to Nicholas Hausmann: "I am commanded by the Prince, while the others go to the Diet, to remain at Coburg, nescio qua de causa. Thus all things are uncertain from day to day." De Wette, IV., 1. Kolde thinks that von Kaden gave Luther only the general reasons why he could not be taken farther. *Kircheng. Studien*, p. 255. Certainly the Elector had not been full and explicit.

‡De Wette, *Luthers Briefe*, IV., 2, 3, 4, 12. Knaake, Köstlin and others have shown that these letters were written, April 23rd, and not April 22nd, as the date is given by De Wette.

Philip, Eisleben, and Spalatin."* The next day he wrote to Eoban Hess, of Nuremberg: "I send you four living, speaking, most eloquent epistles. Gladly would I have been the fifth, but one said to me, keep silent, you have a bad voice."† There is no mistaking the meaning of this last sentence. Somebody, perhaps the Electoral Prince John Frederick, perhaps one of the electoral counsellors, had expressed an unwillingness to have Luther go to Augsburg. The explanation of Engelhardt is as charitable as the facts will allow: "The meaning of the expression manifestly is not that they did not like his faith and his dogmatic views; but that they did not think him possessed of such calmness and gentleness as the proposed work of peace required. This, to be sure, was a second reason why the counsellors of the Elector agreed to leave him behind; but it was subordinate, and entirely unessential for the question of theology."‡ There is no proof that Luther was to be ignored, or was to be denied the opportunity of further influencing his associates in the faith. But that he should be kept from Augsburg, because of his impetuosity, and of his unfitness for negotiations, is just what prudence would seem to dictate. Luther was not the man to appear at diets. He was not taken to Spires in 1529, nor do we hear of his having been ordered to Hagenau and Worms in 1540, and to Regensburg in 1541. Luther could fight with devils, and fanatics, could tear up stumps and stones, but he was not endowed with the patience and tact of the diplomatist. In these practical talents he was greatly surpassed by Melancthon, who in diets and conferences served the cause of the Reformation for thirty years with preëminent success.

MELANCHTHON COMMISSIONED TO WRITE THE "APOLOGY."

There were also personal reasons why Luther should not be chosen to draw up articles to be presented to the Diet. His articles would have been as offensive to the opposite party as his person. They would also have borne the characteristic

*De Wette, IV., 5.

†De Wette, IV., 6.

‡Niedner's *Zeitschrift* (1865), p. 570.

qualities of their author, and would have defeated the end in view. Hence very properly does the judicious Weber write: "Since according to the Imperial Rescript for the Diet at Augsburg in 1530, the Emperor wished to remove all errors and disputes in matters of faith, and wished to hear the opinion and view of every one, it was wise in the Elector not to turn over to Luther the further expansion of the articles composed by the theologians at Wittenberg, and to have him finish the articles which were to be delivered to the Emperor. For since Luther had been outlawed by the Emperor and could not even be taken to the Diet by the Elector, but had to be left at Coburg, would it have been wise in the Elector and his associates to desire to deliver to the Emperor a confession of which the outlawed Luther was known to be the author? Would Luther, full of enthusiasm for the truth, violent in controversy with his enemies, often incautious and insulting in speech, have been able to restrain himself in elaborating the Confession when once he had to speak on the controverted articles and abuses of the Romish Church? Only read the Schmalkald articles, composed for the Council of Mantua. Had he written the Confession in the same tone and spirit, considering the circumstances of the small band of Protestants at that time, could it have been read in the presence of the Emperor, Electors, Bishops and assembled estates of the Empire? Would it not have increased the bitterness of the opposite party, and thus, humanly speaking, have brought greater injury than profit to the good cause? Valdesius said of Me'anchthon's Confession, which he read before it was delivered to the Emperor, that it was so bitter that the opposite party would not tolerate it. What would he not have judged in the case of Luther's work? Even Cochleus, who compared the Schmalkald Articles with the Confession, very correctly judged that it was far easier to listen to the latter, and that its words and thoughts were much less offensive than those of the former. Hence it was well planned that Luther with his fire and enthusiasm, who, when the truth was involved, cared as little for a king as for a stupid priest, in a matter so delicate as the affair of religion at that time, should not be allowed to speak before the

Emperor and the Empire. For truth, when it has to contend with prejudice, operates more effectively on the human heart when it appears in modest, pleasing attire, than when it appears in a coarse, rasping dress, which really discredits it, and exasperates and incenses, rather than conciliates the votary of prejudice. Therefore the work was given over by the Elector to Melanchthon; for he, not less than Luther a friend of truth, had a far calmer soul, was gentle and modest, and with the beautiful and pleasing style, in which he surpassed the theologians of his time, knew how to speak the truth without in the least compromising it, and without exasperating the opposite party."*

That the Elector was influenced by some such considerations as those given by Weber, can scarcely be questioned when we take into the account the circumstances, the end aimed at, and the temper and talents of the two men. Melanchthon, because of his supereminent fitness for the work to be done, was commissioned to write an Apology to be used in defense of the Elector before the Diet. This action on the part of the Elector and his counsellors made Melanchthon for the time being the theological leader of the reforming party. That he occupied such a position is seen in the numerous opinions written by him at Augsburg, in the fact that the *Bedenken* brought by the other theologians to Augsburg were turned over to him for examination, that the Nuremberg legates report his actions, and that he held interviews with Schlepper and Valdesius, the Imperial Secretaries.† Never was leadership more wisely and justly bestowed; never was it more modestly and conscientiously accepted; and it came to him so naturally and so fittingly that neither Luther nor any one of the other theologians journeying together to Augsburg, has left on record a single syllable of complaint. Three hundred and sixty-nine years of afterthought has justified the wisdom of the appointment. Melanchthon's moderation, learning, culture, and familiarity with the Witten-

**Kritische Geschichte der Augs. Con.*, I., p. 26 et seqq. Virek, *Zeits. fuer Kirchenges.* (1888), p. 73.

†C. R., II., 119, 122.

berg teaching, pointed him out as the man best fitted to draw up whatever writing was to be laid before the Diet. There can be no doubt that the selection was entirely acceptable to Luther, and that Luther assisted with his advice so long as the two remained together at Coburg. But we do not know the extent of the writing, nor the exact shape it took at Coburg. It is probable that Melanchthon took the so-called "Torgau Articles" as his guide, and produced a writing not widely different from the second part of the Augsburg Confession, and added a Preface—"exordium." It was thought formerly by some writers that by "Preface" is to be understood Part First of the Confession, or the articles of faith, which were intended to introduce the articles on abuses. But that theory is now abandoned, since it is universally admitted that the "Apology," as it was written at Coburg, and further revised during the first two or three days after the arrival at Augsburg, *did not contain articles of faith.** It is probable that we have Melanchthon's "Preface" in Förstemann's *Urkundenbuch* I., pp. 68, 69, as a part of document "A," which is now very generally recognized as the "Torgau Articles." After making a brief refutation of the charge that the Elector "has abolished all divine worship," and "has introduced a heathenish, dissolute life, and insubordination," this introductory writing says: "To this end it is well to place a long and rhetorical preface," which seems to imply that the thought contained in the preceding paragraph is to be expanded and made more apologetic, so as more fitly to introduce the articles on abuses. And that this "Preface" had some such design, is at once apparent from the words with which it closes: "The dissension now is especially concerning some abuses, which have been introduced by human doctrine and statutes, of which we will report in order, and indicate for what reasons, my lord is induced to cause certain abuses to be abated." It is quite likely that it is of this "Preface," expanded and improved, that Melanchthon writes to Luther from Augsburg, May 4th.†

*See this matter fully discussed in the LUTHERAN QUARTERLY for July, 1897, pp. 311-313, July, 1898, 355 *et seqq.*

†C. R. II., 39, 40.

Naturally and necessarily Melanchthon, with all fidelity to the truth, and after giving due deference to the suggestions of the theologians and civil counsellors, would impress the characteristics of his own mind and temper on the product of his pen. "Certainly Luther would have expressed himself very differently, but there was nothing in the Confession that was un-Lutheran."* It was the mildest possible expression of the doctrines taught and of the ceremonies observed in the churches which had been already reproachfully named *Lutheran*. "It is at the same time a confession and an apology, its aim being to serve the cause of peace. The whole first part, which in brief articles states what is taught by the Evangelicals, proceeds to show how little they deviate from the Roman Church, and that the very heresies, which Eck had catalogued against them, were expressly rejected. The centre of gravity is found in the second part, which treats of abuses. It is shown that for conscience' sake certain universally recognized abuses had to be abolished, and that not only the Holy Scriptures, but also the practice of the early Church, and of the recognized teachers, was on their side."† But we do not learn from any contemporaneous writer, when or under what particular circumstances, the Elector commissioned Melanchthon to prepare an "Apology." It is evident, however, from one of Melanchthon's letters that the commission had been given at Coburg or before the arrival there, April 15th, since, May 4th, two days after the arrival at Augsburg, he writes: "I have made the exordium of our Apology somewhat more rhetorical (finished in style) than I had written it at Coburg. In a short time I will bring it, or if the Prince will not permit that, I will send it.‡" On the same day he wrote as follows to Veit Dietrich, who was with Luther at Coburg: "I will soon run over to you to bring the *Apology* which is to be delivered to the Emperor, that it may be examined by Luther."§

*Prof. Kolde, *Martin Luther*, II., 345.

†Prof. Kolde, *ut supra*.

‡C. R. II., 39-41. In this Letter Melanchthon informs Luther that Eck has sent a "big batch of propositions" to be discussed before the Princes. See LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, July, 1998, p. 355-6.

§C. R. II., 40-41.

Several things are evident from these letters:

1. Melanchthon has been making changes in the writing which now for the first time we hear called "Apology."

2. That this "Apology" was written with the express purpose of being delivered to the Emperor.

3. That Melanchthon was desirous of having the "Apology" examined by Luther before its delivery to the Emperor.

But of the exact form and contents of the "Apology" at this time we know nothing. It probably did not differ materially from the second part of the Augsburg Confession (Article XXVIII. omitted) as we now have it, though evidently important changes had been made between April 23rd and May 4th, otherwise Melanchthon would not have wished to make a journey of nearly two hundred miles to show it to Luther. It was but just and wise that Luther should be consulted, though he was not allowed to speak the final word nor to see the Confession in its final form before delivery, as the facts incontestably prove.

THE APOLOGY IS CHANGED INTO A CONFESSION.

Melanchthon was not permitted to carry the "Apology" to Luther, neither was it sent to him in the form that it had received up to May 4th, for up to that time it did not contain articles of faith, as is now universally admitted by competent scholars. It was simply a defense of the abolition in the Elector's dominions of certain ecclesiastical customs that obscured the Gospel and deceived the people. The theologians believed that they stood on the revealed word of God, and on the teaching of the Catholic Apostolic Church. Hence they did not believe that they were under the necessity of making a confession of faith: and it may be that the Elector did not deem it important to send the "Apology" at that time to Luther, or, the sudden change in the plan of defense, may have been the reason why the "Apology" was not sent to Luther in its earliest form. When the Evangelicals, now assembled at Augsburg, saw Eck's "big batch of propositions," his 404 gravamina against them,

their eyes were opened to the fact that their enemies charged them with innumerable heresies, and identified them with ancient and modern heretics. The entire aspect of the situation was changed. New dangers required new defenses. The Exordium (Preface), whatever it was, had to be abandoned. Articles of faith, that is, positive statements of doctrine were needed, as a means by which the Lutherans could purge themselves from the terrible charge of heresy, and repudiate the company in which their enemies had put them. Thus it was Eck's Propositions that gave the occasion for the preparation of articles of faith for the "Apology," inasmuch as no articles of faith had been composed, nor revised, at Wittenberg (March 14th-27th), for the Diet, for it was maintained, and proclaimed in the "Torgau Articles," that the doctrine taught was salutary and Christian.

It is not improbable that the Electoral party came in contact with Eck's Propositions on the way from Coburg to Augsburg. Because of these Propositions, or for some other reason, the Elector, about the last of April or the first of May, sent a confession of his faith to the Emperor. This confession consisted of fifteen of the Schwabach Articles, revised and translated into Latin.* Consistency would require that these same articles should be prefixed to or made the basis of articles of faith for the "Apology," especially since only a few months earlier they had been presented at Schwabach under the title: "Articles of the Elector of Saxony concerning faith." It was the prefixing of these revised and changed Schwabach Articles to the Apology, and the addition of several new articles, that changed the "Apology" into a confession of faith. This revising, changing and adding, was the work of Melanchthon. Who originated the idea of changing the "Apology" into a confession of faith, is

*The writer has never seen these fifteen articles, nor is he aware that they have ever been published. They were discovered by Prof. Brieger, of Leipzig, in the Vatican Library in 1884, and have been briefly described by him. He says: "*In essentials they agree with the Schwabach Articles.*" He notes particularly that "the tenth article is a (not faultless) translation of the tenth Schwabach (worthy of notice is the statement here: *Quod vere et substantialiter praesens sit verum corpus et sanguis Christi.*" See *Kirchengeschichtliche Studien*, p. 312 et seqq.

not a matter of record. We may fairly infer from Melancthon's letter of May 11th (hereafter to be quoted) that the happy thought originated with him. As in all probability he revised and translated the fifteen articles sent by the Elector to the Emperor, he could in a short time make another revision, and some additions, and thus finish the first draft of the *Augsburg Confession*. At any rate, May 11th, the "Apology" was in a form fit for presentation to the Emperor, as the Elector's vindication against alleged heresy, and as a justification for the change of ceremonies in his dominions.

THE CONFESSION IS SENT TO LUTHER.

As the Emperor was not nearer than Insbruck, and was known to be advancing towards Augsburg slowly, and was not expected at Augsburg within two weeks,* there would be time enough before his arrival, to send the, "Apology" to Luther for examination, and for revision by him if deemed necessary. Accordingly the Elector sent it May 11th, with the following letter: "After that you and our other learned men at Wittenberg, in accordance with our gracious purpose and desire, drew up a statement of the controverted articles of religion, we will not conceal from you that *Master Philip Melancthon* has further revised the same and brought them into a form which we herewith send you. And it is our gracious desire that you should not hesitate further to revise and to consider them. And if you like them to such a degree, or if you think anything should be taken therefrom, or added thereto, note it on the margin (Und ist unser gnädiges Begehren, ihr wollet Dieselben weiter zu übersehen und zu bewegen unbeschwert seyn. Und wo es euch dermassen gefällig, oder etwas davon oder dazu zu setzen bedächtet, das wollet also daneben verzeichnen), in order that on the Emperor's arrival, which we expect in a short time, it may be composed and ready; and return the same hither immediately, well secured and sealed, by this messenger."† On the same day

*C. R. II., 46.

†C. R. II., 47. Following the lead of such eminent German authorities as Pfaff, Weber, Kolde, Schmidt, and others equally conversant with the meaning of German words, and with this particular correspondence, we

Melanchthon wrote a letter to Luther which contains the following. "Our Apology is sent to you, though it is more properly a confession; for the Emperor will not have time for prolix discussions. Nevertheless I have said those things which I regarded as either specially important or becoming. I have embraced about all the articles of faith, for the reason that *Eck* has published the most diabolical slanders against us. Against these I wished to oppose a remedy. Judge about the whole writing in accordance with your spirit."*

Melanchthon's letter is important as noting the change of the document from the form of an "Apology" to the form of a confession, and as requesting a free expression of Luther's opinion about "the whole writing." The Elector's letter, while requesting Luther not to hesitate to revise, add, subtract, as he saw fit, nevertheless confines his observations to the margin; though it is not probable that Luther would have felt himself specially hampered by such restrictions; and there can be no doubt that his suggestions and criticisms, had he chosen to make any, would have received the greatest consideration at Augsburg. But we know that they would not have been final, for no sooner is the "Apology" returned to the Elector, than we hear that it is to be placed in the hands of Chancellor Brück "to be shaped before and behind,"† that is, as Prof. Kolde explains,‡ to be revised generally; and even later we find that the electoral counsellors and theologians are working on it daily, and are making changes and improvements.§ Moreover, the form in which the Confession was sent to Luther was what the Germans call *Der*

have translated *daneben verzeichnen*, note on the margin, am Rande, as the Germans write it. There is no warrant for Dr. Krauth's translation of *daneben* in this passage by, "at the same time." *Conservative Reformation*, p. 224. Such a translation makes only tolerable sense even in the very faulty translation which Dr. Krauth has made of the entire part quoted above in the original. The italics employed by Dr. Krauth in lines 4, 6, 7 are not warranted by the original, and the same is true of the italics on page 233.

*C. R. II., 45.

†C. R., 62, 71, 78.

‡Die Augsb. Conf. 6 note.

§C. R. II., 71.

erste Entwurf, Der fertige Entwurf, Prima adumbratio. "It was far from being finished."* It did not yet contain Article XX., Of Faith and Good Works, which in extent of matter is nearly one-third of the so-called doctrinal part. Probably it did not contain Article XXI. It did not contain Article 27 in its present form. Article 28, according to the judgment of competent scholars, did not yet exist. Neither the Preface nor the Conclusion had been yet composed. That is, more than one-third of the Confession, as it appeared in its final form, was written after May 11th. What verbal changes were introduced into the various articles, we do not know for certain, though we may conclude from a comparison of the oldest manuscript copies with the *Editio Princeps*, that the changes were many and important.†

*Kolde, *Augsb. Konf.*, p. 5. In the *Realencyclopaedie*, Kolde says: "Of the work, which was far from being completed, we know not how much Luther really saw." II., 244. Planck says: "By May 11th Melancthon had finished a complete draft. This the Elector sent on that date to Luther at Coburg. But that draft was changed so much from time to time up almost to the moment of delivery, by additions and omissions, by elaboration and the introduction of entirely new articles, that a wholly different work arose, for which, however, the Torgau Articles furnished the foundation." *Geschichte des Protest. Lehrbegriffs* III., 41, n. We cannot now think of any two points connected with the Augsburg Confession, before its delivery, only as *Der erste Entwurf*, and that it was in that form far from being finished. Oehler holds that Articles XVIII.-XXI. were added after May 11th, *Symbolik*, p. 256. Noesgen says: "May 11 it yet lacked much as compared with its later size, as articles 20, 27, 28," *Symbolik*, p. 75. The proof of this lack is documentary, as will appear in the text.

†See C. R. XXVI. pp. 263-335 for the Latin, and pp. 538-688 for the German. The Spalatin, the first Ansbach, and the Hanoverian, are regarded as the three oldest manuscripts of the Confession, and as exhibiting a text prior to that delivered to the Emperor. See Förstemann, *Urkundenbuch*, I., 310 *et seqq.*, 343 *et seqq.*, C. R. XXVI. 417 *et seqq.* The Spalatin is generally regarded as the oldest MS. of the Confession. Engelhardt holds it to be "the original form of the Augustana sent to Luther." Niedner's *Zeitschrift* (1865) p. 590. The Spalatin MS. has Article 20, Of Faith and Good Works, but it is placed after the present Article 21, Of the Worship of Saints. "But the finer paper on which it is written, shows that it was added later." Engelhardt, *ut supra*, p. 576, 600. Spalatin cancelled the present article 21 in his MS. and did not restore it after he added the present article 20. *Urkundenbuch*, I., p. 322

That Luther was well-pleased, but not absolutely and enthusiastically delighted with *Der erste Entwurf* of the Confession, is evident from his letter of May 15th to the Elector: Ich hab M. Philipsen Apologia uber lesen, die gefellet mir fast wol, und weis nichts dran zu bessern noch endern, würde sich auch nicht schicken denn ich so sanfft und leise nicht treten kan. Christus unser herr helffe, das sie viel und grosse frucht schaffe, wie wir hoffen und bitten Amen. That is: "I have read over Master Philip's Apology. It pleases me very well. I do not know of anything in it to be improved or changed, nor would it become

Bindseil, describing this MS, as it actually appears, having articles 20 and 21, as described above, says: "It lacks the preface to the Emperor, and the last part of the Confession, namely the greater part of the Article *De votis monachorum* (27), the entire article *De potestate ecclesiastica* (28), and the *Epilogue with the names subscribed*." C. R. XXVI. p. 419. He describes the Ansbach ("Onold" he calls it) as "containing only a part of the Confession, viz., the first nineteen articles of faith with the epilogue belonging to them." C. R. II., 419-20. He describes the Hanoverian as "presenting the first nineteen articles of faith with the epilogue belonging to them, and the proem to the controverted articles." C. R. XXVI. p. 422. Very properly does Engelhardt say: "The first MSS. which we have of the Augsburg Confession, must show us how these articles arose (Articles XVIII.-XXI). As already remarked this MS. has Article 20, but on finer paper—a sure sign that it was added later. Likewise the first Ansbach and the Hanoverian MSS. do not have articles 20 and 21; but the Epilogue follows immediately after Article 19. In the latter only subsequently were the Preface, Articles 20 and 21, and the controverted articles, and the later improvements, added by a different hand. By reason of this deficiency these three MSS. point to the earliest period of the composition of the Augustana. The Spalatin has the controverted articles, though Spalatin suddenly stops in the third part of the Article on Monastic Vows (27) at page 62, and was only accidentally hindered from further copying." Engelhardt then concludes: "From this it is clear that Articles 18 and 19, were in the first draft (*im ersten Entwurf*), and that Articles 20 and 21 were added later. As already shown, Article 21 was added after June 16. This is proved by the French translation in the Archives at Cassel, which has Article 21, but not the controverted articles and what is yet lacking in MSS. It thus represents a further step. Now only were the controversial articles added. For this step the Spalatin MS. is proof, since it has Article 21, but numbered it 20. Later he erased it when he introduced the Article, Of Faith and Good Works, as 20, without restoring it after Article 20." Niedner's *Zeitschrift* (1865), p. 600. Printed copies of the Spalatin and First Ansbach MSS. are given in Förstemann's *Urkundenbuch*, I., pp. 310 *et seqq.*

me, since I cannot move so softly and lightly. Christ our Lord grant that it may bring forth much fruit. Amen."*

We may agree perfectly with Prof. Kolde as to the meaning of this letter: "Notwithstanding the undeniable allusion to Melanchthon's well-known effort, to give offense nowhere, he (Luther) wished to express his complete agreement."† Undoubtedly Luther would have expressed himself polemically, and more positively than Melanchthon had done, and, as we learn from one of his later judgments of the Confession, he would in all probability have included in it several additional articles.‡ But the letter disappoints us. It expresses no enthusiasm for the "Apology," and no interest in the coming Diet; and equally are we disappointed to find in his letter of the same date to Melanchthon, that Luther has made no reference to the "Apology," and none to the Diet.§ An explanation is to be sought, not in the supposition that Luther was soured by having not been allowed to take part in the Diet; but rather in the fact, as already stated, that he did not expect any favorable results from the Diet, and was supremely occupied by his own work at Coburg. Nevertheless his letter to the Elector, barring the "*leise Ironie*," shows Luther's full approval of Melanchthon's work *in so far as* it had been submitted to him—*der erste Entwurf*.

MELANCHTHON'S LETTER OF MAY 22ND.

May 22nd, or earlier, Melanchthon hired a messenger to go to Coburg and to Wittenberg. But after hiring this messenger,

*De Wette's *Luther's Briefe*, IV., 17. We have taken our German copy from Weber's *Kirchliche Geschichte*, I., 29. He copied the original in the Weimar Archives.

†*Die Augsburgische Confession*, p. 5. In his article on the Augsburg Confession in the *Real-Encyclopædie*, Kolde says: "Notwithstanding the ironical allusion," etc. In his *Martin Luther*, he says: "In the reference to Melanchthon's well-known inclination nowhere to give offence, and to his (Luther's) own inability to select such mild forms, *Klingt eine leise Ironie durch*. Nevertheless he wished to express his full agreement. A few margined notes, which according to a later notice, he seems to have added, are scarcely worth mentioning." II., pp. 336-37.

‡De Wette, IV., 110.

§Ibid., IV., 16.

and just as he was beginning to write, he received a letter from Luther,—*Jam conduxeramus nuntium qui ad te, et deinde Vuitebergam proficisceretur*; resciverat enim Jonas de filii morte ex literis *Violae* scribae. Sed inter scribendum sunt nobis reditae tuae literae posteriores per tabellarium D. *Apelli*,—in all probability Luther's letter* of May 15th, since this is the only extant Luther letter which he could have received at that time. Melanchthon's letter is not properly an answer to this Luther letter, but is almost entirely a news letter. Besides other items of news he writes in the middle of a long paragraph, and simply as an item of news or of information, the following: "In the *Apology* we change many things daily. The article *De Votis*, because it was more meager than it should be, I have removed, and have put in its place another discussion of the same subject, somewhat more elaborate. I am now treating also of the power of the Keys. I wish you would run over the articles of faith. If you think there is nothing wrong in these, we will treat the rest as best we may, for they are to be changed and adapted to circumstances."†

This, now, is *all* that the letter contains about the "*Apology*." It is chiefly an item of information, with the request that Luther would "run over the articles of faith." The letter does not contain even the slightest intimation that the "*Apology*" or any part of it, was at this time sent again to Luther. The very opposite is to be inferred from the whole face and tone of the item. The writer manifestly goes on the supposition that Luther has a copy of the *Apology* by him. There is no intimation expressed or implied, that Melanchthon knew that Luther had returned the *Apology* to the Elector. Indeed, how could he have known of the return of the *Apology*, since it was returned to the Elector, or to his chancellor,‡ and Melanchthon

*De Wette, IV., 16.

†C. R., II., 60.

‡Knaake, *Luther's Antheil*, p. 58. It is the judgment of the most competent scholars that the same messenger that brought Luther's letter of May 15th to Melanchthon, also brought the letter of the same date and the "*Apology*" to the Elector, May 22nd. Knaake *ut supra*; Engelhardt in Neidner's *Zeitschrift*, (1865) 572-3; Köstlin *Martin Luther*, II., 426; Krauth, *A Chronicle of the A. C.*, p. 30.

wrote this letter to Luther *immediately*—"inter scribendum"—after receiving Luther's letter of May 15th, in which there is not the faintest allusion to the Confession? Moreover, Melancthon would have had no right to send the *unfinished* Apology to Luther. It was not his. It belonged to the Elector. Hence we do not hesitate to say that it is absolutely gratuitous for Dr. Krauth to write: "It (the Confession) was sent again, on the 22nd of the same month (May), by Melancthon, and was received by Luther, in its *second form*."* Such a statement is an assumption pure and simple. Neither the letter of May 22nd, nor any other contemporaneous document, contains one word that can be construed in favor of any such sending, and all the circumstances and known facts are directly against any such supposition. Nor is there any tradition from the times of such

* *Conservative Reformation*, p. 232. On p. 228 Dr. Krauth had written: "The Elector sent the Confession May 11th. Luther replied May 15th, probably the very day he received it; his reply probably reached Augsburg May 20th, and two days after, Melancthon sends him the Articles of Faith, with the elaboration which had taken place in the interval, and informs him of what he had been doing, and designs to do." See Krauth's *The Augsburg Confession*, p. XVII. There is no probability that Luther's letter of May 15th to the Elector reached Augsburg May 20th. In his *A Chronicle of the Augsburg Confession*, p. 30, Dr. Krauth says that the letter to the Elector, of May 15th, and the letter to Luther of the same date to Melancthon, came to Augsburg together. The proof is certain that the letter to Melancthon came May 22nd (C. R. II., 59. See above in text, *inter scribendum*). Ergo. "Sends him the Articles of Faith," etc. Neither in Melancthon's letter of May 22nd, nor in any other existing document is there the shadow of a warrant for this assumption repeated again and again by Dr. Krauth. Such a statement would be instantly ruled out of a court of cassation for the utter lack of evidence to sustain it. In 1577, that is, forty-seven years after the delivery of the Augsburg Confession, George Coelestin wrote: "Yet (after Luther's approval May 15) Philip, some days after, sending a copy to Luther again (*remittens*), writes May 22nd." (We employ Dr. Krauth's translation). In 1578 David Chytraeus repeats this statement verbatim, showing that he simply appropriated it from Coelestin, who, we may charitably suppose, misread or misunderstood Melancthon's letter. This *πρωτον φενδοσ* was long ago abandoned by the historians of the Augsburg Confession. See the matter discussed at length in *THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY*, July, 1898, pp. 382 *et seqq.*, Knaake's *Luther's Anthiel*, pp. 58, 68; Niedner's *Zeitschrift*, (1865), p. 572.

sending. Besides, it is impossible to believe that Melanchthon would have sent the Confession to Luther at this time, or at any other time, without in some way mentioning or alluding to the fact. The *onus probandi* rests upon him who asserts.

Dr. Knaake, whose sympathies would naturally be in an opposite direction, has said: "We must admit that Luther did not receive the Article Of Faith and Works, and it is probable that the judgment expressed on the Confession as sent to him, is to be limited to the first seventeen articles.

"After May 11th only the already quoted communication of Melanchthon about the Confession, of May 22nd, reached Luther. In his subsequent letters he does not refer to it again. We see from that passage that at that time Melanchthon in connection with the other learned men, was working on the two last articles, *de votis* and *de potestate clavium*. Thus the second part of the Confession under consideration was nearly finished. At the same time we there find the purpose expressed by Melanchthon not to send anything more to Luther, because the other articles on the abuses to be abolished had to be changed according to time and circumstances: *reliqua utcumque tractabimus*; *subinde enim mutandi sunt (articuli) atque ad occasiones accommodandi*.

"In the letters exchanged between Luther and Melanchthon, there is, consequently, to be recognized no influence of the former upon the composition of the Confession. Yet that he expressed a favorable judgment on it, in so far as it was submitted to him, cannot be doubted; "* that is, in the form given

*Knaake's *Luthers Antheil an der A. C.*, pp. 76-7. It is highly probable, that Luther received Melanchthon's letter of May 22nd. It is certain, however, that we have no answer to it. After this letter begins that long silence on the part of the men at Augsburg of which Luther so bitterly complains, saying in one place that "for an entire month he had no news from Augsburg" (De Wette's *Luther's Briefe*, IV., 44), and in another, that for "three full weeks he had been tormented by unbroken silence" (*ut supra*, p. 45). Finally when letters came Luther was so angry that he refused to read them—(C. R., II., 141). Messenger after messenger came to Coburg, but they brought no letters for Luther (De Wette, IV., 60). Melanchthon and Jonas tried to throw the blame on the letter-carrier, but Luther indignantly replied: "The fault is yours and yours only" (De

to it by Melanchthon up to May 11th; and there is not one *scintilla* of evidence that Luther saw the Confession in any other than this first form,—*Der erste Entwurf*,—until after it had been read before the Emperor. And yet it underwent many changes even after May 22nd. On its return from Coburg we find it next, May 24th, in the hands of Chancellor Brück, who “had to shape it before and behind,”* that is, as already explained, to revise it generally, and, doubtless, to give it a diplomatic shape, as it was a political as well as a theological document.

Wette, IV., 50). Knaake says: “Melanchthon’s silence extends over the whole time from May 22nd to June 13th.” *Luther’s Anthiel*, p. 51. Köstlin says: “Luther remained without a letter four weeks,” *Martin Luther*, II., 655. Plitt says: “For three weeks long, he (Luther) heard nothing from Augsburg,” *D. Martin Luther*, p. 369. See Kawerau, *Jonas’ Briefw.* I., 161, n. As the letters of Melanchthon and Jonas of May 22nd, were sent by a special messenger, they were probably received by Luther, May 26th. From that time to June 20th he received no news from Augsburg, that is, about twenty-five days. “The messenger was innocent, and Luther’s complaint was well founded.” Kawerau, *ut supra*.

*This we learn from the Reports of Christopher Kress and Clemens Volkamer, the Nuremberg legates, who with other of their fellow citizens, came to Augsburg May 15th. Their official Reports give with great minuteness an account of almost every transaction relating to the Confession and to the Diet. It is so specific that it has been called, “The Protocol.” Bretschneider has had lengthy extracts, and sometimes entire letters extending over several pages, printed in the *Corpus Reformatorum*, Vol. II. This Nuremberg Protocol is indispensable in ascertaining the history of the Augsburg Confession from May 24th, until after its delivery. It ought to be read in connection with *Mittheilungen des Vereins fuer Geschichte der Stadt Nuernberg*, Viertes Heft, 1882, which contains the letters of the Nuremberg Senate to the legates at Augsburg. In his *Conservative Reformation*, and in his *The Augsburg Confession*, Dr. Krauth scarcely noticed this Nuremberg Protocol. In his *A Chronicle of the Augsburg Confession*, he has ignored, or at least failed to report, those passages which bear with absolutely fatal effect on his theory of a *third* sending of the Confession to Luther prior to June 25th.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ARTICLE IV.

THE GOSPEL FOR A WORLD OF SIN.

BY PRESIDENT S. A. ORT, D. D., LL. D.

The world is in a state of deep unrest. It is an unrest not merely with respect to the life of men. A most serious misfortune has befallen the human family. The course of its life is amidst ills and wrongs and woes of keenest sort. The world is in sin. It lies in wickedness. It is separate from God and without hope. It is lost. Deplorable condition, indeed! True for every generation, for every age. But what remedy may avail? How can a sinful race be recovered from the way unto death and be presented before God altogether just? What kind of gospel can meet the extraordinary requirements of the situation and be that mighty power which can lift a world of sin out of the depths into which it has fallen, and place it on the eternal foundations of righteousness and love? To this inquiry divers replies have been given. Various schemes have been devised by the wit of man and tested by his credulity. Some have come down to the present hoary with age, leaving their advocates age by age deeper in misery and moral corruption at the end of their career than in the beginning. Others have run their course and been buried in the far off past. Of all the religions which have been and are now extant among men, none has proved itself able to overcome the difficulties of sin and assure man an immortality of honor and of glory, save one, the gospel of the crucified Nazarene. This is the gospel of which Paul says, that it is not after man, neither did he receive it from man, neither was he taught it but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. It is the divine method for the recovery of sinful men and not a human device. It is from above and not from beneath, "the power of God unto salvation to every one who believeth."

For this gospel a substitute is now offered. The proposition of an up to date religion comes not from the avowed opponents of the Christian scheme, but from those who claim to be its wisest and truest friends. The old faith with its doctrinal statements is no longer serviceable. The credal exhibitions of divine truth are every one of them faulty. Even the teachings of the Apostle Paul are objectionable. Emphatic distinction is made between dogma and religion, philosophy and gospel. The pure truth aside from all forms of human thought alone is the doctrine, or rather, it is said, is the revelation of Jesus.

The long accepted evangelical conceptions of Christian belief are wide of the mark. They exhibit the most glaring inconsistencies and misrepresent the revelation of the Carpenter's Son. All this when reduced to its simple meaning, signifies that in getting the sense of the word of God, we dare not think, because to think of necessity requires some form in which the thinking may be set before the mind. And yet, strange to say, the men who claim to have gone back to Christ and found his real religion abstract from metaphysics and also from the history of our Lord, in what they are pleased to call the spirit of Jesus, are everlastingly trying to make the finest distinctions and arguing that their ideas of the gospel, which this world needs, are correct. Taken all in all, this new religion, which is to be the religion of the twentieth century is about the most metaphysical faith of which we have knowledge.

Much stress is laid on the word reasonable. The constant appeal for conviction is on this basis. Whatever of religious belief does not commend itself to dame reason must be laid aside as unsound, or which, in the end comes to the same thing, does not approve itself to an inner spiritual feeling, should be set away as false.

Strong emphases is placed on feeling. It is given out as a pure soul affection. It is the very essence of religion, or the consciousness of the life of Jesus. John Locke maintained that all our knowledge is derived from sensation. So these new religionists profess that all our knowledge of divine things is the result of a deep inner spiritual feeling.

But a little inspection shows that this spiritual feeling of which they make so much has its source in the intellect rather than in the spiritual susceptibility, and is hence an intellectual affection instead of a feeling aroused by contact of the Holy Ghost with the spiritual nature of man. And so we may rightly expect that, like the extreme mysticism of a former age, this new faith will run its course and terminate in the most ultra form of rationalism, the substantial elements of which it already embraces.

But this new gospel, the twentieth century religion, is now here for inspection. It is put forth with high manifesto as the Gospel which our world of sin needs. Long has mankind waited for this happy day. Eighteen centuries of dogma, beginning with the great Apostle, have burdened and held back the human soul; but now in these latter times, lo! the heavy load is removed and a world of sinners unobstructed rushes back to Christ to find what? A Redeemer who for our sakes became poor, made himself of no reputation, died the just for the unjust, was a propitiation for our sins, and on the third day rose from the dead for our justification? Oh, no, not this never so much, as to find what? The Spirit of Jesus!

Orthodoxy and Pietism are both refused by this extra reasonable religion and a new term, called spiritualism, adopted instead. It is defined as "the predominance of those incentives which are addressed to us through our spiritual nature, the fullness of that rational life which judges all things by their relation to righteousness, the rectitude of the soul itself." Or again, "Spiritualism, or the supremacy of the higher and purer activities over the lower and grosser ones, is the normal unfolding of the mind of man. Without it life fails to become truly rational and rapidly falls off from its possibilities." These statements describe a condition and a process, both of which are within natural lines. The whole may be summed up in a culture which is esthetic, scientific and ethical. In short it is the rationalistic conception of the spiritual and spiritualism.

The new religion is quite fond of this word. In fact it uses it as its shibboleth. It would have us know that its preëminent characteristic is the choicest. The friends of the old gospel

are wont to talk about sound doctrine, and emphasize piety, but the most modern religion has little, if any, concern for these. It rises to a much higher sphere and purer atmosphere. Its home is in the realm of rational affection. It wears the robe of the spiritual. It is spiritualism.

Suppose now we put this new faith, so finely paraded before the public, to a moderate test. Let us seek to ascertain for ourselves whether it has claims sufficient to justify a forsaking the old paths and a walking in the new. For this purpose we will content ourselves with three inquiries: 1st. What does this new gospel teach concerning God? 2nd. What does it say concerning the person of Christ? 3rd. What does it teach concerning sin and atonement?

We premise the discussion of the first question with the following proposition, namely: The gospel for a world of sin must furnish a revelation and, therefore, an adequate and true knowledge of the God who actually exists.

Every religion has its deity. Without this any religion would be impossible. All false religions teach an ideal god. The one true religion reveals the living God. The new gospel of our day claims to be a divine revelation of the essential nature of God. It brings to view merely the acts and manifestations of the Supreme Being. Knowledge of the divine nature is impossible. With this we have nothing to do, since all our objects of knowledge are phenomena. The deity of this religion then plainly must be only a phenomenal existence. The revelation it professes to contain must be only an exhibition of divine acts independent of their ground or source, and fails utterly to give right information concerning the character of the God who actually is. It has well been said "that such phenomenalism is unthinkable, if we are to retain our hold on God as a real Being. Acts and manifestations have only meaning as expressions of a nature or character." Again, this new religion declares its God to be a spiritual personality, and that this personality is Father. Father of whom? Of Jesus Christ and the community of believers. To use the language of another: "An interesting question here arises as to the sense of this term Father. It

seems clear that Fatherhood is simply a synonym for God's will of love as it rests first on Jesus and then on his disciples united with him." But the Jesus of whom mention is here made is only that historical person in whose life is realized completely the mind and will of creating love. He is the Son of God, but an historical Son. His existence is a time reality. He pertains absolutely to divine acts and manifestations. Back of these it is impossible to conceive of him having any being. His Sonship is outside eternity. He is not the eternal generation of God the Father.

Fatherhood of God is consequently not the eternal fact resident in the life of Diety himself, designating primarily an internal relation of the Godhead, as Father and Son, but only a time relation, having reference solely to creature existence. True, Christ is the Son of God, but he is not the eternal Son as God himself is eternal. He does not possess the very essence of Diety. He is not "God of God, life of life, light of light, begotten, not made." Nor, taking the words just as they read, can we say: "He was in the beginning with God, and was God." "But unto the Son he saith, thy throne, O God, is forever and ever." The most that can be claimed for him is, that he possesses perfectly the will and purpose of divine love. "In the intimacy and unity of this relation, perfectly responded to in the loving truth and obedience of Jesus, is realized Fatherhood on the one hand and Sonship on the other." And this is all that is left of an eternal paternity of God. Nothing remains of the one great fundamental truth of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, namely, that the God who actually exists is the eternal Being who is Father, Son and Holy Ghost.

In addition to what has just been indicated, the new gospel declares with enthusiastic speech that God is love. This is strictly scriptural language, and leaves the impression, that the conception of the Divine Being, which this reorganized faith entertains, is soundly Biblical. If, however, the question be raised, does the term love describe the very nature of God, the answer must be in the negative. That it should so do is inconceivable, since the only God we know is composed of acts and manifes-

tatious. Love is neither nature nor essence. It has existence only in the relation of God to a world of spiritual beings. It is the way God determines himself toward such a world as his chief end. In short, "love is will directed to the furtherance of the ends of the one loved." As will, it is said, God can only be thought of in his conscious relation to the ends which he himself is. Nothing is to be thought of in God before he determined himself as love. Either he is thought of thus or he is not thought of at all. Love therefore is not what he is, but what he determines in relation to a spiritual universe. It is merely an act of will. From this it follows that were there no moral creature existing, or no world of spiritual beings, God would not be love, because there would not be any object existing toward which the divine energy could direct itself. God would be without an end of action, and therefore without love. In other words, God can only be thought of as love in connection with a universe of rational being. This certainly must bring us at last to the conclusion, that for the perfection of the God we know, the universe of spiritual creatures is just as necessary as that a God is necessary for the existence of such a universe. And this, as we have long since learned, is the pantheistic theory.

On the other hand the old gospel tells us that God in his very nature is love, and that this love finds the fittest object of its activity and the absolute realization and satisfaction of itself, not in a creature but in infinite personality. Itself eternal and infinite, the object on which it centers its energy and in which it is completely absorbed is likewise eternal and infinite. The first and supreme end of its action is not outside, but entirely within the realm of Deity. The Father has an only begotten Son, eternally generated by him, of the same essence with him, bearing the image of his person and the brightness of his glory, on whom he can pour the love of his infinite heart, and this love in all its fullness is reciprocated by the Son. And as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, he is the object of their mutual love, which in turn is given back by

the eternal Spirit and thus the three are bound together in one life, which is the life of love, and this is the life of the ever blessed God, perfectly blessed in himself, needing nothing external to himself to make him what otherwise he would not be. Here we have indeed a revelation of the eternal, personal God. Through the teachings of this revelation we are able to say who it is dwells beyond the sky, what is his nature, how he exists, and what is the relation which he bears to the world outside himself. The new gospel knows nothing of God as he is in himself. He is here the dark unknown, and unknowable, the inapprehensible absolute of human philosophy. And now I put the question whether the trinitarian conception of God as held in all Christian ages and made known to us, is not far more reasonable, than the idea, confused and ambiguous, which the new gospel offers for our belief? Is not the God of the Nicene Creed and of the teachings of Paul more acceptable to reason, than the theory which rejects a trinity of persons and maintains that the only God for us is a Deity of phenomenal acts and manifestation? While the new gospel uses freely the terms Father, Son and Holy Ghost, let us not be deceived into the supposition that it retains the doctrine of the Evangelical Church. For the Son is only the production of the creating will of love, and as such the supreme object of divine affection, "while the Holy Spirit is the knowledge which God has of himself and of his own end, and designates in the New Testament the Spirit of God so far as he is the ground of the knowledge of God and of the specific religious and moral life in the Christian community, for the practical knowledge of God in the community dependent on God is identical with the knowledge which God has of himself."

Thus it is seen that these sacred names of distinct persons in one essence, so fundamental in the old gospel, become under the speculative manipulation of the new, on the one hand, a creative relation, and on the other, sheer creature knowledge. The God of this up to date religion is hence radically other than the God of the Apostles John and Paul or, if you please, of the New Testament. He is merely an ideal Deity, of whom in his actual existence we know, as Spinoza has long since said, absolutely

nothing. One can readily see that these new religionists in getting rid of dogma, lost the truth itself. True they have retained the names revered by every Christian age and imbedded in Sacred Scripture, but in their reorganized faith are meaningless and empty. They are mere deceptions of the valid doctrine. The early Christian Church made no mistake when in answer to this same false gospel it declared: "I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father before all worlds, God of God, light of light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father. And I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father and the Son, and who with the Father and Son is worshipped and glorified." This is the eternal, living God who has revealed himself to a world of sin in the unfolding of that scheme of redemption which alone can save a sinful race.

The second inquiry relates to the person of Jesus Christ. Here again we enunciate another proposition, namely: The gospel for a world of sin must realize and exhibit the highest possible union between God and man.

The recovery contemplated is not temporary, but permanent. The sinful race is to be secured for God beyond every doubt of future loss and to be bound to him in the most real, living way possible forever and ever. But this can be accomplished only as God takes up into himself or, which is the same thing, only as the two natures, divine and human, are brought together in such way that their union, forever inseparable, constitutes a divine human personality. This means incarnation or the word made flesh. The union of the prophet and God is of a much lower order. Here a dualism abides. Two persons are in fellowship but the fellowship is a communion between the spirit of God and the spirit of man. The union of the God and hero gets rid of this but at the expense of losing one of the factors. As a result we do not see God and man in the unity of one person, but only Deity. According to this idea, which is the heathen view, the human race if recovered from sin, would thereby forever disappear. According to the idea of Judaism,

which is the union of man with God illustrated by the prophet, the communion between God and his sinful human creature would be only mediate and partial, liable at some time to be disturbed or broken up, as it was originally, or the divine may become so thoroughly humanized as to be ultimately lost. According to the view of the gospel, the union in question is a union of natures, divine and human, in one person. The natures throughout retain their identity. Human nature is still human nature, Divine nature is still Divine nature, thus avoiding the idea of heathenism; and these two natures taken together form one person, thus overcoming the dualism of the Judaistic view.

At this point I cannot refrain from quoting Bishop Martensen. He says: "The idea of God himself being in Christ was offensive to the Jewish mind, and therefore it reduced Jesus to the rank of a divinely endowed man. On the other hand the heathen mind found it incredible that God and man should really form one essence, that their union should be more than one of thought and essence, and therefore it maintained that Christ had a body merely in appearance. The former is the meager, common sense, moral view of Christ. The latter is the speculative, phantastical view. These are the fundamental forms of all heresy; the prototypes of all images of Christ, that is of the images which, in leaving out what is offensive, leave out also what is new and original. They make their appearance ever afresh, and as often as they present themselves, the Church repels them."

In the light of what has previously been shown to be the conception which the new gospel has of God, it is easy to observe what is the view which this religion holds concerning the person of Christ. He is merely a creature, a human being on whom the will of God has directed itself as love, or, as is sometimes said, a divinely endowed man. There is here no union of the two natures, human and divine, but merely the revelation of that union between the human and the divine which is by nature the proper portion of us all. The new gospel utterly repudiates the doctrine of incarnation, together with the resurrection, ascension and kingly power of Christ. It maintains that

the Deity of Christ can only be expressed by saying that the mind and will of the everlasting God stand before us in the historically active will of this man. The mind and purpose of God are the mind and purpose of Jesus the human creature, and he is, hence, the revelation of the divine will, but not of what God is in himself. If all this be true, then Judaism was correct in its estimate of the Christ, and rightly opposed our Lord in his claim of actual Deityship. Then too Arius and Sabellius were far nearer the true doctrine concerning Jesus of Nazareth than Athanasius and his colleagues in belief. Then also every form of modal trinitarianism is a truer exhibition of the person of Christ than the much despised dogma of God being actually with his very nature in the Carpenter's Son. Well, what more need be said? It is so easy to understand how the creative will of God becomes the will of Jesus and so impossible to apprehend that the Word was made flesh, that further comment is unnecessary. But I would still have the reader remember that this new religion is quite ancient, and that it offers him no living, personal Christ. The man Jesus is dead. All that is left us is the spirit of this life by which we can become as he was, of the same mind and purpose with God. But there is no personal Jesus who exhibits and realizes in himself our immediate contact and union with God, and the recovery of a sinful world everlastingly unto God. Nothing of all this obtains for us, but only a good life of supreme devotion and self-sacrifice is the gospel given us for our redemption from sin and for membership in the kingdom of God.

Yet I must openly say that I prefer the old gospel with its divine human Christ. True the doctrine involves a most profound mystery. I cannot understand how it is that the divine nature and my nature were united so as to give rise to a new, original person, Jesus of Nazareth. But I believe it is true. And this faith I have on the strength of what the inspired word of God teaches, all quibbling, theorizing, rationalizing and spiritualizing of the sacred text aside. If the Christ which the human race needs is not God manifest in the flesh then surely

there is no hope for a world of sin. Salvation is a dream and eternal death the portion of us all.

I come now to the third inquiry: What does the new gospel teach concerning sin and atonement. Again I offer an additional proposition, namely: The gospel for a world of sin must furnish a sufficient ground for the exercise of divine forgiveness.

According to the common view, sin is transgression of the law. The law is an expression of the essential holiness and righteousness of God. It is a transcript of the divine nature. While the law is that which God wills, yet this willing is determined by what he is. He commands the right and the holy because he is just and pure.

Sin is therefore an offense to the very nature of God as well as a deviation from his will. It is the violation of the normal relation subsisting between God and the moral creature. It is the rupture of an original bond between the soul and God, an evil which has entered through the misuse of human freedom and which entails on the race a heritage of depravity and woe. Connected with this is the sense of guilt arising not from a consciousness of having gone contrary to some individual standard of duty, but from the conviction of having despised the law of God and on that account being under condemnation and exposed to the divine displeasure.

A far different conception is framed in the new gospel. From what has previously been shown to be its idea of the Divine Being, it can readily be inferred that sin can have no significance for God. There is no absolute, ethical nature. There is no inherent, divine righteousness. God is real only in the form of will. What he wills is the kingdom of God. This is the highest good. The contradiction of this good is sin. But this divine will which produces a world of spiritual beings is in itself neither holy, nor righteous, nor, in determining itself, does it rest in any background. Therefore sin is not separation from God, but only opposition to his kingdom.

Before Christ there was really no sin. At most it was only ignorance and hence at once pardonable. There was no original state of innocence. Sin originates in ignorance as the example

of children distinctly shows and may finally issue in the rejection of the kingdom of God as history proves. There is no inherited depravity. Sin consists only in acts of will and never exists in a nature. Children hence have no tendency toward moral evil through birth. The universality of sin is the result of ignorance, of the natural desire for freedom, of education, example, and perverted social influences. With this theory of sin goes a corresponding idea of guilt which is merely, for one thing, a dissatisfaction with oneself for the nonfulfillment of duty and for another, separation from its end to which God as will determines himself, namely, a kingdom of spiritual beings. To be separate from this kingdom or, which is the same thing, from God, is to experience punishment for sin. That God himself, because of what he is as a righteous, holy being, punishes any evil-doer, is not for a moment to be entertained. He is displeased with no one. He only and always loves all. Strictly speaking not any of his moral creatures is accountable to him except so far as he has willed himself into a kingdom of rational being, for it is only in this as righteous and holy love that he in knowable manifestation exists. But enough of this. The old gospel with its conception of God, of sin and guilt, teaches that prior to the exercise of forgiveness toward the sinner and to his becoming the subject of the gracious operation of the Holy Spirit the divine righteousness in its claims against the transgressor must be entirely satisfied. A vicarious atonement for the sin of man must be made. Full satisfaction must be rendered to God who has been sorely displeased by the sinner. Before pardon can be granted to the offender and he be received back into the divine favor there must be a propitiation for sin. Otherwise the penalty attached to a holy law violated must be inflicted on the transgressor without delay. This is clearly the view of the gospel which we teach and preach. But how is it in the case of the new religion, the gospel for the twentieth century? Altogether different, Christ is no God-man. At most he can only keep the law for himself. He cannot be a substitute for a sinful humanity. It is impossible for him to bear our sins in his body on the cross. He can offer no vicarious sacrifice.

All that he can do is to prove faithful to his purpose and express perfectly the will of God, and assure us and all men that we too can approach God. This in the only meaning of Calvary and the cross. The death of Jesus was no satisfaction of the divine righteousness and thereby making it possible for the divine mercy to exercise itself in the rescue of the perishing. Nothing of this, but only an example of sublimest devotion to a purpose and unflinching fidelity to a most noble calling. It was only the death of the martyr and the hero. In fact the new gospel, so popular in some quarters, has no place for the vicarious sufferings and death of a God-man who laid down his own life himself, no man taking it from him, who went down into the kingdom of death and there destroyed the last enemy, who came forth presently declaring, "I am he that was dead and am alive again, and behold I am alive for evermore," who has gone up into the most holy place, there to make intercession for a world in sin and who now is at the right hand of the majesty on high, the world's perfecting Redeemer, glorious in his apparel, omnipotent is his strength, mighty to save. Of such a Saviour the new gospel knows nothing, but instead would have us hear of a very good man who once lived a beautiful life and died a noble death and has left behind him a most winning influence to draw into and hold sinful men in the kingdom of God, and that is about all. Surely this cannot be the Gospel which a world of sin needs. Oh no, the unrest, the misery and woe of Adam and his sons are far too keen and deep-seated to be driven out of the human heart by any such expedient; the ungodliness and wickedness of men are far too heinous and unyielding to be expelled from the soul of man by such a device, and sin itself in its guilt is far too real and destructive in its power to be lured out of the human heart by good example and sheer martyrdom. Forgiveness then is free and ample, but only by the merit of the suffering and death of the man of Calvary.

In conclusion I must say that I still prefer the old gospel of God manifest in the flesh, crucified on Calvary, preached into the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up unto glory; that old gospel which assures me a poor helpless sinner that

God so loved *me*, dead in trespasses and sins, that he gave his only begotten Son to die for *me* that I might not perish, but have eternal life, and that this beloved Son was despised and rejected of men, for *me* that he was a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, for *me* that he was wounded for *my* transgressions, was bruised for *my* iniquities, that the Lord laid on him *my* iniquities, that he was oppressed and afflicted for *me*, and that for *me*, a guilty sinner, he was brought as a lamb to the slaughter. I prefer that old gospel which tells me that the humiliation, the atoning sufferings and death, and the glorious resurrection of God's only begotten Son, all were *for me*, and that through this Son I have peace with God and eternal redemption.

ARTICLE V.

WAS THE SON OF MAN THE SON OF GOD?

BY REV. A. B. TAYLOR.

This question has been answered both positively and negatively,—positively by the large majority of mankind to whom the gospel has come, negatively by a comparatively small number of philosophical and literary critics. Rationalism, having asserted that miracles are impossible, has ruled a divine-human being “out of the court of reason.” Literary criticism has undertaken to throw out as spurious parts of the gospels most essential to the Christian's faith. If, in opposition to the critic's position, it is asserted that epistles of Paul, whose authenticity is firmly established, present the substance of the Church's belief, the attempt is made to shake the Christian's position by the reply: “As any manifestation of the deity through the human is impossible, it is irrational to give weight to any statements that Christ was more than man.” Since these hypotheses have been formed and adhered to regardless of the facts in the case, it is readily seen that this method of disposing of the question of the nature of Christ is entirely inadequate.

Such *a priori* methods of reasoning continue to be applied to the determination of religious questions, while they have long since been abandoned in the scientific and historical fields. Instead of making use of such out-grown methods of investigation, the logical student now applies the method of induction. Not that the formation of hypotheses is not useful and sometimes necessary in arriving at the truth, but hypotheses are valuable only as they are promptly rejected when it is discovered that they do not account for the phenomena. But, so far from pursuing the inductive method, the man intent on dethroning Christ, clings to his theories as with a death grip. Over against these methods of hypothesis and assertion, we place the inductive as the one best calculated to lead to the truth. It is not contended that religion can be reduced to mathematical or logical principles, but the method that has been instrumental in inaugurating the present scientific and progressive era, is most likely to lead to the true answer to the question under discussion.

The inductive method is not urged in contradistinction to that of the rationalist alone; it is also emphasized as being preferable to what may be called the dogmatic or churchly method. The latter aims to furnish a completed creed respecting Christ, which is expected to be received without qualification or question. This method is to be rejected because "it offers us essentially a doctrine of Christ, which is to be appropriated, instead of offering us the living Christ himself. We want a knowledge of Christ,—knowledge in the strictest sense. But this knowledge begins with beholding, with living perception, and ends with a concept. The method mentioned places at the beginning that which belongs at the end."

It has been maintained by some that Christ was an impostor,—that he deliberately set about to deceive. But this theory presents such marked discrepancies with the well-known characteristics of Christ's teaching and methods that it is not strange that it has now been generally given up. All through Christ's life there are strong proofs of his entire sincerity, but at the very beginning of his ministry there is one that is not generally noticed. Consider the call of the first disciples. It was abrupt

and evidently without prearrangement, but instantly they left all and followed him. If Christ had been an impostor would he have begun his work in this risky manner? There were certainly many chances of those whom he called refusing to obey if he had been a mere man like those whom he addressed. If Christ had been a mere schemer he would have taken a more round-about course to accomplish his object. He would have pursued some of the methods of the politician. He would have cultivated the acquaintance of his intended dupes and have been lavish in his promises of reward. The course which he pursued on this and many other occasions clearly indicates his conscious possession of divinity.

"If the character of Christ had been different from what it was—had he been a great scholar in occult science—had he been invested with great social rank or with political influence or power—had he been cunning or ambitious— * * * had he ever faltered, or indicated want of faith in himself or in the doctrines he taught—if any of these things could be alleged with truth against him—and, were he an impostor, some one or all of them would have been certain—there would have been reasonable ground of doubt. But what one of them can be charged against him?"*

A larger number of critics have rejected the idea that Christ was a deceiver, and have substituted the theory that he was an innocent but deluded enthusiast. But here again a gratuitous assumption persists and has more weight than the well-known phenomena of that wonderful life.

Christ lived a perfectly natural life, *i. e.*, natural for him. And from end to end, and between part and part, it presents an entire harmony. The enthusiast is not always the same; he is not always equally enthusiastic. In his thinking and actions there is a marked lack of balance and proportion. But not so with Christ. "In other men we discover that, no matter how great they are in some respects, they are signally deficient in others; but in Jesus we have the vision and faculty divine by which the poet is distinguished, and along with that the philo-

*Foster's "*The Supernatural Book*," p. 262.

sophic character in its highest development, while at the same time we have the sagacity and shrewd common-sense of the most practical man." Study Christ's discourses, from the sermon on the mount to that wonderful last prayer, "Father, the hour is come," etc., and then calmly settle the question whether Jesus was unbalanced or balanced. Surely there is too fine discrimination and too firm judicial balance manifested in that discourse, in which he lays down the guiding principles of his kingdom, for it to be the production of a mere enthusiast. Could any mere man, laying aside the idea of enthusiasm, have produced the Lord's Prayer,—a production acknowledged to be a work of most remarkable comprehensiveness and condensation? Then it is not strange that this theory is being rapidly abandoned, for surely it is not applicable to the case of Jesus Christ.

A theory with regard to Christ that has been more widely held than either of the above, is that his character is a fictitious creation. This theory has been well stated as follows: "The historical Jesus was a very great man, who succeeded in attaching to himself a number of enthusiastic and credulous followers. These imagined him to be the Messiah of certain old predictions, and, believing that the Messiah must do such and such things, they fondly believed that Jesus actually performed them. This tendency greatly increased during the century which followed his death. Numerous ideologists invented a number of stories, which ascribed to him a superhuman character and the possession of miraculous powers; and the credulity of the primitive followers led them to mistake these stories for the facts of the historic life. The fact was that the historic Jesus became gradually metamorphosed into a mythic hero, and the real events of his life became buried under a mass of myth, legend, and ideology. In this state of things the authors of our first three gospels took these legendary reminiscences in hand; and out of them, with the aid of a number of brief documents already in existence, composed their respective gospels, which speedily acquired such a degree of popularity among the primitive believ-

ers, that they have caused all the other legendary accounts to sink into oblivion."*

Do our gospels bear the marks of having been the productions of highly credulous, imaginative men? The disciples were not credulous as is evidenced by the fact that they time and again sought proof in support of the statements of the Lord. And, notwithstanding the fact that their Master had frequently predicted his own death and resurrection, his disciples could scarcely be convinced that he had risen from the dead.

If the gospels present a fictitious creation, how is it that the feat has never been repeated? One character stands immeasurably above that the world has ever seen in life or embalmed in literature. Is this greatest triumph of the literary artist the work of "unlearned and ignorant men?" Is it such an artistic triumph? Is it not rather the description of a life as it was observed by the writers of the gospels, and that without exaggeration and embellishment? It is the theorizer, not the student of the gospels, who asserts that Christ as we understand him is a fictitious creation.

Especially is the theory we are considering seen to break down when we consider that the same man is the ideal, not of Palestine only or of any one type of civilization, but that he is the ideal man wherever he is known. "So far has the many-sidedness and richness of his character transcended the thoughtful analysis of the closest observers, that scarcely any man or section of men, has been able to appreciate more than one of its purely human aspects. The knights of old saw in him the mirror of all chivalry; the monks the pattern of all asceticism; the philosophers the enlightener of all truth. To a Fenelon he he has seemed the most rapt of mystics; to a Vincent de Paul the most practical of philanthropists."

Happily all such theories have been, or are being, abandoned. The increasing importance of material science and its methods is, in some respects, reacting favorably upon religious thought. Men are more and more compelled to give a reason for the faith

*Row's *"Manual of Christian Evidences,"* pp. 79, 80.

that is in them. A gratuitous assumption no longer satisfies. Applying the approved methods of scientific and historical investigation, in order to decide Christ's true position,—whether he was an impostor, an enthusiast, a myth, or God,—we find that men are coming with greater unanimity to accept the last view. Without resorting to the argument from prophecy or miracles, or even to Christ's resurrection, let us review some less familiar reasons for accepting his divinity.

It has been claimed by many in recent years that Jesus Christ was the product of his times,—that the law of evolution accounts for his life. According to Mr. Spencer, if we seek for an explanation of Christianity, we must not look for it in the life of Christ, "but in the aggregate of those conditions out of which both he and it have arisen." That is, he holds that Christ and Christianity are related not from being cause and effect, but that they both arose from the social, religious and political conditions existing at the beginning of the Christian era. While there is truth in the idea that every man, and Christ among the rest, is influenced by the conditions under which he lives, to hold that Christ was made what he was by his times is evolution run mad. Wm. S. Lilly, in his work entitled "Chapters on European History with Introduction on the Philosophy of History," well says, "Do not let us shut our eyes to a plain fact of history. The victory of Christianity was the personal victory of its founder."

What were the characteristics of the times in which Christ lived? Were they Utopian? Were the conditions present from which we would expect the ideal man to arise? We know that history presents us a picture which is quite otherwise. The ages in which noble empires flourished seemed to have passed. The great artists, orators and poets have lived in the past. At this time there were not those living who even dreamed of a golden age and, with skilled hand, pictured its joys. A man who then lived has left us a picture of the times which is appalling rather than attractive. Tacitus wrote: "What is unknown is thought grand and mighty; but no longer is there any tribe beyond us, nothing but waves and rocks, and Romans fierce,

than they, whose unrelenting cruelty you would vainly escape by obedience and good behaviour. Blunderers of the world, after the land fails from their ravage, they grope into the sea, being greedy of his wealth if the enemy be rich, imbibing his servility if he be poor; men whom neither East nor West can satiate. Alone of mankind, they covet alike men's affluence and men's indigence. Theft, butchery, and robbery, they falsely name empire, and where they make a desert they call it peace." To say that Jesus Christ was the product of such times, could be no more correct than to say that the spring, with its singing birds, balmy air and beautiful flowers, is the product of the ice and blizzards of winter.

A strong argument that Christ was more than man is seen in his influence. The manner in which he seemed to rise over his time and transform it, as the rising sun dispels the cold and fog, has never been approached by the influence of any mere man. Consider the conditions. Christ's public life was confined to his young manhood. He organized nothing and wrote nothing, but upon his appearance there appeared a power that determined the course of history. He did not seek influence through political intrigues, or even in profound learning; from all the means of influence which are highly esteemed among men he turned away. And yet Christ must be acknowledged to be at the head of the greatest empire the world has ever known. The perpetuity of Christian institutions accords with no other assumption but that Christ was divine. Just before Christ's death he broke bread and drank wine with his disciples and commanded them to do the same as a perpetual memorial of his death. Since then many centuries have fled,—centuries in which the customs of the world have been changed, but on Sunday in every clime multitudes gather around the memorial table. Within the last two thousand years the world has been radically changed. Ancient institutions have passed away and the seat of civilization has been transferred to lands which were then inhabited by savages. But among all the agencies which have been at work tearing down and transforming, one power has remained and steadily increased. It is the Christian Church.

"But it were simply to tell over again the best known miracle of the ages to tell of the conquests of Jesus—how without money and arms he has conquered more millions than Alexander, Cæsar, Mohammed, and Napoleon; how without the learning and science of the schools he has cast more light on things human and divine than all philosophers and scholars combined; how without writing a single line he has set more pens in motion and furnished more themes for sermons, orations, discussions, and learned volumes, works of art and songs of praise than the whole army of great men, ancient and modern; how, though born in a manger and crucified on a cross, he now rules a spiritual empire that embraces one third of the inhabitants of the globe."*

Christ, while he has influenced the past, has not left the world, but is in it to-day to shape its life and direct its activities. The knotty problems of the world are still solved, when solved at all, by Christ. We find that his words are marvelously full of light for the questions which men have striven in vain to settle. Christ, though claiming to be a king, for the most of his life lived the life of a laboring man and, though he said scarcely anything on the relations of employer and employed, what he did say is clearly the only solution for the vexed question of capital and labor. It is said that when the traveler visits the Church of the Sepulcher, in Jerusalem, the guide will point to a circle of precious stones and say, "This is the centre of the earth." This story is now known to be false, but it is typical of a very impressive truth. Every year it becomes more evident that Jesus Christ is the centre of the world. He has been the leader in the progress of the past and is now the centre of the hopes of the world.

Let us turn now and ask what evidence there is for Christ's divinity in the matter of testimony. We shall first refer to the New Testament writers. It is replied that the Bible is ruled out as evidence. Who has authority to rule it out? The writings of Peter and Paul are historical documents, and their testimony must be admitted. This is true especially as Peter,

*Schaff's *"The Person of Christ,"* pp. 29, 30.

at least, was an eye-witness, and so well fitted to help to solve the problem to which we are now seeking an answer.

A well established utterance of Peter's is recorded in the Acts. "We believe that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ we shall be saved." Knowing Peter's manner of thinking, and knowing that this is a typical expression of his, can we conceive of his saying, "We believe that through the grace of Moses we shall be saved?" No. Peter, a man of sound judgment and one who had been closely associated with Jesus, was accustomed always to think of him as divine.

Turning now to Paul, what is his testimony in this matter? If it be objected that Paul was not an eye-witness of Christ's life,—let it be remembered that Paul had abundant opportunity to judge as to the character of Christ through his intimacy with those who were eye-witnesses. And it is altogether likely that, before he changed from a persecutor to a servant of Christ, Paul made diligent investigation of the facts of Christ's life. Let it be remembered also that the four largest epistles of Paul are not questioned, as to their authenticity, by any of the critics of to-day. The references to Christ's divinity in Paul's epistles are far too numerous to mention separately. The Rev. William Arthur has made such an excellent summary of passages in Paul's writings in which Christ is identified with God, that it is copied here.

"Passing to the Church, it is now the Church of God and now the Church of Jesus Christ; and the kingdom, likewise, was now the kingdom of God and now that of Jesus Christ. Did he speak of the Grace of Christianity? faith is the gift of God and is the faith of Jesus Christ; love is the love of God and the love of Jesus Christ; peace is the peace of God and the peace of our Lord Jesus Christ; joy is the joy of God, is rejoicing in Jesus Christ, is joy in the Holy Ghost; and, in one word, grace is the grace of God and the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ; does he speak of the object of faith and worship? he believes in God and he believes in Jesus Christ. * * * It is God that will raise the dead, it is Christ that will raise us up; it is God

that will judge the world, it is Christ that will judge the world. In fact, when he would prove the fact that we shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ, the evidence that he adduces is that every one of us shall give an account of himself to God."

Different ancient writers beside the authors of the Bible make mention of Christ. We shall quote but one of them, but that one was a Jew and would naturally have been led to reject the divinity of Christ. Josephus, in his *Antiquities*, XVIII, 3, 3, wrote as follows:

"Now, there arose about this time Jesus, a wise man, if it be lawful to call him a man; for he was a doer of wonderful works, a teacher of such as received the truth with pleasure. He carried away with him many of the Jews, and also many of the Greeks. He was the Christ. And after Pilate, at the suggestion of the principal men among us, had condemned him to the cross, his first adherents did not forsake him. For he appeared to them alive again during the third day, the divine prophets having foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things concerning him. And the tribe of those called Christians after him is not extinct to this day."

To come down to modern authors, it would be easy to multiply what might be called expert testimony to the divinity of Christ. But it would be easy to reply to a large share of this, that the witnesses were prejudiced. Therefore, without calling many witnesses, let us content ourselves with the testimony of one, and that one, not a theologian but a general. It is well known that Napoleon I. is reported to have been the author of various statements of belief respecting the divinity of Christ. If we inquire as to Napoleon's qualifications as a witness on this point, it will be universally conceded that he knew men. But as there may be doubt as to their genuineness, the reader is assured that such current statements are, in substance at least, fully authenticated. For an account of a thorough investigation of the authority of these statements ascribed to Napoleon, reference is made to an article by Alexander Mair, entitled, "Testimony of Napoleon I. with regard to Christ," published in the *Expositor* for May, 1890. Having made this reference, portions

of Napoleon's conversations bearing upon the person of Christ, are here transcribed :

"I know men, and I tell you that Jesus Christ is not a man. Superficial minds may see some resemblance between Christ and the founders of empires, the conquerors, and the gods of other religions. That resemblance does not exist. I see in Lycurgus, Numa, Confucius, and Mahomet, merely legislators ; but nothing which reveals the deity. On the contrary, I see numerous resemblances between them and myself. I make out resemblances, weaknesses, and common errors which assimilate them to myself and humanity. Their faculties are those which I possess. But it is different with Christ. Everything about him astonishes me. Between him and anything of this world there is no possible term of comparison. He is really a being apart. His ideas and his emotions, the truth which he announces his method of producing conviction, can be explained neither by the organization of man nor by the nature of things. His birth and the history of his life, the profoundness of his teaching—which truly reaches to the very summit of the difficulties, and which is their most admirable solution,—his gospel, the uniqueness of this mysterious being, his appearance, his empire, his march across ages and kingdoms, all is to me a marvel, a mystery unfathomable ; a mystery which I cannot deny, and yet which I am just as unable to explain. Here I see nothing of man. The nearer I approach him, and the more closely I examine him, the more everything seems above me ; everything continues great with a greatness that crushes me."

We said we would quote from but one modern author, but there is the testimony of one still more modern, testimony so pertinent and unprejudiced, that we cannot afford to pass it by. Mr. William H. Channing recently wrote to Mr. Frothingham, the Unitarian writer : "Once again I sought comfort with the blessed company of sages and saints of the Orient and Hellas—with Lao-Tszee and Kung-Fu-Tszee ; the writers of the Bhagava Geeta and the Dhamma-Bada ; of the hymns of ancient Avesta and the modern sayings and songs of the Sufis ; with radiant Plato and heroic Epictetus. Once more they refreshed

and re-inspired me as of old. But they did something better. Hand in hand they brought me up to the white marble steps, to the crystal baptismal font, and the bread and wine crowned communion table, aye to the cross in the chancel of the Christian temple—and as they laid their hands in benediction upon my head they whispered: ‘Here is your real home. We have been your guides in the desert, to lead you to fellowship with the Father and the Son in the spirit of holy humanity. Peace be with you.’ And so, my brother, once again with purer, profounder and tenderer love than ever, like a little child, I kissed the blood-stained feet and hands and sides of the hero of Calvary, and laid my head on the knees of the gentlest of martyrs, and was lifted up by the gentle arms of the gracious elder brother, and in the kiss of mingled pity and pardon found the peace I sought and became a Christian in experience, as through a long life I had hoped and prayed to be. Depend upon it, dear Frothingham, there is on this small earth-ball no reality more real than this central communion with God in Christ, of which the saints of all ages in the Church bear witness.”

One man there has been, and is, who is also God. Happy is he who not only acknowledges this, but who gladly and heartily receives the Son of God as his Saviour and elder brother.

ARTICLE VI.

THE DENOMINATIONAL COLLEGES AND THE STATE UNIVERSITIES IN THE WEST AND NORTHWEST.

BY PRESIDENT JACOB A. CLUTZ, D. D.

The territorial limitation of the subject of this paper is placed there for two reasons. One is that the question involved is not such a burning one to our older colleges in the east because these institutions are older and better established, and because the state university idea has not received the attention, nor been given the prominence there that it has in the west and northwest. The other reason is that the missionary colleges which are the chief beneficiaries of the Board of Education, and through them of the whole Church, are located in the west, and this is likely to be the case at least for many years to come.

It would be difficult, it may be safely said that it is impossible, for any one not familiar with the facts by personal experience, or close observation, to understand or appreciate the extent to which the state university idea has been pushed, in recent years, in most of the western states, and the greatly increased difficulty in building up denominational, or independent schools, resulting therefrom. With a view to making this as clear and as concrete as possible, a series of questions were sent some time ago to nine of the leading state universities in the West and Northwest, including those of the States of Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska and Wisconsin. The questions were intended to elicit information that would present the status of these institutions ten years ago, and their status at the present time, in order to show both their present condition and their rapid growth. Very prompt and generally very satisfactory answers were received from all of them. But instead of presenting these answers in tabulated form, as was the first intention, it will, perhaps, be best to simply give a general statement of some of the facts reported.

For example, the number of professors and instructors in the faculties has increased from an average of 43 ten years ago to an average of 136 at present, the highest number now being 225 in the University of Minnesota. The average attendance of students has grown from 560 ten years ago to 1,534 at present, the highest number now being 3,229 in the University of Michigan. Only three of these universities maintain preparatory departments, and in two of these the number of students is comparatively small. No tuition is charged in any of them except the University of Michigan, where the tuition to residents of the State is \$30.00 a year, and to non-residents it is \$40.00. Some of the others charge a tuition fee in the professional departments, as of law, or medicine. The State appropriations for building purposes range from \$10,000.00 to \$83,000.00 per annum, and for support from \$57,000.00 to \$249,650 per annum. The total annual income for current expenses is reported at from \$95,000.00 to \$541,672.00, or an average of \$235,515.00. The total estimated value of the several university plants, including grounds, buildings, equipments, &c., is from \$400,000.00 to \$1,550,000.00. Though all these institutions are supported mainly by the state, by direct taxation of the people, some of them have large invested funds, the amounts reported being from \$200,000.00 to \$1,100,000.00. Other facts might be presented, but these will be sufficient to show the liberality of these several States in making provision for their universities. It is easy to see at how great a disadvantage our small denominational colleges are placed in competing with such institutions for students.

But there are some other things which make this competition still more unequal. Chief among these is the prestige which has come to be attached to the State schools just because they are State schools, and of which students expect to reap the benefit, not only while they are students, but also after they leave the institution and are looking for a situation, or are seeking to build up a business or a profession. The mere fact that a man is a graduate of the State university, or has even been a student there, is expected to give him prestige, and to make it

easier for him to get a situation, or to succeed in business or in professional life. Scattered throughout the State are thousands of graduates and former students of the State university, and each one of these feels a personal interest in every other graduate or student and tries to help him on, because he realizes that every successful one adds to his own prestige and chances of getting on.

Moreover there are thousands of citizens who are prejudiced in favor of the students at the State schools, either because they regard it as a matter of State patriotism, or because they are hostile to the Church and all its institutions.

Another thing to be remembered is that in the West the public schools are largely under the control of State university men, or are conducted in the interests of the State university. All the courses of study, from the first year in the primary school on up through all the grades, and especially in the high school, are arranged with a view to preparing the pupils for the State university. That is their *terminus ad quem*. Nearly all the teachers, and especially high school principals, and city and county superintendents, even when not themselves university men, yet somehow come to look forward, and to point the pupils forward, to the State university as the cap-stone and crowning glory of our noble public school system, and as the goal, therefore, which every ambitious student should aim to reach.

The newspapers also help on the crusade in behalf of the State school. They are proud of the university as a State institution, and are ever ready to sound its praises and to publish, without charge, the advertising matter which is sent out by the chancellor, or the regents, from time to time.

At the high school commencement the chancellor of the State university, or some member of the faculty, is frequently invited to address the graduating class. And thus, and in a hundred other ways, the State university is kept before the minds of the young people, and of the parents also, until it becomes almost as much a matter of course for those young men and women who desire to pursue a higher course of study, to pass from the high school to the State university, as it was to go from the grammar

school to the high school. Under such circumstances the wonder is, not that so many go to the State university, but rather that so many, or any at all, can be drawn aside from the strong current in that direction to enter the denominational colleges.

But perhaps enough has been said on this phase of the subject. Our next inquiry will be as to the proper solution of the problem thus presented. What should the friends of the denominational colleges do? What can they do?

In seeking to answer these questions there is one thing that can be assumed as settled. This is that the State university is here, and is here to stay. We may have doubts about its expediency. We may question the right of the State to tax all its citizens to furnish to a select few—and the number must always be few and select—a higher education which is not intended to fit them for citizenship, the public schools do that, but which is designed to prepare them to earn a livelihood, or to acquire position and wealth in one of the learned professions or in scientific or business pursuits. We may deny that the State can give a fully rounded and complete higher education, including the moral and spiritual nature of man. And we may, therefore, assert that the State should not attempt to carry its work beyond the public schools, believing that a one-sided education, which has no place for the religious element, is false and dangerous, at once an injury to the individual and a menace to society and to our free institutions, rather than a benefit and a blessing. But in spite of all that we may say the State university will remain, and it will grow stronger in resources and in influence from year to year. So we come to ask again, What shall we do about it? What can we do?

Three possible solutions of the problem have been suggested and may be considered.

The first one is to close up all the church schools and turn all education over to the State, higher education as well as lower.

This is undoubtedly the plan which would meet with most favor among those who are engaged in State school work. Some of them may say very kind and complimentary things

about the denominational colleges, on public occasions or in private conversation with church-college men. But there is good reason to believe that the great majority of them would be greatly pleased to see all church colleges abandoned, and that not a few of them are working to this end both secretly and openly. In all matters of legislation, and in the interpretation of law, they are ever disposed to throw all possible hindrances in the way of the denominational colleges securing due recognition, or enjoying granted privileges. Another evidence of this is found in the manner in which the State universities arbitrarily discredit the work of the church colleges in spite of the fact that the latter frequently maintain higher requirements for admission to the college classes than the universities themselves, and do their work with at least equal fidelity and conscientiousness.

But can we afford to turn over the education of all our young men to the State? The writer is among those who believe that we cannot. Under our system of government the State is essentially secular and non-religious, even if not irreligious. It is true that certain forms of religion are maintained by the State, such as the appointment of chaplains in State institutions, the opening of the sessions of the State legislatures with prayer, etc. So also is it customary in most of the State universities to conduct chapel exercises for the benefit of such students as may care to attend them, and also occasionally to hold other religious services. And in some cases these services are very well attended and are made very profitable. Many of the professors in the State universities, perhaps a large majority of them, are devout Christian men and women. Much voluntary religious work is done among and by the students also, and in some of these State schools the general atmosphere is as distinctively and as strongly Christian as in most of the denominational colleges.

But the difficulty is that in a State institution all this is incidental. It might be said that it is accidental. That is, it is not definitely provided for or required by law. It is largely a

matter of tradition. It grows out of the general sentiment of the community, and it will probably last as long as this is pre-vaillingly Christian. To a considerable extent, it grows out of the fact that the earliest colleges in this country were founded by the Church and were distinctively Christian. Though Harvard college has not, in recent years, always been true to her ancient motto, "*Pro Christo et Ecclesia*," that motto of the oldest college in America has been so stamped upon our whole college system that even the State schools have felt it and have yielded a considerable measure of respect to it.

But it is hard to see by what law these religious features of our State schools could be maintained, or enforced, if the men in charge of them should not care to maintain them, or if the community at large should become generally indifferent to them, as is now the case in some communities in the west, or if any considerable number of unbelieving citizens should choose to object to them and seek an injunction against them in the courts. Only about a year ago the State Superintendent of schools in one of our western states officially interpreted the provision of the State constitution forbidding the use of public money for the support of religion as making it unlawful to allow any religious service of any kind whatever to be held in any public school building. It is well known that similar provisions in other State constitutions have been interpreted as forbidding public school teachers to open their schools with the reading of the Bible or with prayer. Now it is hard to see how, in such a state, the holding of daily chapel exercises, with the singing of hymns, the reading of scripture and prayer, can be legally allowed in the State university, or in any of the State schools. It is a question whether it would be allowed in some of them if it were not for the existence and competition of the denominational colleges. That the difficulty is felt by at least some university men is evident from a remark made by President Adams, of the University of Wisconsin, in a paper published last year. Pleading for more active work on the part of the different denominations in behalf of the religious welfare of the students at the State uni-

versity he says, "The regents of the university under the constitution and the ruling of the supreme court, can do nothing."

Besides, the mere fact of holding daily chapel exercises, and other occasional religious meetings, does not of itself make a school Christian. It is little influence for good these will have, if the head of the school and a majority of the professors and students are absent, and perhaps plainly showing their impatience with the whole performance, as is said to be frequently the case in one of our western State universities.

To make a school really and positively Christian, the entire work of school, in all the departments, must be pervaded by the Christian spirit. This must show itself in every class-room, and in every recitation, not necessarily by distinctively religious instruction, but by the fact that all truth is regarded and presented from the Christian standpoint. God must be recognized as the center and source of all truth. All truth must be made to point to him and lead back to him. And the fact must always be remembered that "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," and that personal consecration to him and to his service is the first and the highest duty of man.

Religion cannot possibly be given this place and emphasis in a State school. No religious test can be applied in the selection of teachers. No religious teaching can be required of any, or indeed allowed. The professor may be a Christian, or an unbeliever; he may even be an atheist and a bald materialist. If he understands his subject and is able to teach it, and is of good character, that is all that can be required. Hence the Church cannot afford to close up its schools and give the entire work of education over to the State. There are too many risks involved in this for the Church, and too much peril for the State itself.

But it may be asked, in the second place, can we not combine the two? Is it not possible for the Church and the State to unite in the work of education, at least to such an extent that the Church may secure for her young people the benefits of the liberal provisions for instruction made by the State without at the same time surrendering her own care of the young people

themselves? Why not let the State educate the head and the hand, and have the Church supplement this with the culture of the heart and the care of the soul?

This is, in a general way, the solution of our problem offered by the advocates of what has sometimes been called "the Church Annex to the State University." Professor Ely, of the State University of Wisconsin, may be regarded as the father of this plan, or at least as its best known and most persistent supporter, though many other well-known men have also approved and advocated it. The plan is, in brief, for each denomination to provide a dormitory, or dormitories, contiguous to the State universities, in which the young people of that denomination attending the university may find rooms and board. These dormitories are also to be equipped with libraries and reading rooms, and also with suitable rooms for lecture and recitation purposes, and for various religious exercises and uses. The persons in charge of these dormitories are to look after the spiritual interests of the young people residing in them, and to give them instruction in the Bible and the Catechism, and perhaps in church history. It has even been suggested that students for the ministry might in this way do a sufficient amount of work during their college course to omit the first year in the theological seminary and complete their theological course in two years. Indeed some of the advocates of this plan would have all the theological seminaries conducted also in connection with the State universities so that the students might do most of their work, practically all except Dogmatic and practical Theology, in the university.

Now it must be granted that, at first thought, this plan seems to be very simple and practical. It looks as though it might offer an easy and a quick solution of our educational problem. But further examination hardly bears out this promise. The fact is that this plan is open to nearly all the objections to the first plan, already suggested. It would still leave the chief work of education in the hands of the State with no assurance at all of Christian teachers, or of Christian teaching. And every one who knows the influence which a strong teacher may acquire

over the mind, and the heart, of a bright and alert student, will appreciate the danger which lurks in this uncertainty. It is true that this plan seems to make provision for the religious instruction and care of the students in the church dormitory—if you can get them there and keep them there. But to those who are familiar with the tastes and habits of that peculiar specimen of the genus *homo*, the American student, it will seem very doubtful whether many of them would care to place themselves under the restraints of such a church dormitory, or to load up with a lot of work in Bible study, or other religious subjects, when it has no special connection with the regular courses of study, and the neglect of it will in no wise compromise their standing in the university. There is good reason to believe that, in many cases, one of the chief arguments for going to the State university, in the minds of the young people, is that they will not there be subjected to the restraints that are placed upon students in the denominational colleges.

Moreover, this arrangement, even if otherwise successful, would still leave the students in the secularized atmosphere of the State school and subject to all the secular tendencies which are always predominant in these schools. Hence it would be sure to furnish the Church with very few candidates for the ministry. Even those who might go there intending to enter the ministry would be in great danger of being turned aside from their purpose, as has been the case with some.

It may be practicable, and it might be wise, for these denominations which have the funds to spare for this purpose, to establish at the seats of the various State universities denominational "Halls"—buildings, or perhaps simply a room, which shall be maintained as a kind of denominational headquarters to which students may resort, and where they may always find some good reading matter, and some innocent games, and especially a sympathetic friend who will be ready to help them in any time of need. But this seems to be about all that should ever be undertaken in this line of work, and all that is practicable.

We come, then, to the third possible solution of our problem

and the one which seems to be the only true and safe one. It is to keep the denominational colleges intact, and entirely independent of all connection with the state schools, and to place them upon such a financial footing that they can fairly compete even with the State university in the work which they undertake to do. And this suggests some limitations to their work. Of course they will not offer any professional courses, nor should they attempt any post-graduate work at all unless they are thoroughly equipped for it both in teachers and in apparatus. But the ordinary undergraduate work required for the Bachelor's degree can be done just as well in a properly equipped small college, as in the State university, and often very much better. And the people will recognize this. Of course, there will always be some who will prefer to go to the State university, or to send their children there, just as there will always be some church members who, it seems, would rather attend any other church than their own. But the great majority of Lutheran people are loyal. They are loyal to their churches, and they will be loyal to their schools when they are made worthy of their confidence and patronage. And this would not require anything extravagant or unreasonable. It is plain that our denominational colleges in the west can never expect to rival the State universities in material equipment such as buildings and libraries and apparatus, nor in the number of teachers or the variety of courses of study offered. Nor is this at all necessary, because they are not likely ever to have the same number of students, or the same demands.

But what they do need, what they ought to have, what they must have, if they are to maintain their places and do their work, is an equipment in buildings and apparatus that will enable them to care for and properly teach from 250 to 300 students, and an endowment adequate to support at least eight professors in the collegiate department alone. Under such circumstances the preparatory department would probably be self-sustaining. This would mean an additional endowment of from \$100,000.00 to \$150,000.00 for each of our western colleges. Is this extravagant? Is it unreasonable? Is it impossible? It is neither.

In a Church with as many members and as much solid wealth as belongs to the General Synod, the raising of two or three hundred thousand dollars to place Midland and Carthage colleges on a solid basis, or even enough to include Hartwick and Susquehanna, ought not to be regarded as an Arabian Knight's dream.

But this is what it would mean. It would mean a great revival of interest in the subject of Christian higher education throughout the Church. It would mean a new and juster estimate of the place and importance of our educational institutions in the whole work of the development of the Church and the saving of the nation. It would mean also a clearer, and more general recognition of the fact and duties of Christian stewardship, and enlarged liberality in giving for this department of the Lord's work, not only through the Board of Education, but in special gifts directly to the institutions themselves. All our institutions ought to have more money, the older ones as well as the younger ones, those in the east as well as those in the west. And it ought not to be necessary for the presidents, or other representatives of these institutions, to spend their time and wear out body and soul, traveling about in the churches to coax it from unwilling or reluctant contributors. It ought to be given freely, spontaneously, gladly, by those whom God has prospered and made able to give and to give in large sums, by the hundreds, and the thousands, and the tens of thousands, and in at least a few cases by the hundreds of thousands.

ARTICLE VII.

THE HISTORICAL LIBRARY.

BY REV. W. A. LAMBERT, B. A.

How many books might be and ought to be written on the "Amenities of Literature"! Too little is known of books, their character, value and humor. Librarians especially, who in the course of their professional labors accumulate immense stores of valuable and interesting information might communicate their knowledge in forms more interesting and readable than bibliographical bulletins, more connected than Disraeli's works, with better intentions than Andrew D. White in his "Warfare of Science with Theology," and with more definite purpose than Richard Burton in his "Anatomy of Melancholy."

It is not, however, in the character of a librarian that I am to write here, but in that of a chance visitor, who has taken his time to study the contents of the Historical Library for several definite purposes, and has incidentally been requested to furnish an account of what he met with in the course of his studies.

An account of the Historical Library could not be complete without a sketch of its history. But completeness will hardly be found an attribute of this description; and inasmuch as the *QUARTERLY* has already published an article on that topic by one who was far better able to prepare it than I could possibly be at present, (Dr. Hay), the omission may perhaps be pardoned. If any will take the trouble to find and read that article, which was also published separately as a pamphlet, they may share the feelings of all who may visit the library: admiration of the amount of material here gathered, and disappointment in the very partial success with which the Curators have so far met in their very praiseworthy undertaking.

But we are not to express either our astonishment, or our admiration here; we are to visit the library, and reveal its treas-

ures,—only in part, of course, and hastily ; giving just enough to excite the curiosity of those who ought to have, but have not yet made a pilgrimage to this little temple of Lutheran literature.

Let us walk first to the far corner of the room, and give our attention to the closet in that corner. Opening the glass doors we meet a strange medley of books and papers. Below are massive folios marked "Records," "Protocoll," etc., indicating that their contents are the written authoritative minutes of synods and conferences. On the top shelf we find small thin books, such as might readily be carried in the inside coat pocket. A glance within proves them to be diaries—the journals of a long-lived man, whose sermons and correspondence—a large part of it official, connected with the West Pa. Synod—are also somewhere in this closet. We can here trace Rev. G. A. Reichert from Germany to Nova Scotia, from Nova Scotia to the West Indies, and back, then to Pennsylvania, and through interesting periods in the Church's life, almost to the day of his death. More : we can tell what books he owned as a student, and what he paid for them. This may seem a trifling matter,—but does it not enable us to judge of the training theological students received full eighty years ago ?

We may go back farther however. Here we find a few letters of the Patriarch Muhlenberg in his own handwriting ; an autobiography of his contemporary, Handschuch, a diary of Brunholtz, and strange books in manuscript by Jacob Goering. Or perhaps we wish to hear Helmuth and Schmidt preach in Philadelphia ; here one has saved us the labor of digesting their lengthy discourses ; he has written brief sketches of them, and—that we might not be surfeited with German Lutheranism—has entered an occasional English sermon by the Episcopalian rector.

And yonder—truly strange are the vicissitudes of time—we may go to school in Helmstedt with Helmuth in 1759, and watch him as he writes down the German his teacher dictates, then laboriously matches it on the opposite page with what should be its Latin equivalent, but which the teacher's red ink

proves only too imperfect. How different appears the page, somewhere not far away, on which this same Helmuth, a poor old man of almost seventy years later, gratefully acknowledges a slight gift! A library strangely disregards time; it places the record of a man's boyhood and old age even more vividly before us than the family Bible, as though it would turn preacher, and proclaim the mortality of man.

But note that mass of books and papers, filled with writing in a rather small hand. What might they contain? They are the record of the active life of an active man. Lectures on almost all branches of theology and on philosophy, articles written and re-written, resolutions and plans drawn up, some almost without a clue as to their intended use—these are the work of Dr. S. S. Schmucker. Yes, there are even several proofs, with the corrections by his hands, showing that sometimes at least, he was not chary in his changes. Sermons, also, and lectures are here preserved which bear marks indicating that the Doctor found his productions worth repeating occasionally, and sometimes after long intervals.

Here among these letters whose dates run from 1747 to within a few years of the present, we can trace the movements which have made the Lutheran Church in Pennsylvania what it is. We read the protest of David Henkel against the establishment of a Central Seminary—and his suspicion, nay, positive charge that the members of the General Synod of 1823 are not Lutherans! We can trace the Seminary through its struggles, follow Dr. Schmucker through the United States and Europe trying to gather funds; we read the recommendations of the Seminary and of the cause of the German Lutherans flowing in from all quarters. We see the growing efforts for Church union, the commendations and criticisms of the "Fraternal Appeal"—among which that of Dr. Chas. Hodge, of Princeton, is a brilliant specimen of keen insight into the springs of the movement. Here we also find the question discussed as to the return of the Pa. Ministerium into the General Synod in 1853, and the separation in 1866.

And here we can call back earnest, pious old John Stough to

tell us—though it is in the difficult manuscript of his aged son—of the beginnings of Lutheranism in Ohio, and the zeal with which the travelling preacher labored almost a century ago. Or again, Father Heyer will contribute a few scenes to what we know of his labors extending from India in the east to Minnesota in the west.

May we now leave these MSS.—English, German and Latin, and turn our attention to what is here in print? One moment, please; we have not yet seen the oldest of all these papers. We may disregard those transcripts by Dr. Fritschel, made from two rare books treating of the early American history of the Lutheran Church; while valuable, they are not really relics. But here, wrapped in pasteboard as it was returned by a careful borrower, is an old record, and in a fourth language—the Dutch,—telling us of early doings in New York and Nova Scotia. Shall we increase the list of languages? Then it may be interesting to study Goering's Hebrew lexicon, all in MS., prepared 1783; and somewhere I am sure we could find a little Greek.

Only one manuscript more. A single page written in a script belonging to a bygone age, it seems to be a fragment from some baptismal record, and bears the date 1590. Is it of value? That can hardly be told unless the whole of which it was once a part can be rediscovered.

I have promised to leave the MSS.—and yet I have not given all. What a collection of autograph signatures might be made here! But I will turn to the clippings, and mention other MSS., only incidentally. One of the plans of the curators of this library was the collection of congregational records and histories. Certain it is that all sound reasoning must suggest that all valuable documents should be placed in a safe and accessible library or archives, rather than be left to moulder away in the garret of some uninterested descendant, or on the table or bookshelf of some thoughtless pastor. It is equally certain that the history of congregations is an important feature in the history of a Church. The more reason to regret that the curators have not been able to collect, still less to arrange the histories of all the churches. But the clippings gathered from

church and secular papers, though not yet rendered very accessible, give proof of no little activity in this direction. When to these are added the MS. histories prepared by J. R. Focht (Allegheny Synod) and others, no mean start will be seen to have been made.

Now to the books: We will begin right here at the end near the closet containing the MSS. We cannot refrain from expressing here our pleasure and our regret. Here *should* be a copy of every work published by a Lutheran in America; yes, we will not limit it to any district or organization—for the founders desired no limitations to be placed here. As the great library at Washington should contain a copy of every book published in America, so this Historical Library should contain a copy of every book published by a Lutheran. But would any one so seriously insult our Church as to hint that this is a complete collection? We will not enumerate even the most prominent omissions—enough to say that there are abundant such, sufficient to hamper the work of a student, though there are enough here to occupy a student for months.

Here we may see that Lutherans are not all theologians: stories, histories, biographies, travels, poems and works of science are scattered here and there; works of S. S. Schmucker, W. J. Mann, J. G. Morris, Dr. Bachman, C. W. Schaeffer, C. F. Schaeffer, B. Kurtz, and a host of others.

But we must go to the opposite side of this shelf to see the pride of the library. Here, neatly bound, stand the minutes of the various synods; if not entirely complete, at least very nearly so: Pa., West Pa., N. Y., Franckean, Olive Branch, Pittsburg, Va., S. C., Allegheny,—they are all here, and this is not a complete list—and the Gen. Synod and Gen. Council

Facing these volumes are volumes of bound pamphlets, such as are scattered here and there on the other shelves. They almost induce one to believe that Lutherans write—or did write nothing but pamphlets, and having now largely given that up, have not yet begun writing books. How much interesting history, how much valuable material is scattered through these occasional productions. They are all catalogued, but, alas! the

catalogue is in yonder case, and it should be in the hands of the Lutheran pastors!

What are these unbound pamphlets filling five shelves, and why have they not been considered worthy of a more durable dress than the original paper? Those, the curator will tell you, are duplicates, and—you may have what you need from that lot—their space is more valuable than their presence here.

Here at least we have come to a gratifying sign, proof positive that printers are not all non-Lutherans, nor authors either. The table is filled to overflowing; new books, you see—some of them, and some old enough to have been here twenty years ago.

At last we are approaching the end of our journey through this little room. We have passed by a few things. Back in the closet we left a number of photographs and larger pictures of ministers and churches; now we are passing by several albums filled with similar pictures, and with older cuts of the Reformers and their companions, etc.,—a collection which would fill a book-lover with fearful thoughts of the mutilated volumes from which the title pages and frontispieces have been clipped. We also pass by that collection of books on Luther and the Reformation; not because it has no claim upon us or has offended us by the numerous and conflicting reports it contains of Luther and his work, but because it merits, and will doubtless receive special attention.

Last then we meet the record of the Church's history, not this time in letters or lectures or books on various subjects, but in that mirror of church life—the church paper. A tolerably complete file of the *Lutheran Observer*, the *Lutheran and Missionary*, the *Workman*, the *Luth. Zeitschrift*, and a number more, the names of which may be read in Dr. Hay's printed catalogue. These can be appreciated only by him who has examined them, and noted the articles from famous pens which fill their columns.

Having now passed through the Historical Library, have we not noticed one great lack? Books in abundance, unworked mines of the richest ore—but where is the librarian, to make the most of this storehouse,—to make its treasures accessible?

Would not that be a life-work for some one—especially since the Lutheran Church nowhere has a librarian in this country, and having no librarian, has no accessible library? But this is merely a short sermon after a long text; I hope it may be pardonable.

ARTICLE VIII.

CURRENT THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

I.

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

BY PROF. DAVID H. BAUSLIN, D. D.

In the study of comparative religion the racial equation is always strong and widely different. Among no people is this racial factor more prominent in their religious thought and life than among the peoples of India. It is a gloomy religion marked by strong distinctions based upon blood and inherited prejudices; which teaches that men transmigrate through countless bodies, that the bondage to birth and death is due to ignorance and maintained by works whether good or bad, and in which life is viewed as a calamity, and personal existence as exposure to successive cycles of conscious miseries under multitudinous forms. Its hidden recesses may be gloomy and forbidding, but the study of a religion is full of interest when the grand problem is how to attain the final beatitude, which is the loss of conscious personality; a religion in which good works and bad, virtue and vice are, because of their consequences, undesirable, and hinder by creating merit or demerit, the final emancipation of the soul. The study of a religion, too, must have some attendant profit as well as admonition, in which virtue needs to be rewarded, and when its reward is exhausted, birth into another form is necessary, and so new virtues can only prolong the miserable cycle of births and deaths, in which vice needs to be punished and when its demerit is exhausted

birth must again happen, and more vice leads to births *ad infinitum*.

The characteristics of a great world religion, only a glimpse of whose numerous teachings has thus been hinted at, add much interest to the leading article in the current issue of the *Contemporary Review*, by that competent student of comparative religion, Dr. A. M. Fairbairn. He gives us an elaborate study on "Race and Religion in India," in which he points out the fundamental differences between the Eastern and Western mind and the extreme difficulties in the way of the one understanding the other. The Hindu mind as contrasted with the occidental mind, thinks Principal Fairbairn, is a metaphysical mind and is accustomed to use mythology as its thought form. He says, "We can understand a mythological as an historical age, as an early period in literature, or as a stage in human development out of which man passes; what we cannot so easily understand is the continuance of this stage into a highly rational or speculative period. But this is precisely what we have in India."

Another fact which makes it so difficult for the East and West to come closer together is the indifference of the Hindu mind to history and the inaptitude for criticism which it conjoins with its unwearied literary activity. Dr. Fairbairn gives some illustrations from his own experience in India, whither he had gone as the "Haskell lecturer," of this "want of the historical spirit, the feeling for reality which is the mother of all genuine criticism." He recounts a conversation with a learned Pundit on the Vedas, in which all his own suggestions as to the development noticeable in the vedic literature, the differences between its earlier and later contents, were met by the constantly repeated formula that the Veda was eternal, and that what was eternal, did not admit of the successions of time. The Western mind can only stand astonished and helpless in the presence of such an attitude of persistent stolidity. It is, however, on the question of personality that the East is at farthest remove from the West. Dr. F. again says, "Where Europe and India differ absolutely is as to the mode in which the infinite being is concerned to realize himself in time. The transmigration of the

soul is the native and invincible faith of India; but it is an impossible belief in Europe. * * * In the dawn of Greek speculation it appears, as a simple and childlike guess, which died with the growing maturity of thought, or as a borrowed belief which the native mind refused to assimilate; in Plato it takes a form singularly illusive and imaginative, floating like a cloud on the edge of his thought, without ever penetrating it or obtaining a solid place within it. * * * But the idea holds the Hindu in an iron grasp, which neither the lapse of time nor the change of religion can loosen."

A notable passage in this fine article also gives a Hindu appreciation of the notion of transubstantiation as taught by Romanists: "We," said the Hindu, "have nothing so gross in our religion as you have in yours. We make an image or a symbol of our god, but we never confound either with the god it speaks of. But you, you take a piece of bread and a cup of wine, you mutter over them a prayer, and they straightway become the flesh and blood of your God, which you offer up in sacrifice and then consume. In all Hinduism you will find no idolatry so gross as this."

In India our writer finds the most bewildering and multitudinous polytheism that man has ever known, justified by a pantheistic monism so absolute that a monotheistic religion as vigorous as Islam looks like a pale pluralism by its side. His portrayal of the contradictions of this religion, the supplanting of which constitutes, one of the most difficult and interesting of modern missionary problems, is worthy of being reproduced for our readers at more length than our space permits. We cannot, however, forbear to transcribe the following, "There is an authority more infallible and coercive than that of Rome; but there is no dogma which defines it, no person who embodies it, no legislature or magistracy which enforces it. There is a religion which is in its worship sensuous and idolatrous, unmoral and sacerdotal in a degree without parallel; yet the men it esteems most holy are men who have despised the most sacred acts and observances of the worship. It is a religion without church or creed, so open that it may say, 'Nothing that is nat-

ural to man is alien to me,' and so elastic that it may add, 'Every religious belief or custom man has had or yet has I can comprehend'; but it is so closed and exclusive as to boast the most inflexible sacerdotal system, and the most inviolable social order which time has ever realized. Within it the most bestial practices and the most ideal speculations live side by side in mutual toleration, the practices untroubled by reproach, the speculation untouched by disgust. The religion has no moral law and attempts no moral discipline; but it has erected and sealed, by sanctions which it will allow no man to break, distinctions of classes and laws regulative of man's relations to woman and woman's to man that involve the very gravest moral principles and issues. And the religion which is thus a mass of anomalies to us is no anomaly to the Hindu. He and it have so grown up together that it is a perfect mirror of his history, the complete reflex of his mind. We feel its contradictions, but he does not. The speculative monism and the practical polytheism neither offend nor perplex his intellect as they do ours; the rigor of caste regulations and the want of both moral authority and power in the religion do not strike him as the incongruous and inconsistent things they seem to us. Yet we confess that he is a man as subtle and sane in intellect as we are, with a reason quick to detect absurdities, and able to exercise a keenly critical dialectic."

The London *Church Quarterly Review* presents an elaborate review of a recently published history of the popes, by Dr. Louis Pastor, of the university of Innsbruck, which we should judge from the finely written review to be a most elaborate and exhaustive work. From the review we learn that Dr. Pastor finds in the excessive individualism fostered by the pagan Renaissance the primary cause of the evil development of that widely important movement. To the humility, the self-renunciation, the mortification of Christianity, it opposed the egotism, the pride, the ambition, the vanity, the personality of pagan antiquity. In this, it is held, lies the explanation of its strange

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combination of classical and artistic culture which was united to shameless wickedness, perfidious craftiness, and the most absolute contempt for morality. Earthly grandeur, sensual enjoyment, and a burning thirst for the immortality of fame, to be obtained through the accomplishment of something great and memorable, were the ideals at which it aimed. To appear large in the eyes of their cotemporaries and of posterity, to be invested with great importance and to have their names on men's lips, to be conspicuous and pre eminent, if only for detestability, in this world, for they believed in no other; such according to this recent standard history, were the motives and the principles which avowedly and without a tinge of compunction animated the pagan Renaissance. We quote the *Church Review's* portrayal, as based upon Dr. Pastor's history:

"The preachers of the day inveigh in the most direct and impassioned language against the unbridled licentiousness, the luxury which spreads like leprosy, and which no sumptuary laws can check; the passion for gambling, in which whole fortunes are dissipated and children are-beggared; the usury, by which not only Jews but Christians grind down their poorer brethren, in violation of the edicts of Holy Church; the iniquities of the theatre and of slavery openly practiced; the indecency which taints the poetry and other literature in growing circulation. All the vices of two civilizations seem to be stalking abroad unabashed; and if their prevalence is exaggerated, and the main body of the Italian people were untouched by these evils; if a determined effort was made by the religious orders to promote social reforms and the foundation of *Monts-de-piété* provided invaluable help against too frequent oppression, it is yet unquestionably true that nothing was too monstrous or too bizarre for the Humanists, and it was they who occupied the most conspicuous places at that epoch in the Italian States. How largely vice in every form—and some of its phases were unspeakable in their enormity—was enthroned in high places is amply illustrated in the pages of Machiavelli, Ariosto, and such classical scholars as Pulci and Poliziano and Pontano; in the fact that many ruling Italian princes were of illegitimate birth; in the

contempt in which human life was held, and the friend of yesterday was assassinated to serve the convenience of to-day. A strange medley of Christianity and Paganism was substituted for Catholic orthodoxy. Superstition and belief in astrology supplanted faith in the gospel of Christ, and the depravation of morals, already scandalously notorious in convent and cloister, among the ranks of the clergy and Sacred College of the Cardinals, reached its zenith when, in the person of Alexander VI., the incarnation of the pagan Renaissance was seated on the throne of the chief of the Apostles."

Two of the most important indices of theological thought in Great Britain and America are to be found in two recent publications, viz: Vol. 2, of the Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, and Prof. Brigg's "*General Introduction to the Study of Holy Scripture*." In the Dictionary we should say that the most valuable and reliable, from the orthodox and evangelical standpoints, are the theological articles which have been prepared, many of them with great care and elaboration, while the least reliable, and indeed most dangerous articles are those on critical questions. Among the most important articles on Biblical Theology are such as Forgiveness, Gehenna, Glory, Gnosticism, God, Grace, Hades, Heaven, Hell, Hinnom, Holiness, Holy Spirit, Hosanna, Immanuel, Incarnation, Inheritance, Jesus Christ, Justification, Kingdom of God, and Foreknowledge. The omission of Inspiration from this list is explained by the fact that Dr. Hastings, who writes under this head, refers to the article Bible in the first volume, for the doctrine of the inspiration of the Bible, though he observes here that the Revised Version rendering of I. Timothy follows the oldest English renderings. The eschatological articles on such subjects as Hades, Heaven and Hell, furnish a comprehensive examination of the Scriptures and of the rabbinical teachings. They teach that there is no probation after death. The article on God is composite, being written by Professors Davidson and Sanday. There is a decisive assertion of the truth that in the Old Testament "God is fully personal from the first," and the recognition that Matthew Arnold's theory

about "a power not ourselves making for righteousness," is dispelled by the facts. The treatment of God in the New Testament is very comprehensive, beginning with tendencies toward monism, transcendence, and particularist limitations in the contemporary Judaism in the time of our Lord. The main object of the article is to show what new elements are added, and what old elements are specially developed or emphasized in the New Testament.

When we pass to Christological articles we find that the longest, and in many respects, the most important article is that on Jesus Christ, by Prof. Sanday. It is so voluminous that it would make a good sized volume, and the writer has realized what Hooker said about the Incarnation and the Sacraments,—that "in other things we may be more brief, but the weight of these requireth largeness." The chief objection to the article is that it contains too many suspended judgments upon so vital a subject in all correct religious thinking and life. We should not pronounce it such an article as would establish faith and quicken men's belief in Jesus as the world's Redeemer. Dr. Sanday's judgment, p. 653, too, that "no one has ever touched the gospels with so much innate kinship of spirit" as Newman, may be questioned.

The important article on the Incarnation is written by Mr. Ottley, a strong writer. It contains many passages that are admirable and some which do not satisfy. His language is sometimes ambiguous, and that not infrequently at a crucial point of his subject. He comes finally to the conclusion that "Jesus of Nazareth was not only the expected Messiah of Prophecy, but in a unique, absolute sense, divine; God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God"

The article on the Holy Spirit by Dr. Swete, Regius Professor of Divinity, Cambridge, is full, the author proceeding through the whole Bible in his examination. He investigates the work of the Spirit in creation, intellectual life, prophetic inspiration, anointing the Messiah, and the moral and the religious life of men. The article is an excellent one and may be profitably

read, and with it Professor Stewart's article on Grace, and Dr. Simon's on Justification.

Turning from questions of Biblical theology, we have a great variety on antiquities and biography, on geography and archæology. Important articles on antiquity and biography are those on the Flood, Food, Genealogy, Herod, Hittites, Idolatry, Incense, Grace, Israel, Jacob, John the Apostle, John the Baptist, and Judas Iscariot. If one is looking for some of the advanced views of the "Higher Critics," or what is better, the "Destructive Critics," he can find them in the article on the Flood, by F. H. Woods, Theological Lecturer of St. John's College, Oxford, and in that on Genesis, by Canon Ryle. The first of these articles is written upon the assumption that "it is a fact admitting of no reasonable doubt, that the account of Genesis is really composed of two flood stories, one of which belongs to the early source of the Hexateuch known as J., the other to the post-exilic P." The writer endeavors to establish a four-fold argument against the historicity of the flood. His logic is highly rationalistic. His article dwells much on stories or legends alleged to have been found in folk-lore and early literature of all peoples, and has the cock-sureness about it, so characteristic of the critics.

The article on Genesis is a careful piece of work, done in popular style, and takes it for granted that modern critical theories are the only ones any longer allowable, the writer hardly even taking the trouble to allude to works of learned writers on the other side.

These articles afford samples of the new critical methods recognized, especially in articles on Old Testament subjects, in the new dictionary. The scholarship that does not accept the post-exilic priest-codex theory, seem to have no standing. The writings of the Old Testament are reconstructed on a negative basis, the text, as we believe, being uniformly parcelled out into its supposed literary sources. Our feeling is, that on this class of subjects this great work is one-sided in that it seems to be dominated entirely by ingenious literary theories. Even the critics themselves are not in accord in their hypotheses, as for example in the article on Isaiah, Dr. George Adam Smith

sharply calls Dr. Cheyne and others to account for too great concessions to destructive rationalism, in the discovery of glosses in the text. It is but fair to say that the New Testament articles are likely to appeal to a wider circle of readers, and with more success, the writers of the Tuebingen type, on that class of subjects, not only having been repulsed but long since driven from the field.

The *Introduction* of Dr. Briggs contains a vast amount of detail, and embodies the well known critical views and methods of that industrious, but very erratic scholar. One characteristic feature of the book is the manifest pleasure that the author takes in posing as a martyr to the truth, apparently at least, classifying himself with Galileo and nearly every profound thinker since the day of Socrates, who has been obliged to pause in his work and defend himself, like the apostle Paul, against these "days" and "evil workers" whom, a few sentences later, he describes as "the theological bourbons who never learn anything from past defeats." This is not temperate and scholarly speech. Dr. Briggs should, at least, remember that he has not yet finished his course, and is not yet canonized, as some to whom he compares himself. He is yet among the spirits being tried now—not so much by ecclesiastical courts, as by the canons of sound criticism, and the law and the testimony as apprehended by a sound and scholarly Christian judgment of such men as William Henry Green, Howard Osgood and others. Dr. Briggs should not grow impatient and place himself among the martyrs because his revolutionary views are vigorously challenged, and because the "spiritual intuitions, the conscience and the reason" of Rev. Dr. Briggs, an Episcopalian priest, and an erstwhile Presbyterian minister, do not always commend themselves to a sober and well-balanced spiritual intellect. In view of anything like a wide induction into the facts of history, it is as one has expressed it, the "altitudinous immensity of egotism" for any man, however gifted and learned, to suppose that his theory is the only one to be selected by posterity as embodying the very truth.

Dr. Briggs is especially severe on what he calls "speech, har-

dened into dogmatic terms." His book is full of erudition, but is pre-eminently deficient in sound judgment, the place of which is supplied by the very thing he denounces in others as dogmatism, assertions which the reader is expected to accept on the bare statement. If any dogmatic assertiveness can surpass his manner of speaking of the "Higher Criticism" as "exact and thorough in its methods," and of the theory that "Moses did not write the Pentateuch," and that "Isaiah did not write half the book that bears his name," and of the sure results of his views as being accepted by all genuine critics the world over, then we are not acquainted with that sort of assertiveness. Professor Briggs betrays all through his book strong confidence in himself and his associates, and an equally strong tone of contempt for all who differ from him. But he should not be surprised because his judgment is not looked upon as infallible when he employs methods of criticism and interpretation on the Old Testament, which, if applied to some chapters in the gospels would dissolve the Incarnation entirely; and because, for example, men can not agree with him in regarding the first chapter of Genesis as unhistorical to criticism *because it is poetry*, and the second chapter of Luke as historical to criticism *because it is poetry*.

The system employed in this *Introduction* leaves Christianity in grave doubt on an important subject, viz: Whether the inspired Bible is only that of the original writers, or whether additions and changes and corrections made by redactors and emendators are also inspired. It is an awkward position, to say the least, into which Professor Briggs forces men, upon the gravest of all subjects, on p. 317 of his book, when he says: "The only question of integrity with which inspiration has to do is the integrity of the canon, whether the interpolations, the separate parts, the writings as a whole, are real and necessary parts of the system of divine revelation—whether they contain the divine word. *This can never be determined by the Higher Criticism.*"

This is a matter of great importance, for according to Prof. Briggs and company, it is the function of the Higher Criticism

to disintegrate the sacred scriptures into their alleged sources and component parts, and then coolly to decline all sort of responsibility for the work of reconstruction upon the simple ground of incompetency. Tradition is good, bad, and indifferent, and it is some compensation to have a critic of Dr. Briggs' temper announcing the inability of his science to tackle any sort of a critical task; but we submit that the traditional view can do better than the above indicates. His book also indicates, as we have pointed out in the case of the *Dictionary* above, that the critics are not at one by any means among themselves; for on p. 287, the author scores Dr. Harper, of the Chicago Baptist University, for not coming out more openly as a Higher Critic. We could cite passage after passage to show the certitude with which the author speaks, as for example on pp. 322, 327 and 565. About it all there is a positiveness of statement and a confident assurance and sort of *ex-cathedra* utterance to which as a scientific work Professor Briggs' *Introduction* is not entitled. We are led to the conclusion that the "microscope of criticism," of which he speaks, is even more likely to distort facts than are the "spectacles of tradition," to which he sneeringly alludes.

One of the most specious and delusive systems of religious thought ever articulated is represented in this country. It is known abroad from its most distinguished representative as Ritschlianism, and is participated in we believe, to some extent at least, in this country, by many who know but little or nothing of Albrecht Ritschl. It is a system of religious thinking that disavows definition altogether and desires to substitute for it mere feeling. It has been shown by such strenuous conservatives as Frank, Drickhoff, and Luthardt, that the theory of this vague theological school makes the questions what God, Christ, and the resurrection are in themselves, a matter of indifference, and only attaches any importance to our own judgment of their worth to ourselves. One of the best, and even most luminous examples of this specious system, we find in the leading article in the July number of the "*American Journal of Theology*," by

Professor Freidrich Loofs, of the University of Halle, the title of which is "*Has the Gospel of the Reformation Become Antiquated?*" "What is the gospel of the Reformation?" asks the Professor, and true to the *tenet* of his school regarding definition, he says further, "Among evangelical Christians this ought to be an entirely superfluous question." But he soon finds himself under the necessity of making definitions and accordingly proceeds to say what he means by the gospel of the Reformation. Manifestly it is a gospel that would not be recognized by the reformers who at the first rescued the real gospel from the perversions and corruptions of the papacy. The author of this article prefaces his definition of Reformation theology by an attempt at rescuing Luther from some merely incidental beliefs and methods of interpretation. This is his language: "Now the following is beyond all doubt, beyond all need of proof: (1) That many of Luther's representations of the life, the person, and the work of Christ have their origin entirely in the fact that Luther accepted as indisputable everything that is narrated by the Holy Scripture, and, furthermore, that he interpreted the Scriptures according to the standard of mediæval traditions which he had retained; (2) That this valuation of the Scriptures as the *verbaliter* inspired word of God, and certainly his acceptance of erroneous mediæval traditions concerning Scripture interpretation, do not stand in any constant inner connection with his central thought. Everything therefore in his Christological representations, which originates solely in this valuation of the Scriptures, either directly, or inasmuch as the then prevailing interpretation of Scripture seemed to support many old theological traditions, indirectly, I regard as the temporary garb of the gospel of the Reformation. But to this does not belong his conviction that in the Holy Scripture we hear the word of God addressed to man, and that his Holy Spirit generates faith in us through the word; nor does it include his estimation of Christ's death as the act performed for our salvation; nor his belief in the resurrection of Christ; nor yet his view of Christ as the *deus revelatus*. For in Luther these four elements stand in such con-

stant and inner connection with the *promissio remissionis peccatorum* that each one of the thoughts—"the word shall they have unassailed," "Given for you," "Christ is risen," "God revealed in Christ," became for him on more than one occasion a distinguishing mark of the gospel."

Proceeding from this effort at delivering Luther from the thralldom of his sturdy misconceptions, Professor Looft goes on to define: "The gospel of the Reformation is the message of God to our humanity, offering us justification only through faith in Jesus Christ the Saviour, in whom the eternal God has revealed himself to the world in the *life of a human person*, by whose death and resurrection he has redeemed us from sin and death." Much of this sounds well, and is like unto the speech of the Evangelical Canaan. But Prof. Looft proceeds at once to supplement the above definition with this comment, "In the name of Scripture authority the demand is made that we include in the conception of the gospel (a) the 'born of the Virgin Mary,' (b) the ascension as a distinct event, separated from the resurrection by a period of forty days; (c) our redemption 'out of the power of the devil.' No doubt Luther included all these in the glad tidings of Christ. Is it, nevertheless, possible with sincerity to espouse the cause of the gospel of the Reformation without including in it these three elements? Most assuredly. It is not only justifiable, but also a two-fold duty, not to confuse the conception of the gospel with these three things." This disciple of Ritschl proceeds further to give a four-fold reason why the gospel of the Reformation, as interpreted by Luther and others, is foreign, not to say offensive to the present age. He gives the reasons thus: "The first is the dependent relationship of man to God, presupposed by the gospel of the Reformation, or rather to speak more accurately, by the reformers, the second, the fundamental stress which it lays on the remission of sins; the third, the conditioning of this remission upon the death of Christ; and the fourth, the supernaturalistic interpretation of history by the reformers, especially with reference to the person of Christ." We have presented, at some length, these views, that readers of the QUARTERLY may know something of how

this representation of a widely current article of religious thought tries to join together what God has put asunder, viz : evangelical phraseology and a specious and delusive alien interpretation.

The writer concludes with what he regards as the religious necessity of the times : "An honest, whole-souled, out-and-out fight for the gospel of the Reformation, [of course as interpreted by Prof. Loofs & Co.,] and an equally determined fight AGAINST all obsolete tradition and dogma. *This* standard I believe would carry success with it in the modern world, such as no other watchword, whether traditionalistic or liberal, could hope for."

The latest issue of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, contains an article by the Rev. Thomas Chalmers, a congregational pastor, strongly confirmatory of the Lutheran position on the subject of the indoctrination of the youth in the use of the catechetical methods. The title of Mr. Chalmer's article is "*The Catechumenate ; its Achievements.*" A few extracts will give his estimate of the utility of the method he advocates on the ground that some other methods of religious work have been weighed in the balance and found wanting : "It is the method that, at all earnest times in the moral history of the race, the Church has relied upon with greatest success, and with a keen sense that the moral evils of our day are great enough to call for the most humble and earnest searching of means by which they may be stayed. We have been led to an old method as a practical plan for social regeneration."

Speaking of the use of the method in Scotland, Mr. Chalmers says : "The invigorating effect of this one hundred years of campaign on the intellectual character of the people may be understood by King James' slur at Hampton court conference, when he said that 'in Scotland every son of a good woman thought himself competent to write a catechism.' "

"In our advocacy of a restoration of the systematic catechumenate, we are often met by the objection that it is aping the Roman Catholics. As a matter of historic fact, it seems hardly necessary to state that the restoration of the catechetical method

in the Roman Catholic Church follows the rise of Jesuitism, and was a shrewd application of lessons learned from the Protestant enemies, and was the mightiest means by which ground lost by the Roman Catholics was regained by them."

On the neglect of this method the writer says: "We firmly believe that for the neglect of this definite pastoral catechumenate, there are souls this hour being dragged to ruin and the grave. A weeping, sin-stricken civilization is weighing us in the balance; the day of summing up is approaching, and the thieves and harlots will be our judges."

Dr. Augustus H. Strong, President of the Rochester Theological Seminary, has for years made a study of *The Great Poets and Their Theology*. He has given the results of his studies on that subject under the above title. *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* contains a discriminating study of the subject from which we select some extracts:

"The great poets whose theology Dr. Strong seeks to set forth are Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Goethe, Wordsworth, Browning and Tennyson. He does not maintain that the poets are 'conscious theologians.' In their vocation as seers, however, they have glimpses of truth in theology, as well as in philosophy and physics. From their higher point of view, indeed, they sometimes descry truths which are yet below the horizon of other thinkers. Poetical expressions of these truths are all the more valuable because they are clothed in the language of feeling and appeal to our sense of beauty. 'The great poets, taken together, give united and harmonious testimony to the fundamental conceptions of natural religion, if not to those of the specifically Christian scheme. This testimony is cumulative, and it follows the law of evolution, by advancing from vague to clear. Even poets like Goethe, who proclaim another gospel, witness, in spite of themselves, to the truth as it is in Jesus.'"

As samples of his specific method of dealing with the fascinating subject we may instance Dr. Strong's treatment of Goethe and Wordsworth. Goethe he calls "the poet of Pantheism:"

"He believed only in a God who was identical with nature, who consecrated the lower impulses of man as well as the higher, who could be approached without confession or repentance of sin. His writings affected only an aesthetic, never an ethical, reformation. 'It was a pagan culture which he set himself to tain. He was the 'great heathen' of modern times, and he was not ashamed to be known as such. * * * Goethe had in his heart turned away from the true God, the personal God, the God of holiness, the God who imposes moral law, the God who offers pardon through Christ—and he had put in his place a God of his own wishes and imagination, a God to whom evil and good are both alike, because both alike proceed from him, a God who is best served not by self-restraint and self-sacrifice, but by the unhindered development of all our inborn instincts and powers.' 'Goethe's history shows that he loved darkness rather than light because his deeds were evil.' "

"Wordsworth is treated as 'the poet of nature.' He was 'primarily a seeker after truth.' To him, 'truth was reality; the inner life of things.' 'The world of nature and of man expressed not only thought but feeling, and this thought and feeling was the thought and feeling of a Being greater than the world, because he was the Maker and Life of the world.' "

The *Reformed Church Review*, in its most recent issue, contains a strong editorial on *The Authority of the Heidelberg Catechism*. It contains some timely and wholesome reflections on such subjects as creed subscription, denominational honesty, etc. Of the form of subscription maintained in the Reformed Church it says: "The Reformed Church in the United States unites in the confession of her adherence to the doctrines of the Holy Scriptures as set forth in the Heidelberg Catechism, taking the same in its historical (or original) sense; and declares that any departure from the same is unauthorized by the Church; and renewedly directs all her ministers, editors and teachers of theology faithfully to preach and defend the same." This declaration, adopted in 1881 by the General Synod "as the conclusion of a long period of controversy, may be supposed now to form

a part of the organic law of the Reformed Church in the United States."

In defining the term "*historical or original sense*" the *Review* says: "The historial sense of a book is that in which its author or authors understood it, and which is conditioned by the circumstances, questions and antitheses of the age in which it was produced."

"The existence of denominational divisions in the Church of Christ is itself an evidence of uncompleted development. It is, however, not inconsistent with the idea of Christianity as an advancing order of life, so long as the denominations do not claim their individual peculiarities to be essential to the absolute being of the Church, and deny the quality of Christians to other religious communions. Their peculiarities may be legitimate as distinguishing particular phases of Christianity which are required for its constitution as a whole; and, indeed, it is only as possessing such peculiarities that a Christian body can have a right to separate existence. A denomination that should be just like some other, ought to unite with that other."

"Loyalty to the Catechism demands first of all devotion to its fundamental purpose, and agreement with the answers which it gives to the fundamental questions of the time. No man can be true to the historical sense of the Catechism and adopt the Romish theory of church authority, or of the rule of faith, or the Lutheran theory of the Lord's Supper. Loyalty to the Catechism requires one to be *Reformed* and not Catholic, or Lutheran, or Methodist, however ready he may be to grant that the Catholic and Lutheran and Methodist Churches are true parts of the Church of Christ."

Speaking of Arminianism, in his book entitled *The Church in the Mirror of History*, Dr. Karl Sell, the Reformed author says: "It possesses no psychologically matured certainty of divine grace like Lutheranism or Calvinism." A similar sort of concession seems to be made by a Methodist writer in the "*Methodist Review*," He says, "In its inception Arminianism, unlike Calvinism, was not a thoroughly articulated and scientific sys-

tem of theology, but simply a principle of loyalty to truth leading ultimately to the adoption of a rule of interpretation in dealing with the great facts of history, providence, and the human soul—with the constitution and principles of God's moral government over men, with the truths of revelation, and with man's relation to God and to the work of redemption—demanded alike by the character and purpose of God, by the general tenor and scope of sacred Scripture, and by the intuitions of the reason and the conscience."

II.

GERMAN.

BY REV. S. GRING HEFELBOWER, A. M.

Prof. Meinhold begins a review of recent literature on the Old Testament with a *quasi* acknowledgement that the charge that there is a counter-movement in Old Testament criticism has adequate foundation. Even the address of Fries before the Stockholm conference shows this, in spite of statements that it contains to the effect that the Wellhausen theory, that the priest-codex did not come into existence until after the time of Ezekiel, cannot be overthrown. Fries claims, however, that many of the points in this theory are regarded by the critics of to-day as very doubtful. Gimbel showed in 1895 that in order to come to a proper understanding of the Old Testament more must be gotten from a study of the comparative history of religion. In the same year Winkler emphasized the need of a more thorough knowledge of general history, and finally Fries himself and Hoonacker came forward with the claim that the Old Testament commandment knew nothing of an absolute centralization of cult, although it actually occurred. This showed that the Ariadne's thread of Wellhausen's method was misleading. And, after briefly reviewing the works of Buhl, Koenig, Cornill, and Kamphausen, Fries concludes that even the critics on Wellhausen's side are more and more inclined to regard the patriarchs as historical personalities. Meinhold criticizes Fries very severely, denying unconditionally his and Hoonacker's claim that there was no commandment concerning the centralization of

cult. Meinhold also minimizes the study of the history of religion and of general history, because we know so little about it. Petrie's Menephtah finds and the Tell-Amarna tablets really prove nothing. The inscription of Pharaoh to which Fries attaches great importance is quite unreliable, as Wiedemann has already proven. "We learn from it merely that there was an Israel, nothing more." Several other works on Old Testament subjects are reviewed, all of which receive the same condemnation. In speaking of "*Lex Mosaica*," which has recently appeared in German, he recognizes Sayce's scholarship, but adds that he gives such free rein to his imagination that his conclusions are unscientific and untrustworthy, just as is the case with Hommel.

Under the title "Was Israel ever in Egypt and how did it pass into Canaan?" F. Schiele gives a short and remarkable recension of Old Testament history, which may be considered quite characteristic of the extreme students in this field. There was a stay in Egypt, but not of Israel for it did not yet exist. The Leah stems, *i. e.*, Reuben, Simeon, Levi, Judah, Issachar and Zebulun, were in the pasture lands of Goshen that belonged to Egypt. Their condition in a settled mode of life soon became unbearable to them, for they were really nomads. The Levite Moses eventually freed them, after first having made some vain attempts. In the house of a Midianite or of a Semitic Jahve priest, he went over to Jahve and his oracle, with which neither he nor his people were acquainted before. Jahve was probably the league god of a confederation of states. In his name Moses prophesied to his companions freedom and inheritance in the land of Canaan. The effort to gain freedom was successful. Thus Jahve became a god of history, and the Israelitish religion the immediate preliminary step of Christianity. In the conquest of the land of Canaan, successful on all sides at first, but at length disastrous in the west, Simeon and Levi were swept away, but the southern part remained under the Hebrews. In the middle and north the young stem of Joseph, which at first settled the mountains of Ephraim, soon became a powerful tribe. Here also appeared the name Israel, which was combined with

the Canaanitish clan heroes. Joseph's migration was remembered and was eventually claimed by all Israel. Levi, through his defeat on the one hand and through his knowledge of the customs and cult of Jahve worship on the other, became the chief bearer and preserver of the legends of the stay in Egypt. "Is it then to be wondered at that the Levites fused their historical remembrance of the stay of their tribe and companions in Egypt with the legends of all Israel?" It is refreshing to know that even Meinhold raises some serious questions concerning some of these strange assertions.

Karl Mueller, the talented and popular Reformed professor of Erlangen, published a little volume of addresses which show him to be a rather extreme representative of his Church. Yet he turns down the old protestant doctrine of predestination, refusing to draw its logical consequence of rejection by God, and teaches with the Formula of Concord election and the universality of grace, which, though inconsequent, is in most excellent agreement with the standpoint of faith. Throughout the book the relation between election and the certainty of salvation by faith is established with energy and clearness.

It is now generally acknowledged that the last quarter of a century has marked a great change in the treatment of the history of dogma, and the initiative in making this change is attributed by almost all students in this field to the liberal school. A. Hegler, apparently a disciple of Harnack, in the "*Theologische Rundschau*" of March, 1899, speaks on this subject somewhat as follows:

The present work in this field is characterized by the receding of the speculative historio-philosophical element, caused, (a) by the thorough investigation of sources which lead to new questions and new points of view, and (b) by the greater emphasis placed upon historical relations which supplant the old idea of the inner necessary movement of dogma by explaining it from the concrete circumstances of its genesis and formulation.

Thus the individual conditionality of a doctrine receives much greater emphasis than it had in that history which was written under the influence of Hegel. The wonderful completeness which the speculative method gave us is lost, but the variation is greater, the problems of the science are studied more, and in many places the real relation of things become plainer. In a word, the science receives a more historical character. When the abstract elements recede the unity of the whole process is nevertheless preserved, because dogma at every step of its development appears as the expression of a well defined conception of Christianity, the tenacity of which depends chiefly upon the constancy of the fundamental religious conceptions. The necessity of the course of development is not overlooked by this method, but is regarded less logically and more historically. A uniform norm is found in the primitive Christian doctrine of salvation conceived of in the sense in which the Reformation embraced it, yet in such a way that an attempt is made to free it from the metaphysical relations in which the Reformation possessed it. The conclusions of our new theology and philosophy concerning the relation of religion and science, the peculiarity of religious knowledge, etc., help to determine this norm and to direct its use. It was Adolf Harnack's great work that opened these new paths to the history of dogma, and gave it a cast that differed greatly both from the conceptions of Baur and from the presentations that came from a stricter or more mediating orthodoxy. He found his general premises for the most part, in Albrecht Ritschl's dogmatics, but used them in such a free way that on the one hand the old liberals found a basis for common work and on the other his history of dogma greatly influenced the conservatives. Seeberg's "Text-book of the History of Doctrine," shows this influence in many things, such as the arrangement, general conception, and even style. As in the writings of Harnack and Loofs the attention paid to the more philosophical elements is decidedly less than that devoted to the all important doctrine of salvation.

During recent years considerable attention has been paid to methodology, as is shown by the pamphlets of Krueger, of 1895,

and Stange of last year. Harnack, in the new edition of his history, (chiefly in the preface), treats the subject, as does Loofs in his article under this head, in the new edition of the *Realencyklopaedie*. Seeberg and Loofs distinguish between history of dogma and history of theology, to which Stange objects.

Zahn's introduction to the New Testament has been before the theological world long enough to have made a well-defined first impression. The work, especially the second volume, which treats of the four Gospels, Acts, Heb., I. and II. Peter, I. II. and III. John, Jude and Revelation, had been awaited with much interest by all parties. And judging from the various criticisms that it has received from all sides, it seems to be about what was expected as to method and results, and fully what was expected in point of learning. No criticism, however severe, that has thus far come to hand, professes to reflect upon the breadth and thoroughness of his scholarship. All agree in placing him first among the conservatives in the field of primitive Christian literature, and some insist that he does not stand second to any man in all Germany. One reviewer in arguing for this latter estimate notes the fact that he and his great opponent, Adolf Harnack, in their recent works are much nearer each other in chronology than they were, which nearness is wholly due to Harnack's approaching Zahn. The "*Theologischer Literaturbericht*" mentions Zahn as "the greatest German student of patristics," and says that his work was produced by the "incomparable knowledge of sources, the penetrative acumen, the fine psychological understanding, and the talent of presentation of the master." Professor Haussleiter, of Greifswald, says that in many important respects it surpasses any work of its kind that has ever been written. Another reviewer writes: "Should the author's name not lead one to expect that his work would be of such importance that scholars in this field would have to reckon with it for years, or perhaps decades? A glance at the immense amount of new material will convince him at once." On the other hand the reviews from men of the liberal school are just as severe as these are complimentary. They agree that in

breadth of learning and penetrative acumen Zahn is about first, (though some who acknowledge this at one place in their reviews deny it at others,) but they invariably add that the work is vitiated by his having used his scholarly attainments in the interest of preconceived opinions. With one accord they condemn him of having paid too much attention to tradition. Professor Schnerer, of Goettinger, says: "It was his guiding star." Professor Johannes Weiss, of Marburg, acknowledges that he had a finely, almost exquisitely, developed historical taste, but adds that it was developed all in one direction. He also recognizes his keen penetration in the field of tradition, but claims that there was also present "an obtuseness of vision and sense for those things that speak against tradition, so that we can note only with painful pity the inharmonious flaw that mars the unity of this great and learned character." Very few of this school have hesitated to call him a master of early Christian tradition, but they also claim that, to a certain extent, he was its slave as well. Schnerer asserts that his investigation of the text always bows to tradition and that he frequently forces a text till he gets from it that which he wants. Nevertheless all his opponents, whose reviews have thus far come to hand, readily acknowledge that there is much to be learned from his work.

His conclusions as to the chronology of the New Testament are briefly as follows: Christ crucified, probably 30 A. D.; conversion of Paul 35; epistle of James about 50; Paul's epistles, Galatians, I. and II. Thessalonians in this order in 53; I. Cor., spring of 57; II. Cor., Fall of same year; Romans from Greece, 58; Ephesians, Colossians, Philemon and II. Peter, 62; in this same year Matthew wrote his Gospel in Aramaic in Palestine; Philippians, 63; I. Peter, 64; Mark's Gospel, probably begun in Rome in this year, but not published until 67; I. Timothy and Titus, 65; II. Timothy, 66; Epistle of Jude, 75; St. Luke's Gospel and Acts by Luke, and Letter to the Hebrews, about 85; the Gospel and epistles of John, between 80 and 90; and Revelation about 95.

Zahn gives us the entire New Testament as genuine with the general epistle of James, written by James the brother of our

Lord, and the epistle to the Hebrews, written perhaps by Barnabas, but more likely by Apollos, as Luther thought.

The theory of the composite authorship of the pastoral epistles (Harnack, Juelicher,) he dismisses with the remark that such theories are not accepted by anybody save their authors, and merit our attention only for the keenness and painstaking shown in their invention. All of the so-called Johanine writings are undoubtedly from the Apostle. Zahn identifies the Presbyter and the Apostle referred to in a passage from Papias quoted and interpreted just the opposite by Eusebius. Harnack ascribes the gospel to John the Presbyter, who had things reported to him by John the apostle, and asserts that Revelation is from the same author. It is curious to note that Zahn does not refer the "Logos" of John I., 1, to the pre-existent Christ, but rather to his earthly condition. Luthardt does the same. According to Zahn, chapter XXI. was not written by John, but by some one else during his life and with his approval.

[There will be more in a later issue concerning the synoptic and Johanine question and concerning Acts.]

ARTICLE X.

REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

A System of Ethics. By Friedrich Paulsen, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Berlin. Edited and translated by Frank Thilly, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Missouri. Royal, 8vo. Pp. 723. \$3 00.

Let me say at once concerning this work of Professor Paulsen's that it is the most stimulating and attractive book of Ethics that it has been my happy fortune to read. In the first place, it has none of the cut and dried flavor of the average text book and it avoids, on the other hand, the diffuse and discursive method of many scholastic volumes by German writers. I have hard work, indeed, in believing that in either material or style it is the work of a professor, and a German professor at that. This book of Ethics was written out of doors, but it sprang from the heart, through the intellect of a man of wide culture. How much of its charming language-form is due to the fine literary touch of Prof.

Thilly I am unable to guess, but the sanity of spirit and the breath of philosophy that is brought to bear by the author, upon the principles and problems of ethical study are the real illuminating and creative forces of the book. I am devoutly glad that the science of conduct has been made so attractive by the combined labor of Professors Paulsen and Thilly.

The original work is divided into four books. The first outlines the historical development of the conceptions of life and moral philosophy from the time of the Greeks down to the present, and is one of the most fascinating surveys of the subject ever written. The second examines the fundamental questions of theoretical ethics. The third, which is full of practical wisdom, applies the principles of Book II to our daily conduct and defines the different virtues and duties. The fourth is sociological and political in its nature, and deals with the "Forms of Social Life." This last section has not yet been published in English but we urge both Prof. Thilly and the publishers to add it to future editions of the work, despite its present bulk, for, after all, the application of ethical law to social and industrial organizations is *the* problem of modern ethics. Its elemental principles were settled by the Greeks—especially Plato and Aristotle.

Professor Paulsen in his preface to the second edition thus defines the ground principle of his system, "Let me here briefly outline the conception towards which the thought of the age seems to be tending; I call it the *teleological* view. It is limited and defined by a double antithesis. On the one side by *hedonistic utilitarianism*, which teaches that pleasure is the thing of absolute worth, to which virtue and morality are related as means. In opposition to this, teleological ethics contends that not feeling of pleasure, but the objective content of life itself, which is experienced with pleasure, is the thing of worth. Pleasure is the form in which the subject becomes immediately aware of the object and its value. *Intuitionistic formalism* is the other antithesis. This regards the observance of a system of *a priori* rules, of the moral laws, as the thing of absolute worth. In opposition to this, teleological ethics contends that the thing of absolute worth is not the observance of the moral laws, but the substance which is embraced in these formulæ—the human historical life which fills the outline with an infinite wealth of manifold concrete forms; that the moral laws exist for the sake of life, not life for the sake of the moral laws."

Professor Paulsen denotes his point of view as "teleological energism." On page 223 of Book I he says, "The first question, as our historical review has shown, gives rise to two theories, the *teleological* and the *yo malistic*. The former explains the difference between good and bad by the effects which modes of conduct and acts of will naturally produce upon the life of the agent and his surroundings. Acts are called good when they tend to preserve and promote human welfare; bad, when they tend to disturb and destroy it. Formalistic ethics, on

the other hand, claims that the concepts good and bad, taken in their moral sense, designate an absolute quality of will, without any regard to the effects of acts or modes of conduct; that this quality can not be further explained, but must be accepted as a fact. "That will is good," says Kant, "which is determined by respect of duty; that will is bad which is determined by the opposite." I am an advocate of the teleological view.

The second question: What is the end of all willing? has also given rise to different answers, which may be reduced to two fundamental forms: the *hedonistic* and the *energistic*. The former asserts that the will is universally, and invariably bent upon pleasure, (or avoidance of pain), and, hence, that pleasure is the highest absolute good, which is not desired for the sake of anything else. The energistic view, on the other hand, holds. The will does not aim at pleasure, but at an *objective content of life*, or since life consists solely of action, at definite concrete activities." Theologically phrased Professor Paulsen is perfectly willing to adopt the dictum and theistic implication in Christ's words. "I am come that ye might have *life* and that ye might have it in abundance."

If space permitted, I would like to review in extenso each part and chapter of this masterful book—in some instances I should assume the impertinent role of dissenter. I might as well mention the two most grievous differences I hold against the author. In the historical section, despite an apologetic note, I can not accept his interpretation of "The Christian conception of life." He makes it a too ascetic and watery affair, a thing of mere world denial (*Welt überwindung*). He knows that such a presentation seems to emasculate our conception of early Christianity, but his reply is go back to the gospels and early Church and you will find Tolstoi nearer right than Hase.

The second disagreement I have with Professor Paulsen is that his Christian abutments are selected solely from what I must call the ethico-theistic material of scripture, and ignores, in some instances denies, what I would consider legitimate historical and dogmatic reinforcement of his noble thought structure.

Prof. Paulsen is not a tyro attempting to build up a system of ethics without metaphysics or religion. He is theistic, not agnostic, idealistic, not materialistic. His chapter on pessimism is the sanest and most lucid explanation and condemnation that I have ever read. I am sorry poor Schopenhauer could not have sat beneath the teaching of this sunny, healthful analyst of life. Literature, history, and philosophy are combined in exquisite proportion all through Paulsen's theodicy.

I fancy it is in his chapter on "Duty and Conscience" that his ideas will cause some shock to the traditionally trained pupil. The effect of the doctrine of evolution is clearly at work in this chapter. It is because it is so clearly and frankly applied to the genesis of the moral sense that we intuitionists and "conscience the direct voice of God"

party hold our breath as the Professor traces the biological background, and advances through social experience toward the human sense of duty and the "categorical imperative." Lest I misrepresent this carefully written chapter I will not attempt to state my difference in my limited space. But I must save Professor Paulsen from a possible misunderstanding by any reader who will not accept my advice to procure and digest the book. He does not make duty and conscience the product of simply the brutal and tribal experiences of the past. Compliance with beneficent custom is tremendously emphasized but it is because the natural is permeated with the divine. Let him summarize for himself: "The form, however, is universally the same: a knowledge of a higher will [parental, communal, cosmic] by which the individual will feels itself internally bound. This higher will is, in the last analysis, universally regarded as the will of a superhuman, of a divine power."

"In 'Egoism and Altruism' he shows how inseparable these two are in a genuinely fruitful life. Seemingly antagonistic they are united in the higher harmony.

"In Virtue and Happiness," one feels how inextricably one is linked to the other and we hold on to virtue though it brings us to the cross. His discussion of "The Freedom of the Will" is, on the whole, satisfactory to our earlier ideas of personal initiative and responsibility, though the idea of "metaphysical" freedom is gravely questioned.

But for the third book, *Doctrine of Virtues and Duties*, we have unstinted praise. The chapters on *Self Control*, *The Bodily Life*, *The Economic Life*, with its lenient squint towards the political control of many private industries, and a graded income tax; the fine chapters on *Spiritual Life and Culture*, and the wonderful grasp of the affectional life revealed in *Compassion and Benevolence*, together with the strong sections on *Justice*, *Veracity* and *Love of Neighbor* make this book worthy of a yearly reading.

Personally I wish to express my profound gratitude for the moral uplift I owe to Professors Paulsen and Thilly.

E. H. DELK.

PERIODICALS.

The *Atlantic Monthly* for October presents a collection of contributions of brilliancy and scholarship. The first article, by President Eliot, of Harvard, on Recent Changes in Secondary Education, is a conservative and encouraging estimate of the subject. A carefully considered paper on the United States and Rome, by H. D. Sedgwick, Jr., is well worth study. President Benjamin Ide Wheeler, whose current contributions to the *Century* on Alexander the Great, have won him such well deserved praise, contributes an article on Language as Interpreter of Life. In addition to these we note, The Works of George Meredith, by Paul Elmer More; Letting in the Light, by Jacob A. Reis. The Road to England, by Thomas Wentworth Higginson; The Louisiana Expansion in its World Aspect, by Charles M. Harvey; The Flaw in our Democracy, by J. N. Larned. In fiction Miss Johnson's serial, To Have and to Hold, gains increasing interest with each chapter and bids fair to gain for this novelist even more applause than her popular Prisoners of Hope. In shorter stories we find P'tit Jean, by Mrs. Prince; Through Old Rose Glasses, by Miss Earle. These, together with some numbers we have not mentioned, will sustain the position this journal holds as the magazine of the literary aristocracy.

